The Palestine Liberation Organization Chooses its Path: The P.L.O. Between the October War and Camp David, 1973-1978. By: Alex Zambito

Following the 1973 October War between Egypt/Syria and Israel, political conditions around the Palestinian national struggle changed dramatically. The decision by both Egypt and Syria to pursue a political instead of military solution and encourage the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to do the same, exacerbated already simmering tensions within the PLO between “Moderates” who wished to pursue a political settlement and “Rejectionists” who insisted on the primacy of armed struggle. This internal conflict would be decided in the favor of the “moderates” as the PLO began its long trek to a political settlement inaugurated by the 1993 Oslo Accords.

On October 6, 1973- the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur- Egypt and Syria launched offensives against Israel with Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula and Syrian troops entering the Golan Heights- lands occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War in 1967.[1] These offensives initially met with great success as Egyptian troops and tanks shattered the costly fortifications of the Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal and Syrian forces made significant advances into the Golan Heights.[2] However, an Israeli counter offensive and U.S. airlift allowed the Israeli army to push Syrian forces out of the Golan Heights and break through Egyptian lines to cross the Suez Canal.[3] The War ended on October 25 when an American-Soviet brokered ceasefire resolution (Resolution 340) was passed by the United Nations Security Council.[4]

Despite the war only lasting nineteen days its political fallout was significant. The myth of Israeli military invincibility was shattered by the early military successes of the Egyptian and Syrian armies.[5] With these successes the Arab armies also regained some of the prestige they had lost after their humiliating defeat in 1967.[6]  Most importantly, the war broke Arab-Israeli negotiations out of the state of limbo (“No War, No Peace”) in which their respective Soviet and American patrons had placed them since the end of the Egyptian/Israeli War of Attrition in 1970.[7]  As historian Craig Daigle has demonstrated, Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, sought to pursue a “limited war” which would force the renewal of negotiations for a final settlement on the Palestine issue and increase Arab leverage in those negotiations.[8] Following the war, both the Egyptian and Syrian governments pursued a political settlement for Palestinian national aspirations and began to pressure the PLO to do the same.[9]    

For the PLO, the war changed political conditions drastically. Having regained the political initiative, the Arab states now pushed for a political settlement, which, prior to the war, the PLO had always officially rejected insisting on the sanctity of armed struggle.[10] This change in the regional political situation exacerbated disagreements which had been simmering in the PLO prior to the war. On one side were “moderates” who were willing to pursue a political settlement to their national aspirations and accept a Palestinian state on part of Palestine. On the other were “rejectionists” who refused participation in any political settlement and insisted on the creation of a single, secular state on all Palestinian territory.[11] However, even prior to the war the PLO had begun making overtures indicating its willingness to participate in a political settlement. In 1969, PLO President Yasser Arafat approved the opening of a “back channel” to Washington between his security chief, Ali Hassan Salameh, and CIA field agent, Robert Ames.[12] Through this channel, which operated until Ames’s death in 1983, Arafat’s party, Fatah, provided security for U.S. diplomats in Lebanon and shared intelligence on threats to American interests.[13] Further, in July 1973 Arafat sought to open a direct political channel with Washington which was rebuffed.[14]

Following the war, the Arab states sought to encourage this trajectory and marginalize “rejectionist” groups. In November 1973, all countries at the Algiers Summit of the Arab League, except for Jordan, voted to recognize the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people.[15] This was reaffirmed by a unanimous vote at the Rabat Summit the following year.[16] However, conservative Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia predicated this recognition on the suppression of radical elements within the PLO.[17] Additionally, the declaration from the Algiers summit removed any reference to the sanctity of “armed struggle” or the “Indivisibility of Palestine” which had previously been mandatory.[18] This strategy was summed up in a written statement by the Egyptians delivered to the Israeli government via the United States explaining their decision to recognize the PLO at the Rabat summit, claiming, “The Egyptian Government was forced to pursue this tactic to win over the PLO so that no change would take place in the stands of the moderate sides in favor of the extremists within the PLO.”[19]  

This path was further encouraged in November 1974 when the U.N. General Assembly recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people and granted the organization observer status.[20] These recognitions were significant, not only for raising the PLO’s status, but, also, for raising its status relative to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.[21] Since Jordan had a majority Palestinian population and had occupied the West Bank up until 1967, King Hussein insisted his kingdom was the legitimate representative of Palestinians.[22] This position was encouraged by Israel and the United States who wished to isolate the PLO and come to a permanent settlement with the pro-west kingdom.[23] The Arab States’ decision to back the PLO in this dispute was inspired by the PLO’s agreement to join military operations during the October War, while Jordan refused any major participation fearing consequences from its U.S. ally.[24]  

The PLO took a further step towards accepting a settlement at the twelfth Palestinian National Council. This was the council to release the ten-point-program which would call for the creation of a “people's national, independent, and fighting authority on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated.”[25] The PLO characterized this as a “transitionary” state from which the PLO would carry out its struggle for the final liberation of all of Palestine[26]. As Fuad Faris stated in an article arguing in favor of this position, “from a revolutionary point of view, a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza can only be proposed as a transitional destabilizing factor, planned as an anti-Zionist and anti-Hashemite entity by necessity.”[27] Despite these protestations of continued revolutionary zeal, this resolution was the first time the PLO had publicly endorsed the possibility of accepting a Palestinian state on part of Palestinian territory. “Rejectionist” groups correctly claimed this was a step towards accepting a political settlement and a “mini-state”.[28] Protesting this trajectory, the PFLP withdrew from the PLO executive committee in September of 1974.[29] However, this did not change the PLO’s trajectory as the fifteen-point program released by the thirteenth PNC in 1977 explicitly called for the creation of a Palestinian state and removed any mention of “total liberation”.[30]

This pivot to “moderation” was stimulated by diplomatic gains but also political and military setbacks, particularly the growing division between Egypt and Syria. These troubles began with the ending of the war, as Syrian President, Hafez al-Asad, was caught off guard by Egypt’s acceptance of a cease-fire on October 22.[31] Asad’s intentions in the war were to capture the Golan Heights militarily and inflict as much damage on Israel as possible.[32] Sadat’s intentions of a limited war to catalyze a political settlement left Syrian forces to face the superior Israeli military on its own and led Asad to accept the cease-fire.[33] These divisions were intensified by subsequent disagreements over how to best pursue a political settlement. Cracks in unity began to appear at the December 1973 Geneva Conference, which Egypt attended but Syria rejected.[34] A significant factor in these disagreements were the attitudes of the respective governments to the United States; Whereas Asad doubted the value of a U.S. role, Sadat believed Washington was an essential partner.[35]
​
Following the October War, U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, pursued a “step-by-step” strategy towards a political settlement. This meant that Israel- and its U.S. benefactor- would negotiate agreements with each of the Arab governments individually, with Palestinian participation determined at the end.[36] Ultimately, Kissinger aimed to isolate and weaken the PLO before bringing them into negotiations.[37] Sadat was amenable to this strategy and demonstrated it by signing the Sinai I and II disengagement agreements with Israel in 1974 and 1975, respectively.[38] The latter of these agreements called for the withdrawal of troops in the Sinai, created a U.N buffer zone, and stated that future conflicts between the two countries “shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.”[39] While the Syrians signed their own disengagement agreement with Israel in 1974, it was much more modest and inadequate as a formal peace agreement.[40] The Syrian positions accepted the idea of a political settlement but insisted on maintaining a united Arab position in collective negotiations using recognition of Israel and the threat of war as bargaining chips.[41] Additionally, the Syrians insisted on a role for their own benefactor- the USSR- in a political settlement, something Sadat, who had just removed Egypt from Soviet camp, was willing to do without.[42]

While the Sinai agreements did not fully remove Egypt from the military situation, the easing of tensions between Egypt and Israel removed military pressure from Israel allowing it to focus on other enemies. As PLO Executive Committee Member, Zuhayr Mohsen, predicted, "Israel is going to use all its weight in order to threaten the Syrians.”[43] Facing the specter of an almost certain military defeat, Syria found itself facing a situation of “half war, half peace”, where the Syrians sought to undermine any final peace agreement, while simultaneously avoid provoking Israel into a war.[44] Thus, Syria sought to curb Palestinian guerilla activity. So, while the Sinai agreements pushed the PLO closer to Syria, it also ratcheted up tensions between the two as Syria attempted to exert control over the PLO’s activity.

This dynamic played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War which roped in both the PLO and Syria. Following the expulsion of the Palestinian resistance from Jordan after “Black September” in 1970, the main base of operations for Palestinian guerillas was in Lebanon, which generated hostility from groups who feared the PLO’s radicalizing influence and confrontation with Israel.[45] In 1975 recurring clashes between Lebanese militia groups led to the eruption of an all-out civil war pitting Palestinian and Lebanese “leftists”- primarily composed of Muslim groups calling for a secular state and the restructuring of its wealth and power- against “rightists”- consisting mainly of Lebanese Maronite groups seeking to maintain Maronite dominance.[46] Similar to its relationship with the PLO, Syria hoped to command Lebanese politics, particularly its foreign policy. Not only did the Syrians hope to keep Lebanon within its united Arab bloc for future negotiations with Israel, but due to its shared borders with both Syria and Israel, Syria had a vested interest Lebanon’s domestic situation.[47] With Lebanon’s already weak state, the Syrians feared a further deterioration in the country could provoke an Israeli military intervention from where Israel could outflank Syria’s defenses in the Golan Heights.[48]   

In the initial months of the conflict, the Syrians provided weapons and diplomatic assistance to the leftists while also trying to restrain them and curb the fighting.[49] But, as the situation continued to deteriorate towards the end of 1975, Syria began to threaten a direct military intervention.[50] When rightist groups ignored this warning and began an offensive aimed at partitioning the country and creating a Maronite state, the Syrians sent in forces from both the Palestinian Liberation Army and Al-Saiqa (a Syrian dominated Palestinian political party) to impose a cease-fire.[51] Additionally, the Syrians put forth a peace plan which would concede some of the reforms the leftists called for and strengthen the central authority.[52] As for the Palestinians, they would no longer interfere in internal Lebanese politics and the Maronites would allow them to remain in the country.[53] However, the leftists rejected these proposals causing Asad to cut off military support in March 1976.[54] Subsequently, the leftists went on the offensive foiling any Syrian peace plan and by April, Maronite forces were in danger of being destroyed.[55]
​
This was something Damascus wished to avoid. Not only did the Syrians fear that a leftist victory would only come at great cost, they also were not too excited at the prospect of a radical, “rejectionist” Lebanon which may seek to sabotage Syria’s settlement strategy and drag Syria into another war with Israel.[56] Syria’s attempts to restrain its allies began with modest military incursions across the border, building to a larger offensive in June 1976 meant to intimidate the leftists.[57] When Syrian forces met strong resistance from its allies, Damascus resolved to reprimand them, supporting a Maronite war of attrition followed by an offensive against the leftists deep into Lebanon in the Fall of 1976.[58] Having thoroughly chastised his former allies, Asad accepted Arab mediation bringing the conflict to a temporary close.[59]

While all of this was occurring, matters continued to deteriorate within the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank. In the years following the Six-Day War Israel expanded its settlements on Arab territory, building approximately one-hundred settlements beyond the green line by 1977.[60] By this time Israel had expended over $400 million on settlements and had populated them with over 8,000 settlers.[61] This erosion of Arab territory was significant because it changed the facts on the ground and increased Israel’s leverage in any future negotiations. As Israeli Minister, Yisrael Galili, put it, “I am convinced that what we have accomplished from the Six Day War until now constitutes an extremely significant reality from a political, security and national point of view. The settlements constitute a deployment of extreme value that expands the infrastructure of the State of Israel and offers a dimension of entrenchment and firmness. We have seen this even within the framework of disengagement of forces agreements: as happened in the Golan Heights, the existence of the settlements was very valuable. This is especially true when the question involves a framework of negotiations for permanent peace. No settlement was established on the assumption that we would abandon it.”[62] This official program of settlement was accompanied by campaigns from right-wing expansionist groups, such as Gush Emunim for accelerated settlement, particularly in Samaria- the northern section of the west bank.[63] This activity was often condoned or sometimes supported by the Israeli government. For instance, in 1976 Israeli Defense Minister, Shimon Peres, conveyed “hope that a majority will be found in the government which would support the right of the settlers to remain where they are.”[64]

These expansionist policies engendered significant resistance within the occupied territories. In August 1973, the Palestinian National Front (PNF) emerged to coordinate national and democratic activities within the West Bank and immediately recognized the PLO.[65] The PNF was a union of various underground national and progressive groups, with some allied to existing guerilla groups.[66] An increase in political and guerilla activity led the Israeli occupation forces and Jordan to institute draconian security measures. All Palestinian Arabs were subject to administrative arrest for “security reasons” and could be held indefinitely.[67] In one instance, 12 Palestinian youths were arrested for allegedly being involved with the PNF.[68] In the early months of 1976, mass demonstrations broke out in major towns and villages of the west bank, triggered by continued expansion of Israeli settlements. To maintain order military authorities dispatched paratroopers, killing at least three people.[69] Additionally, protests erupted when a group of Israelis held Jewish services at the Haram- site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and one of the holiest places in Islam- leading to brutal police suppression.[70]

These events not only indicated a growing level of resistance within the occupied territories but also their growing political significance. The PNF attended the Palestine National Council in 1974 marking the first time an organized voice from the West Bank had been represented at the conference.[71] This was significant because of the political priorities of the occupied territories. Dealing directly with the effects of occupation, Palestinians in the occupied territories were the most insistent on curbing Israeli settlements and the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian authority.[72] Further, Palestinians in the West Bank were adamantly opposed to the Hashemite Kingdom and the possibility of a re-occupation by Jordan.[73] With this, they feared that the U.S. and Israel may attempt a final settlement with Jordan, circumventing any participation by the PLO. As one member of the PNF put it, “There is something brewing, but the war in Lebanon and the uprisings in the West Bank are happening because we don't want to be part of the Jordanian kingdom again. We want self- determination, to have our own state. We don't want to be occupied.”[74]

Even with all this, the possibility of a collective peace agreement including the PLO was not off the table. After Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, he indicated his willingness to include the PLO at a second Geneva conference, even calling for a “Palestinian homeland”.[75] Carter sent overtures that Washington would open direct talks with the PLO if they would unequivocally recognize Israel with the acceptance of UN Resolution 242, which the PLO had historically opposed due to its ignoring Palestinian national rights.[76] However, with Israeli and American refusal to recognize the PLO and no promise they would actually have a state at the end of the process, the PLO Central Council voted down the proposal.[77] As for Israel, not only did the new Likud government not want them at a peace conference, they viewed recognition of the PLO as a threat to the future of Israel, particularly in the West Bank. As Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin stated, “Agreement to negotiate with the terrorists means accepting in advance that we are discussing an Arab country... We must remember that they are claiming ownership over Judea and Samaria. When we talk about negotiations with Jordan, we have a clear position that Jordan has no legitimate position in Judea and Samaria... If we agree to discuss with the PLO this is tantamount to recognition. Recognition of the PLO means forfeiting negotiations in advance, not to mention the distastefulness of the very contact with the PLO, which is nothing more than a gang of murderers.”[78] As an alternative to negotiations with the PLO, the Israeli government developed a plan whereby administrative autonomy would be given to Palestinians, but the land would remain under Israeli sovereignty with Israel in charge of security.[79]

​Facing Israeli intransigence and domestic outrage over his call for a Palestinian homeland, Carter abandoned efforts to bring Palestinians into a peace conference and endorsed the Israeli plan.[80] With Sadat’s surprise visit to Jerusalem, the U.S. renewed a modified version of its step-by-step plan beginning with a separate peace with Egypt, followed by separate Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian peace agreements.[81] This initiative launched by Sadat’s visit would culminate in the Camp David Accords, which would bring the Palestinian resistance to a crossroads: whether to continue down their path to a political settlement or try to reinvigorate the military option.

The Camp David Accords which were signed on September 17, 1978 by the United States, Israel, and Egypt. The accords were a pair of agreements. One established a separate peace between Israel and Egypt and the other created a formula for a final resolution to the Palestinian national question.[82] The latter framework called for the establishment of a “self-governing” Palestinian authority, the powers of which were to be determined Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.[83] This authority would operate for a transitional period of five years, with negotiations between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to decide the final status of the occupied territories convening about halfway through this period.[84] The framework included that Palestinians may be allowed representation in the Egyptian and Jordanian delegations. However, this representation was not mandatory, and any Palestinian appointments would be subject to a decision by their respective governments.[85]

Political fallout from the accords was swift, with most Arab governments condemning the Sadat’s initiative.[86] Facing political isolation, Sadat claimed the accords were not actually a separate peace. As the newspaper, the Jewish Week, sarcastically explained it, the agreement “looks like a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace, feels like a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace, and smells like a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace, but is not a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace.”[87] In November 1978 at the Arab summit in Baghdad, Arab heads of state condemned the accords and placed sanctions on Egypt.[88] This division had profound political and military effects on the PLO. Politically, the accords removed a possible partner for the PLO making them increasingly dependent on Syria. Previously, the PLO had been able to play on the rivalry between Syria and Egypt for leadership in the Arab world to their own advantage, but this was no longer an option after the accords.[89] This also led to the further deterioration of the military situation for the PLO. With the Egyptians fully out of the conflict, conventional war with Israel was off the table. Additionally, while the accords made the PLO more dependent on Syria, the relationship between the two continued to be strained due to the latter’s intervention in Lebanon and its continued attempts to control the Palestinian resistance.[90] This meant all the states sharing a border with Israel- Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria- had a vested interest in restraining Palestinian guerilla activity. And, with the Palestinian resistance facing further pressure in Lebanon, the military options for the PLO were becoming increasingly narrow. Finally, with the Egyptian military threat removed, Israel was free to expand and fortify settlements in occupied territories, further eroding Palestine’s potential land.[91]

Another urgent development for the PLO was the inclusion of Jordan as a representative for Palestinians in the future negotiations over the occupied territory. The PLO feared a future settlement where they were excluded from participation in the autonomous authority promised under the accords. Hani Al-Hassan, political advisor to Yasser Arafat, described the accords as an attempt “to liquidate the Palestinians politically” proclaiming, “they have separated Egypt from the Arab world, and they are trying to separate the PLO from the Palestinian people.”[92] Further, the growing political importance of the occupied territories and their distaste for a settlement with Jordan pressured the PLO to halt any progress towards implementing the Camp David framework.[93]  

These conditions arising from the Camp David Accords led to the solidification of the moderate turn the PLO had taken since the end of the October War. Despite the return of rejectionist groups such as the PFLP, the PLO did not backtrack on any of its previous decisions and would go even further in the following years.[94] The narrowing of its military options along with pressure from Arab governments pushed the PLO down the road to a political settlement. Further, with the increasing harassment it was receiving in Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance feared the possibility of losing its main base of operations, hastening its pursuit of an independent land base. This was made even more urgent by the continued expansion of Israeli settlements and the possibility of Jordan being reintroduced as a representative of the Palestinian people. Combine this with the rising political importance of occupied territories and their demands for some form of autonomy, and the stage was set for the PLO’s path Oslo.

While much of Camp David framework never came to fruition, many of the PLO’s fears were realized in the coming years. Theories that the withdrawal of Egypt would free up Israel to focus on the PLO came true when Israel intervened in Lebanon leading to the PLO’s expulsion in 1982 and their move to Tunisia.[95] With little military alternative, the PLO continued concessions towards a political settlement culminating in its acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242 and its recognition of Israel in December of 1988.[96] Given the pressures facing the PLO it is difficult to tell if an alternative strategy would have ended in better results. However, it does appear that many “rejectionist” criticisms of a political settlement have proven accurate. Almost thirty years on from Oslo the situation has deteriorated for Palestinians in many ways, with violence continuing and being increasingly concentrated on them. Thus, for better or worse, the Camp David Accords have had a profound impact on the history of the Palestinian liberation movement by increasing the pressure on the PLO to pursue this policy of “moderation”. After almost fifty years, this decision is still controversial with many considering it “capitulation” rather than “pragmatism”. With Palestinians continuing to face oppression, violence, and occupation the history of these decisions become even more important for informing the path forward to a just solution.

Works Cited

[1] Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 74.

[2] Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 295.

[3] Ibid, 306-310

[4] Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 125

[5] Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.

[6] Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 328.

[7] Sameer Abraham, “The PLO at the Crossroads: Moderation, Encirclement, Future Prospects,“ MERIP Reports, no. 80 (September 1979): 5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011621

[8] Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).

[9] “Arab States Intensify Squeeze on PLO,” MERIP Reports, no. 55 (March 1977): 24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010833

[10] Yassin El-Ayouty, “The Palestinians and the Fourth Arab-Israeli War,” Current History 66, no. 390 (February 1974): 74-75, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45313005

[11] Muhammad Y. Muslih, “Moderates and Rejectionists Within the Palestine Liberation Organization,” Middle East Journal 30, no. 2 (Spring 1976): 127-140, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4325481.

[12]Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid

[15] Shaul Bartal, “Yom Kippur War Influence at the PLO Recognition and the Palestinian Problem,” History Research 5, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 255, doi: 10.17265/2159-550X/2015.04.005

[16] Ibid, 262

[17] MERIP Staff, “Open Door in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports no. 31 (October 1974): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010893.

[18] Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.

[19] “Egypt and the Palestinians: Behind the Recognition of the P.L.O.,” MERIP Reports, no. 30 (November, 1974): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011739

​[20] “The United Nations and the Palestinian Struggle,” MERIP Reports, no. 43 (December 1975): 19-20, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011088

[21] Shaul Bartal, “Yom Kippur War Influence at the PLO Recognition and the Palestinian Problem,” History Research 5, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 262- 265, doi: 10.17265/2159-550X/2015.04.005.

[22] Ibid

[23] Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.

[24] Shaul Bartal, “Yom Kippur War Influence at the PLO Recognition and the Palestinian Problem,” History Research 5, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 262- 265, doi: 10.17265/2159-550X/2015.04.005.

[25] Muhamma Muslih, “Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council”, Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 17-18, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537386

[26] Qais Salim, “Resistance and National Self-Determination in Palestine,” MERIP Reports, no. 28 (May 1974): 8-9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011292

[27] Fuad Faris, “A Palestinian State? (Notes on the Palestinian Situation After the October War,” MERIP Reports, no. 33 (December 1974): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30114333

[28] Qais Salim, “Resistance and National Self-Determination in Palestine,” MERIP Reports, no. 28 (May 1974): 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011292.

[29] MERIP Staff, “Open Door in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports no. 31 (October 1974): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010893

[30] Ibrahim Abu Lughod, “PNC Maps out Palestinian Strategy,” MERIP Reports, no. 57 (May 1977): 10-13, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011556

[31] Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 336.

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 154
​
[35] Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid

[38] Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 335-336

[39] “The Sinai Agreement, 1975,” Current History 70, Iss. 000412 (January 1976): 32,

[40] Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 338

[41] A. I. Dawisha, “Syria and the Sadat Initiative,” The World Today 34, no. 5 (May 1978): 196, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395050

[42] Ibid, 197-198

[43] “Reactions to the Sinai Agreement,” MERIP Reports, no. 41 (October 1975): 21, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693719

[44] Sameer Abraham, “The PLO at the Crossroads: Moderation, Encirclement, Future Prospects,“ MERIP Reports, no. 80 (September 1979): 12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011621

[45] MERIP Staff, “Why Syria Invaded Lebanon,” MERIP Reports, no. 51 (October 1976): 12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010905.

[46] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians,” Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857807

[47] Ibid, 3-4.

[48] Ibid

​[49] Ibid, 4-5

[50] Ibid, 5

[51] Ibid

[52] MERIP Staff, “Why Syria Invaded Lebanon,” MERIP Reports, no. 51 (October 1976): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010905

[53] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians,” Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857807.

[54] Ibid

[55] MERIP Staff, “Why Syria Invaded Lebanon,” MERIP Reports, no. 51 (October 1976): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010905

[56] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians,” Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 5-6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857807.

[57] Ibid, 6-7

[58] Ibid

[59] Ibid

​[60] “Israeli Settlement Policy,” MERIP Reports, no. 59 (August 1977): 22, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011700

[61] Ibid

[62] Ibid

[63] MERIP Staff, “Open Door in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports no. 31 (October 1974): 14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010893.

[64] “Palestinian Resistance Threatens Israeli Occupation,” MERIP Reports no. 46 (April 1976): 18, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010899

​[65] MERIP Staff, “Open Door in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports no. 31 (October 1974): 7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010893.

[66] Ibid

[67] Ibid, 10

[68] Ibid

[69] “Palestinian Resistance Threatens Israeli Occupation,” MERIP Reports no. 46 (April 1976): 18, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010899.

[70] Ibid, 18-19

​[71] MERIP Staff, “Open Door in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports no. 31 (October 1974): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010893.

[72] Ibid, 10-11

[73] Ibid

[74] Abdul Aziz Hajj Ahmad, “Interview with the Palestine National Front,” MERIP Reports, no. 50 (August 1976): 21, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010885

​[75] Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.re

[76] Ibid

[77] “PLO Rejects U.S. Attempt to Finesse Question of Participation in Peace Talks,” MERIP Reports, no. 60 (September 1977): 23, 26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011550.

[78] Ibid

[79] Daigle, Craig, “The Loser of the Camp David Accords,” Washington Post, September 19, 2018,https://www-proquest-com.ez-proxy.brooklyn.cuny.edu/docview/2109949209/9379DA7FCA5D4596PQ/17?accountid=7286

[80] Ibid

[81] Khaled Elgindi, Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), ch. 3.

[82] Joel Benin, “The Cold Peace,” MERIP Reports, no. 129 (January 1985): 3-4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011855

[83] Fayaz A. Sayegh, “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestinian Problem,” Journal of Palestine Studies 8, no. 2 (Winter 1979): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536507.

[84] Ibid

[85] Ibid

[86] “Baghdad Summit: ‘The Palestinian Question is the Essence of the Conflict,’" MERIP Reports, no. 73 (December 1978): 22-23, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012266

[87] Fayaz A. Sayegh, “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestinian Problem,” Journal of Palestine Studies 8, no. 2 (Winter 1979): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536507.cro

[88] Sameer Abraham, “The PLO at the Crossroads: Moderation, Encirclement, Future Prospects,“ MERIP Reports, no. 80 (September 1979): 12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011621

[89] MERIP Staff, “Why Syria Invaded Lebanon,” MERIP Reports, no. 51 (October 1976): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010905.

[90] Sameer Abraham, “The PLO at the Crossroads: Moderation, Encirclement, Future Prospects,“ MERIP Reports, no. 80 (September 1979): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011621.

[91] Ibid, 12-13

[92] Hani al-Hassan, “PLO on Camp David: ‘The Plan is to Liquidate the Palestinians Politically,’" MERIP Reports, no. 72 (November 1978): 12-13, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011096.

[93] “Declaration of the Mayors and Leaders of the West Bank and Gaza,” MERIP Reports, no. 72 (November 1978): 15, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011098.mu​

[94] Muhammad Muslih, “Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council”, Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 19-20, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537386
​
[95] Joel Benin, “The Cold Peace,” MERIP Reports, no. 129 (January 1985): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011855

[96] Muhammad Muslih, “Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council”, Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537386

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Author

​I'm Alex Zambito. I'm born and raised in Savannah, GA. I graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2017 with a degree in History and Sociology. I am currently seeking a Masters in History  at Brooklyn College. My Interest include the history of Socialist experiments and proletarian struggles across the world.

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