To extend a population’s life expectancy at birth (LEB) requires capabilities that are scarce in the United States. The U.S. LEB has fallen in the recent period, quite abruptly. Meanwhile, life expectancy in China and Cuba continues its long-term rise. To understand why we should explore nations’ varying capabilities to achieve social change and promote social gains.

Medical and sociological causes of death that relate to life expectancy and are specific to the United States will not be explored here. A subsequent report will cover that ground.
​
The U.S. National Center for Health Statistics on Aug. 31 set U.S. LEB for 2021 at 76.1 years, the same figure as in 1996. The decline from 77.0 years in 2020 and from 78.8 in 2019 was the greatest continuous U.S. fall in LEB in 100 years. Life expectancy for men in 2021, 73.2 years, represented an unprecedented male-female gap of almost six years (increased male mortality is routine).

Policies put in place following the two countries’ socialist revolutions led to wide-ranging social initiatives that are protective of all people’s lives and, incidentally, crucial for long life expectancy. Capitalist governments, less oriented to social change, are prone to tolerating gaps in social development.

The two socialist countries pursued particular objectives to achieve social gains. Specifically, they have endeavored to establish working-class political power, promote decent and healthy lives for all working people, eradicate major economic inequalities, and build unity.

Some capitalist countries have also attempted to fulfill a few of these objectives when under left-wing governance, with mixed success. A look at how well they may have succeeded, and at some of the consequences when they have not, may shed light on the failings of capitalist states to support the lives of their people, particularly the U.S.’ failure to sustain a LEB that in 2020 was already lower than that of 53 other countries.

The subject of providing social support is, of course, vast. On that account, the discussion here pays more attention to health care and less to other areas. It draws on the insights of Vicente Navarro, professor of public health and public policy at universities in Baltimore and Barcelona.

As regards working-class political power, Navarro maintains that “countries with strong labor movements, with social democratic and socialist parties…have developed stronger redistribution policies and inequality-reducing measures…. These worker-friendly countries consequently have better health indicators [including LEB] than those countries where labor movements are very weak, as is the case in the United States.”

Navarro blames the lack of universal health care in the United States, unique among industrialized nations, on the lack there of a strong labor movement and/or a labor or socialist party. Political power exerted by the organized working class in industrialized nations may vary, but it almost always exceeds workers’ power in the United States, where statistical markers of health outcome are decidedly less favorable.

The political weakness of the organized workers’ movement in the United States is clear. “The working class,” Navarro writes in 2021, does not appear anywhere in the Cabinet nor the Senate, and only appears in the House with an extremely limited representation of 1.3 percent.” Most “members of these institutions belong to the corporate class, closely followed by upper-middle class.” He condemns the “privatization of the electoral process,” in which “there is no limit to how much money can go to the Democratic or Republican party or their candidates.”

Decent and healthy lives are far from routine in capitalist countries, where poor health is associated with low social-economic status. Navarro reports that, in the United States, the “blue-collar worker has a mortality rate from heart conditions double that of the professional class. Mortality differentials by social class are much larger in the United States than in Western Europe.”

He notes that “top level British civil servants live considerably longer than do lower level ones,” and that “members of the [Spanish] bourgeoisie…live an average of two years longer than the petit bourgeoisie…who live two years longer than the middle class, who live two years longer than the skilled working class, who live two years longer than members of the unskilled working class, who live two years longer than the unskilled [and unemployed] working class.”

Alienation under capitalism exacerbates health problems. According to Navarro, “the distance among social groups and individuals and the lack of social cohesion that this distance creates is bad for people’s health and quality of life.” The social isolation he describes adds to challenges faced by social support systems and detracts from the usefulness of interventions.

Attempts by capitalist countries to remove wealth inequalities, especially in the health care arena, show mixed success. As commercialization of healthcare advances, difficulties mount. As the result of profit-taking in that sector, society-wide inequalities are aggravated, and working people lose equal access to quality care.

And yet some form of public overview of, or support for, health care sectors is more or less routine in the various capitalist countries. In many, public authorities operate and pay for hospitals, nursing homes, staffing, drugs, equipment, and training. But the infiltration of market prerogatives and privatization in the health care systems of richer countries now threatens long established goals of accessible health care for all.

In Europe, austerity campaigns under neoliberal auspices have led to cutbacks in publicly provided care. Privatization inroads blunted the institutional response in Europe to the COVID-19 pandemic. Investor groups have been eyeing the hospital and nursing home sectors as profit-making opportunities. According to the Lancet medical journal, privatization within the British National Health Service contributed to an increase in preventable deaths from all causes between 2013 and 2020.

The United States is the poster child of war in defense of privilege. There are stories, from health care:

In 2020 salary and benefits for William J. Caron, Jr., CEO of MaineHealth, a major care provider in the author’s locality, were $1,992,044; for Richard W. Petersen, Maine Medical Center CEO, they were $1,822,185. A commentator notes that “Hospital CEOs are compensated primarily for the volume of patients that pass through their doors—so-called “heads in beds.” Average annual income for U.S. primary care physicians was $260,000 in 2021; for specialists, $368,000.

According to bain.com, “Medtech companies are among the most profitable in the healthcare industry, with margins averaging 22%…profit pools [will] grow to $72 billion in 2024.” And “HME (home medical equipment) retail companies average 45 percent gross profit margin (GPM).”

Researchers found that between 2000 and 2018, the “median annual gross profit margin” (gross profit is revenue minus costs) of 35 pharmaceutical companies was 39.1% higher than that of 357 non-pharmaceutical companies. The CEOs of three major pharmaceutical companies” increased their wealth by “a total of $90 million” in 2018. As for COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers: “Moderna’s and BioNTech’s 2021 net profit margins reached 66% and 54%, respectively.”

The matter of creating unity to establish socialism and arrange for the common good needs little comment. Unity within society is a near impossibility under capitalism, inasmuch as divisions there are inherent to a world of greed and individualism. Meanwhile, China, opting in favor of life, put on a magnificent display of socialist unity as its people grappled with the pandemic.

The government imposed strong preventative measures and accepted the inevitability of economic disruption and loss. China’s COVID-19 mortality rate is 1.07 deaths per 100,000 persons. Its U.S. counterpart never seemed to choose and, that way protected economic growth. The U.S. COVID-19 mortality rate is 319.59 deaths per 100,000 persons.

It is important, finally, to lay to rest any suggestion that the riches of the United States and other capitalist nations automatically enable them to offer long life expectancies. Individualized entitlement to wealth is basic to how they operate, and that’s a contradiction and an obstacle.

A society aiming to pursue social initiatives that are comprehensive and directed to all population groups equally is a society that has to redistribute wealth. Wealth redistribution is the necessary adjunct to the objectives already discussed. The message here is that capitalist-inspired measures don’t make the grade and that socialist programs, as in Cuba and China, do work and do offer the promise of decent and secure lives to entire populations.
​
As with all op-eds published by People’s World, this article reflects the opinions of its author.

​The following speech was given by Xi Jinping at the 28th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee on November 23, 2015.

Today, we are holding the 28th group study session of the Political Bureau, and our focus is on the basic principles and methodology of Marxist political economy. The aim of this study session is to strengthen our understanding of the basic principles of Marxism. We have previously held sessions on subjects related to historical materialism and dialectical materialism. On this occasion, we will deepen our understanding and grasp of the laws underlying economic development by reviewing Marxist political economy so that we can become more competent and proficient at leading the nation’s economic development.

I would now like to discuss some of my thoughts.

Marxist political economy is an important component of Marxism and required learning for our efforts to uphold and develop Marxism. Marx and Engels carried forward historic achievements made in the field of economics, especially British classical political economy, through a process of critical examination based on the worldview and methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. After intensive study of human economic activities, they founded Marxist political economy, which drew back the curtain on the laws underlying the economic workings of human society and capitalist society in particular. Engels said that the whole theory of a proletarian party was derived from the study of political economy, while Lenin regarded political economy as the most profound, most comprehensive, and most detailed proof and application of Marxist theory. Though there is now a rich diversity of economic theories, our study of political economy must be based on Marxist political economy and not any other economic theory.

There are people who believe Marxist political economy and Das Kapital are obsolete, but this is an arbitrary and erroneous judgment. Setting aside more distant events and looking at just the period since the global financial crisis, we can see that many capitalist countries have remained in an economic slump, with serious unemployment problems, intensifying polarization, and deepening social divides. The facts tell us that the contradictions between the socialization of production and the private possession of the means of production still exist, but they are manifested in ways and show characteristics that are somewhat different. After the global financial crisis, many Western scholars began studying Marxist political economy and Das Kapital again for the purpose of reflecting on the deficiencies of capitalism.

Last year, the book Capital in the Twenty-First Century by French scholar Thomas Piketty aroused broad discussion in international academic circles. Using accurate and abundant data, Piketty shows that levels of inequality are as high or higher than they have ever been in the U.S. and other Western countries. He argues that unconstrained capitalism has aggravated phenomena such as wealth inequality, and that the situation will continue to get worse. His analysis is mainly conducted from the perspective of distribution and does not touch significantly upon more fundamental questions of ownership, but the conclusions he reaches are nonetheless well worth our consideration.

​Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, our Party has integrated the basic principles of Marxist political economy with the practice of reform and opening up, and made constant efforts to enrich and develop Marxist political economy. After the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Reform of the Economic Structure” was passed in October 1984, Deng Xiaoping commented that this represented a “first draft” of political economy that fused the basic principles of Marxism with the practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics. As reform and opening up has constantly pushed deeper in the more than three decades that have passed since then, we have brought about many important theoretical achievements in the Marxist political economy of contemporary China. Some examples are the theory on the essence of socialism; the theory on the basic economic system for the primary stage of socialism; the theory on establishing and implementing the philosophy of innovative, coordinated, green, open, and shared development; the theory on developing the socialist market economy and making the market play the decisive role in resource allocation while ensuring that the government better plays its role; the theory on China’s entrance into a new normal of economic development; the theory on coordinating the processes of new industrialization, digitalization, urbanization, and agricultural modernization; the theory on the nature of ownership rights, contract rights, and usage rights for contracted farmland; the theory on making effective use of domestic and international markets and resources; and the theory on promoting social equity and justice and bringing about common prosperity for everyone. These theoretical achievements were never discussed by the authors of the Marxist classics, and before reform and opening up we had no experience or understanding of the issues with which they are concerned. Instead, they form a body of knowledge about political economy that has been molded by the conditions of contemporary China and the nature of the times. This has not only provided firm guidance for China’s endeavors in economic development, but also opened up new frontiers for Marxist political economy.

In the volatile and unpredictable tide of the world economy today, a major test of our Party is whether or not we can effectively steer the great ship of China’s economy. With an extremely complex economic landscape both at home and abroad and an overwhelming profusion of economic phenomena to contend with, studying the basic principles and methodology of Marxist political economy can help us master sound means of economic analysis, understand the processes through which the economy runs, build a grasp of the laws underlying social and economic development, and become more competent at keeping the socialist market economy on course. This will enable us to address theoretical and practical challenges in our nation’s economic development more effectively.

The purpose of studying Marxist political economy is to better lead China’s economic development. While we must ensure that we uphold its basic principles and methodology, it is even more important that we integrate Marxist political economy with the realities of our nation’s economic development, and constantly strive toward new theoretical achievements in the process.

First, we must uphold a people-centered approach to development. Development is for the people; this is the fundamental position of Marxist political economy. Marx and Engels stated that “the proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority,” and that in future societies, production would be “calculated for the wealth of all.” Deng Xiaoping said that emancipating and developing productive forces and eliminating exploitation and polarization in order to ultimately bring about common prosperity represents the essence of socialism. The Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in October 2015 clearly emphasized the need to uphold a people-centered approach to development, and to make improving the people’s well-being, promoting their all-around development, and pursuing steady progress toward common prosperity the immutable aims of economic development. This is something that we must never lose sight of. When planning economic work, formulating economic policies, and promoting economic development, we must always adhere firmly to this fundamental position.

Sixth, we must uphold the fundamental national policy of opening up. According to Marxist political economy, human society will ultimately witness the transcendence of history from the level of individual nations to the global scale. Today, the degree of our country’s connection with the world is unprecedented, as is our economy’s impact on the world economy and vice versa. With globalization advancing deeper, we could not possibly pursue development by closing ourselves off. Instead, we must be adept at keeping an eye on the landscape both at home and abroad and making good use of domestic and international markets and resources. Conforming to the trend of our economy’s deep integration into the world economy, we must develop a more open economy, actively participate in global economic governance, and push the global economic order in a more just, equitable, cooperative, and mutually beneficial direction. At the same time, we must firmly safeguard our nation’s development interests, forestall risks of all kinds, and ensure our economic security. In carrying out these tasks, there are many theoretical and practical questions that we must explore further.

To conclude, our commitment to upholding the basic principles and methodology of Marxist political economy does not imply rejection of the rational components of the economic theories of other countries. Western economic knowledge on topics such as finance, prices, currency, markets, competition, trade, exchange rates, industries, enterprises, growth, and management do reflect one side of the general laws underpinning socialized production and market economics and should therefore be used as reference. At the same time, however, we must cast a discerning eye on the economic theories of other countries, particularly those of the West, making sure that we separate the wheat from the chaff. Putting our own interests first while using the strengths of others to our advantage, we must ensure that we do not mechanically copy the aspects of these theories that reflect the nature and values of the capitalist system or that are colored by Western ideology. Although the discipline of economics is devoted to the study of economic issues, it does not exist in a vacuum, and therefore cannot be separated from social and political issues. Therefore, when our educators teach economics, they must not advocate the indiscriminate absorption of foreign concepts. They must discuss Marxist political economy and the socialist political economy of contemporary China thoroughly and at length so to prevent their marginalization.

For Marxist political economy to remain vital, it must evolve with the times. Practice is the source of theory. In the space of mere decades, we have completed a process of development that took centuries for developed countries. Behind all our incredible progress and achievements in economic development have been the tremendous momentum, vigor, and potential of theoretical innovation. Today, our economy and the world economy are facing many major new challenges, and these need to be addressed by sound theories. Grounded in China’s national conditions and our experiences in development, we must thoroughly look into new issues and circumstances faced by the domestic and global economies, bringing new patterns and characteristics to light. We must review and refine the achievements we have made in recognizing underlying laws through the process of economic development and elevate our practical experience to the level of systematized economic theories. By doing so, we will constantly open up new frontiers for Marxist political economy in contemporary China and contribute Chinese wisdom to the discipline’s innovation and development.

Originally appeared in Qiushi Journal, Chinese edition, No. 16, 2020.

​The Communist Party of China (CPC) was formed in July 1921. From that time up to the present day, it has led the Chinese Revolution – a revolution to eliminate feudalism, to regain China’s national sovereignty, to end foreign domination of China, to build socialism, to create a better life for the Chinese people, and to contribute to a peaceful and prosperous future for humanity.

Some of these goals have already been achieved; others are ongoing. Thus the Chinese Revolution is a continuing process, and its basic political orientation remains the same.

Feudalism was dismantled in CPC-controlled territories from the early 1930s onwards, and throughout the country in the period immediately following the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Similarly, warlord rule was ended and a unified China essentially established in 1949; Hong Kong was returned to Chinese rule in 1997 and Macao in 1999. Only Taiwan continues to be governed separately and to serve foreign interests. And yet in a world system still principally defined by US hegemony, the imperialist threat remains – and is intensifying with the development of a US-led hybrid war against China. Therefore the project of protecting China’s sovereignty and resisting imperialism continues. Similarly, the path to socialism is constantly evolving.

In the course of trying to build socialism in a vast semi-colonial, semi-feudal country, mistakes have certainly been made. The collected works of Marx and Lenin bubble over with profound ideas, but they contain no templates or formulae. Chinese Marxists have had to continuously engage in “concrete analysis of concrete conditions”,1 applying and developing socialist theory, creatively adapting it to an ever-changing material reality. In their foreword to Agnes Smedley’s biography of Zhu De, The Great Road, Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy wrote that the Chinese communists, “in the midst of their struggle for survival … have proceeded to evolve a more flexible and sophisticated theory which enriched Marxism by reflecting and absorbing the stubborn realities of the Chinese scene.”2

As Liu Shaoqi, a prominent CPC leader until his denunciation during the Cultural Revolution, explained: “because of the distinctive peculiarities in China’s social and historical development and her backwardness in science, it is a unique and difficult task to apply Marxism systematically to China and to transform it from its European form into a Chinese form… Many of these problems have never been solved or raised by the world’s Marxists, for here in China the main section of the masses are not workers but peasants, and the fight is directed against foreign imperialist oppression and medieval survivals, and not against domestic capitalism.”3

This article argues that, while the Chinese Revolution has taken numerous twists and turns, and while the CPC leadership has adopted different strategies at different times, there is a common thread running through modern Chinese history: of the CPC dedicating itself to navigating a path to socialism, development and independence, improving the lot of the Chinese people, and contributing to a peaceful and prosperous future for humanity.

​The CPC was formed in response to a clear need for revolutionary leadership. The 1911 bourgeois revolution that had finally overthrown the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China had come to a dead end, owing to the manoeuvring of the imperialist powers and their comprador agents. Most of the country was run by warlords. The feudal economy remained in place and the bulk of the population remained permanently on the brink of starvation, indebted to landlords. The various imperialist powers maintained their footholds, with Britain, the US, Japan and Germany competing for control of China’s land and resources.

Young people in particular were searching for a path forward. “Youth organisations and study circles sprang up in great profusion”, writes Israel Epstein,4 including the New People’s Study Society in Hunan, led by a certain Mao Zedong. A turning point came on 4 May 1919, when the students of Beijing marched on the government buildings in protest at the Treaty of Versailles, which legalised the Japanese seizure of Shandong province and rejected China’s demands for the abolition of foreign spheres of influence and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The demonstrations caught the imagination of students, workers and radical intellectuals throughout the country. “The May 4 Movement was a climactic point of the Chinese revolution. It took place after, and was one of the results of, the October Revolution in Russia.”5 Han Suyin described the May 4 Movement as “a leap of consciousness, a radicalisation, which would determine the course of history.”6

The CPC, formed two years later, was the first organisation to put forward the slogan ‘Down with imperialism’, recognising that China’s weakness and backwardness were inherently bound up with foreign domination. Some relatively forward-thinking elements of the emerging capitalist class had hoped that the US or Japan might help China to establish itself as a modern capitalist power, but the communists recognised that this reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of imperialism. The major capitalist powers were compelled by the nature of their economic system to compete for control of China – a country offering an abundance of land, people, natural resources, and geostrategic advantage. Japan, the US, Britain, Germany and others wouldn’t hesitate to support feudal warlords where it suited their interests; nor would they hesitate to suppress the Chinese people’s desire for independence and progress. The CPC’s anti-imperialist position quickly won it the support of a significant section of the population.

Soon after its formation, at its Third Congress in 1923, the CPC pushed for a united front with the Guomindang (GMD)7, a revolutionary nationalist party set up by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 (the veteran politician and doctor Sun was elected as provisional president of the Republic of China following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty). The idea of the united front was to construct an anti-imperialist alliance incorporating workers, peasants, intellectuals and the patriotic elements of the capitalist class, with a view to decisively ending feudalism, uniting the country under a single central government, and driving out the imperialist powers. Denied recognition or support by the West, the GMD was in the process of orienting towards the recently-formed Soviet Union, which had already demonstrated itself to be a supporter of Chinese sovereignty (the Bolsheviks had indicated their support for Sun Yat-sen as early as 19128 and, once in power, renounced all privileges in China granted to the tsarist regime). Recognising that the CPC would be more effective in mobilising the masses of the working class and peasantry, the GMD agreed to the CPC’s proposal, and the CPC leadership took joint membership of both organisations.

This first united front started to fracture after the death in 1925 of Sun Yat-sen. The GMD’s right wing gained the ascendancy under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (who would later go on to become the highly authoritarian leader of Taiwan from 1949 until his death in 1975). Chiang “believed that communism was inhuman and that, unless defeated, it would mean oppression for the Chinese people and the destruction of their traditional culture.”9 Fearing that the communists were gaining too much popular support, Chiang orchestrated a coup against them, in collaboration with the various foreign powers that had recognised in Chiang a potential partner in the pursuit of an ‘acceptable’ political conjuncture in China.

When, in April 1927, Shanghai was liberated from warlord control as the result of an insurrection of the local working class (led primarily by CPC forces), Chiang’s forces won control of the city by means of a massacre of its liberators, killing an estimated 5,000 people. This marked the start of a several-year campaign of mass killings by Chiang’s forces against communists and progressive workers. With CPC members formally ejected from the GMD and the united front dismantled, Chiang Kai-shek set up a new regime in Nanjing, under which “communism became a crime punishable by death.”10 The government focused its efforts not on resisting imperialism or uniting the country but on suppressing communists. Facing something close to physical annihilation, the membership of the CPC fell from 58,000 at the start of 1927 to 10,000 by the end of the year.

These disastrous events led the communists to a strategic reorientation. It was clear that a united front policy focused on the major urban centres was no longer a viable option. Meanwhile, “as every schoolboy knows, 80 per cent of China’s population are peasants,”11 and, as William Hinton writes in the preface to his classic account Fanshen, “without understanding the land question one cannot understand the Revolution in China.”12 The CPC was moving towards the development of a rural-based revolutionary movement.

Following a failed uprising in his native Hunan, Mao Zedong fled with his forces into the Jinggang mountains, in the border region of Jiangxi and Hunan provinces. This became the birthplace of the Chinese Red Army and the site of the first liberated territory. The Jiangxi Soviet expanded over the course of several years to incorporate parts of seven counties and a population of more than half a million.

Han Suyin notes that Mao Zedong “was the first in the party who abandoned the city orientation and devised a major strategy born from China’s reality.” The working class were a growing force, but constituted less than one percent of the population. “Mao saw that setting up rural bases, dedicated to the liberation of the peasantry from the oppression of landlordism, was the only way in which revolution would succeed.”13 Not only was the mass of the peasantry against feudal exploitation, but it could also understand the connection between foreign domination and domestic poverty. The period of foreign aggression from 1840 had led to wars and instability, much of the burden of which fell on the peasantry, which was expected to provide soldiers and sustenance. Any agricultural surplus from good harvest years was redirected to the state (or local warlord), leaving grain reserves empty and thus contributing to vast famines.

The CPC and Red Army grew in strength and experience during this time. Chiang Kai-shek’s obsessive focus on eliminating communism led Mao and his comrades to develop a theory of guerrilla warfare that would prove decisive in the CPC’s rise to power. However, China was rendered vulnerable to attack by Chiang’s pacification programme. Even when the Japanese occupied Manchuria in September 1931, siphoning Manchukuo off as an ‘independent’ puppet state a year later, Chiang’s clearly stated policy was: “Internal pacification first, before external resistance”.

Between 1929 and 1934, Chiang’s forces led a series of brutal encirclement campaigns in an attempt to bury the Jiangxi Soviet. After suffering a series of defeats at the hands of a highly motivated and skilled Red Army, the Guomindang mobilised warlord armies from around the country, organising a force of more than a million troops. The communists had no choice but to abandon the liberated territory and break the siege. This process became the Long March: the extraordinary year-long retreat to the North-West, covering over 9,000 kilometres and ending with the establishment of a revolutionary base area in Shaanxi. This area would serve as the centre of the CPC’s operations until shortly before the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

In the liberated territories, the communists led the creation of a new political economy in the countryside that – along with their determined struggle against Japanese militarism – would earn them the support of the broad masses of the peasantry. In his classic account Red Star Over China, Edgar Snow paints a vivid picture of life in the red base areas: “Land was redistributed and taxes were lightened. Collective enterprise was established on a wide scale… Unemployment, opium, prostitution, child slavery, and compulsory marriage were reported to be eliminated, and the living conditions of the workers and poor peasants in the peaceful areas greatly improved. Mass education made much progress in the stabilised soviets. In some counties the Reds attained a higher degree of literacy among the populace in three or four years than had been achieved anywhere else in rural China after centuries.”14

Opium production was ended and replaced by food agriculture. Antiquated feudal practices such as foot-binding, infanticide and the keeping of slave girls were prohibited. Peng Dehuai, one of the top Red Army leaders and later the Defence Minister of the PRC, commented on the decisive importance of the CPC’s progressive and popular policies in the liberated areas:

> “Only by implanting itself deeply in the hearts of the people, only by fulfilling the demands of the masses, only by consolidating a base in the peasant soviets, and only by sheltering in the shadow of the masses, can partisan warfare bring revolutionary victory… Tactics are important, but we could not exist if the majority of the people did not support us.”15

By the mid 1930s, the Japanese armed forces were consolidating and expanding their occupation of Northeast China, aided and abetted by the Western powers, who were motivated by the idea of cooperating with Japan to attack the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-shek’s position was becoming untenable. He granted concession after concession to the Japanese, but he could no longer justify his refusal to defend China’s national sovereignty. In July 1937, Japanese forces marched out of their puppet state of Manchukuo, going on to occupy Beijing and Shanghai.

In this context, more progressive elements within the GMD took the initiative, detaining Chiang in the northwestern city of Xi’an and forcing him to agree to cooperate with the CPC against Japanese occupation. Thus was formed the Second United Front. The red base at Yan’an (Shaanxi) was recognised as a provincial government and the CPC was legalised; the Red Army was re-designated as the Eighth Route Army.

​In the period of the Second United Front, the CPC won enormous prestige for its leadership of the national defence efforts and for its commitment to improving the lives of the population in the territories under its control. Yan’an became a pole of attraction for revolutionary and progressive youth throughout the country. British academic Graham Hutchings writes that “Yan’an seemed to stand for a new type of society. Visitors, foreign and Chinese, found it brimming with purpose, equality and hope. Many students and intellectuals chose to leave areas under the control of a central government they felt lacked a sense of justice, as well as the will to confront the national enemy, for life in the border regions and the communist or ‘progressive’ camp.”16

It was increasingly clear that the communists were the most cohesive, committed and competent political force in China; the only political party with the potential to restore China’s sovereignty, unity and dignity. Mao and the CPC leadership took the time to theorise the type of society they were trying to build; what the substance of their revolution was. The results of these debates and discussions are synthesised in Mao’s 1940 pamphlet On New Democracy, which describes the Chinese Revolution as necessarily having two stages: “first of New Democracy and then of socialism.”17

New Democracy was not to be a socialist society, but a “democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people led by the proletariat.” Extending a friendly hand to patriotic non-communist forces, Mao invoked the spirit of Sun Yat-sen, calling for “a republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People’s Principles with their Three Great Policies.” (The Three People’s Principles were – approximately – nationalism, people’s government, and social welfare; the Three Great Policies were alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the CPC, and support for the workers and peasants).

The key elements of this stage of the revolution were to defeat imperialism and to establish independence, as an essential step on the road to the longer-term goal of building socialism. How long would this stage last? It would “need quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us.”18

Such a society would not be a dictatorship of the proletariat; that is, the working class would not exercise exclusive political control. Rather, political power would be shared by all the anti-imperialist classes: the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie (ie those elements of the capitalist class that stood against foreign domination).

In economic terms, New Democracy would include elements of both socialism and capitalism. “The state enterprises will be of a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national economy, but the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not ‘dominate the livelihood of the people’, for China’s economy is still very backward.” Land reform would be carried out, and the activities of private capital would be subjected to heavy regulation.

In conversation with Edgar Snow, Mao envisaged China taking its place within an ever-more globalised world – perhaps anticipating the ‘opening up’ of four decades later: “When China really wins her independence, then legitimate foreign trading interests will enjoy more opportunities than ever before. The power of production and consumption of 450 million people is not a matter that can remain the exclusive interest of the Chinese, but one that must engage the many nations. Our millions of people, once really emancipated, with their great latent productive possibilities freed for creative activity in every field, can help improve the economy as well as raise the cultural level of the whole world.”19

Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, the CPC and GMD attempted to negotiate a post-war government alliance. However, the agreement forged in Chongqing in October 1945 fell apart as Chiang’s forces continued their military attacks on the CPC-controlled areas. A bitter four-year civil war ensued, resulting in the communists’ victory, Chiang Kai-shek’s flight to Taiwan, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. The newly-installed government, led by the CPC, attempted to build the type of society described in On New Democracy. Its governance was based on the Common Programme – an interim constitution drawn up by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (a united front body created by the CPC), with 662 delegates representing 45 different organisations. The Common Programme did not call for the immediate establishment of a socialist society, and it promised to encourage private business. As Mao had written earlier in the year, “our present policy is to regulate capitalism and not to destroy it.”20 Patriotic capitalists were invited to participate in government.

The most important immediate economic change was the comprehensive dismantling of feudalism: the abolition of the rural class system and the distribution of land to the peasantry (a process already well underway in the areas under CPC control). Land reform resulted in a large agricultural surplus which, along with Soviet support, created the conditions for a rapid state-led industrialisation. Hutchings notes that “dramatic improvements in life expectancy and literacy rates and increases in living standards accompanied the appearance of factories, roads, railways and bridges across the country.”21 Along with this came an unprecedented shift in the status of women, who had suffered every oppression and indignity under feudalism. Via a system of “barefoot doctors”, basic medical care was made available to the peasantry. “As a consequence, fertility rose, infant mortality declined, life expectancy began to climb, and the population stabilised and then grew for the first time since the Japanese invasion of 1937.”22

The New Democracy period only lasted a few years. By 1954, the government was promoting collectivisation in the countryside and shifting private production into state hands. By the time of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, there was no more talk of a slow and cautious road to socialism; the plan now was to “surpass Britain and catch up to America” within 15 years.

The reasons for moving on from New Democracy are complex and contested, and reflect a shifting global political environment. The CPC had envisaged – or at least hoped for – mutually beneficial relations with the West, as is hinted at in the quote above that “legitimate foreign trading interests will enjoy more opportunities than ever before”. However, by the time of the founding of the PRC, the Cold War was already in full swing. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, and with the outbreak of civil war between the communists and the nationalists, the US came down on the side of the latter, on the basis that Chiang understood the civil war to be “an integral part of the worldwide conflict between communism and capitalism”23 and was resolutely on the side of capitalism.

The US made its hostility to the People’s Republic manifestly clear from early on. The US involvement in the Korean War, starting in June 1950, was to no small degree connected to “the West’s determination … to ‘contain’ revolutionary China.”24 The genocidal force directed against the Korean people – including the repeated threat of nuclear warfare – was also a warning to China’s communists (although the warning was returned with interest, when hundreds of thousands of Chinese volunteers joined hands with their Korean brothers and sisters, rapidly pushing the US-led troops back to the 38th parallel and forcing an effective stalemate). Soon after the arrival of US troops in Korea, US President Truman announced that his government would act to prevent Taiwan’s incorporation into the PRC, since this would constitute “a threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.”25 Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet of the US Navy into the Taiwan Strait in order to prevent China from occupying it (such, incidentally, are the imperialist origins of the notion of Taiwanese independence). Along with these acts of physical aggression, the US imposed a total embargo on China, depriving the country of various important materials required for reconstruction.

The dangerously hostile external environment made New Democracy less viable. There are parallels here with the Soviet abandonment of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1929. Much like New Democracy, the NEP had consisted of a mixed economy, with private business encouraged in order to increase production and enhance productivity. Introduced in 1921, the NEP proved highly successful, allowing the Soviet Union to recover economically from war whilst minimising internal class conflict. By the end of the decade, however, new external dangers were emerging and it became clear to the Soviet leadership that the imperialist powers were starting to mobilise for war. From 1929 the Soviet economy shifted to something like a wartime basis, with near-total centralisation, total state ownership of industry, collectivisation of agriculture, and a major focus on heavy industry and military production.

Similarly in China in the mid-1950s, the shifting regional situation contributed to an economic and political shift. Beyond that, there was undoubtedly a subjective factor of the CPC leadership wanting to accelerate the journey to socialism – to “accomplish socialist industrialisation and socialist transformation in fifteen years or a little longer”, as Mao put it in 1953.26 With the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the gradual deterioration of relations between the CPC and the new Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev, the Chinese came to feel that the Soviets were abandoning the path of revolutionary struggle and that responsibility for blazing a trail in the construction of socialism had fallen to China. To move from a position of economic and scientific backwardness to becoming an advanced socialist power would require nothing less than a great leap.

​To this day, the most popular method for casually denigrating the People’s Republic of China and the record of the CPC is to cite the alleged crimes of Mao Zedong who, from the early 1930s until his death in 1976, was generally recognised as the top leader of the Chinese Revolution. If the CPC was so dedicated to improving the lot of the Chinese people, why did it engage in such disastrous campaigns as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution?

The Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, was an ambitious programme designed to achieve rapid industrialisation and collectivisation; to fast-track the construction of socialism and allow China to make a final break with centuries-old underdevelopment and poverty; in Mao’s words, to “close the gap between China and the US within five years, and to ultimately surpass the US within seven years”.27 In its economic strategy, it represented “a rejection of plodding Soviet-style urban industrialisation,”28 reflecting the early stages of the Sino-Soviet split. The Chinese were worried that the Khrushchev leadership in Moscow was narrowly focused on the avoidance of conflict with the imperialist powers, and that its support to China and the other socialist countries would be sacrificed at the altar of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Hence China would have to rely on its own resources.

For all its shortcomings, the core of the GLF was pithily described by Indian Marxist Vijay Prashad as an “attempt to bring small-scale industry to rural areas.”29 Mao considered the countryside would once again become the “true source for revolutionary social transformation” and “the main arena where the struggle to achieve socialism and communism will be determined.”30 Agricultural collectivisation was fast-tracked, and there was a broad appeal to the revolutionary spirit of the masses. Ji Chaozhu (at the time an interpreter for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later China’s ambassador to the UK (1987-91)) notes in his memoirs: “The peasants were left with small plots of their own, for subsistence farming only. All other activity was for the communal good, to be shared equally. Cadres were to join the peasants in the fields, factories, and construction sites. Even Mao made an appearance at a dam-building project to have his picture taken with a shovel in hand.”31

The GLF was not overall a success. Liu Mingfu writes that “the Great Leap Forward did not realise the goal of surpassing the UK and US. It actually brought China’s economy to a standstill and then recession. It caused a large number of unnatural deaths and pushed China’s global share of GDP from 5.46% in 1957 to 4.01% in 1962, lower than its share of 4.59% in 1950.”32

The disruption to the basic economic structure of society combined with the sudden withdrawal of Soviet experts in 1960 and a series of terrible droughts and floods to produce poor harvests. Meanwhile, with millions of peasants drafted into the cities to work in factories, “no one was available to reap and to thresh.”33 The historian Alexander Pantsov writes that the “battle for steel had diverted the Chinese leadership’s attention from the grain problem, and the task of harvesting rice and other grain had fallen on the shoulders of women, old men, and children… A shortage of grain developed, and Mao gave the command to decrease the pace of the Great Leap.”34 Ji Chaozhu observes that “malnutrition leading to edema was common in many areas, and deaths among the rural population increased.”35

Certain of the GLF’s goals were achieved – most notably the irrigation of arable land. However, it didn’t achieve its overall objective, and the disruption it caused contributed to a deepening of poverty and malnutrition. It was called off in 1962. It remains a highly controversial topic in Chinese history. For anticommunists, the GLF provides incontrovertible proof of the monstrous, murderous nature of the CPC – and Mao Zedong in particular. Western bourgeois historians seem to have settled on a figure of 30 million for the estimated number of lives lost in famine resulting from the Great Leap. On the basis of a rigorous statistical analysis, Indian economist Utsa Patnaik concludes that China’s death rate rose from 12 per thousand in 1958 (a historically low figure resulting from land reform and the extension of basic medical services throughout the country) to a peak of 25.4 per thousand in 1960. “If we take the remarkably low death rate of 12 per thousand that China had achieved by 1958 as the benchmark, and calculate the deaths in excess of this over the period 1959 to 1961, it totals 11.5 million. This is the maximal estimate of possible ‘famine deaths.’”36

Patnaik observes that even the peak death rate in 1960 “was little different from India’s 24.8 death rate in the same year, which was considered quite normal and attracted no criticism.” This is an important point. Malnutrition was at that time a scourge throughout the developing world (sadly it remains so in some parts of the planet). China’s history is rife with terrible famines, including in 1907, 1928 and 1942. It is only in the modern era, under the leadership of precisely that ‘monstrous’ CPC, that malnutrition has become a thing of the past in China.

In other words, the failure of the GLF has been cynically manipulated by bourgeois academics to denigrate the entire history of the Chinese Revolution. The GLF was not some outrageous crime against humanity; it was a legitimate attempt to accelerate the building of a prosperous and advanced socialist society. It turned out not to be successful and was therefore dropped.

In the aftermath of the GLF, Mao’s more radical wing of the CPC leadership became somewhat marginalised, and the initiative fell to those wanting to prioritise social stability and economic growth over ongoing class struggle. Principal among these were Liu Shaoqi (head of state of the PRC, widely considered to be Mao’s successor) and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. Liu, Deng, Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai put forward the concept of the Four Modernisations (in agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology) which would come to constitute a cornerstone of post-Mao economic policy.

In the years that followed, Mao and a group of his close comrades began to worry that the deprioritisation of class struggle reflected an anti-revolutionary ‘revisionist’ trend that could ultimately lead to capitalist restoration. As Mao saw it, revisionist elements were able to rely on the support of the intelligentsia – particularly teachers and academics – who, themselves coming largely from non-working class backgrounds, were promoting capitalist and feudal values among young people. It was necessary to “exterminate the roots of revisionism” and “struggle against those in power in the party who were taking the capitalist road.”37

The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 as a mass movement of university and school students, incited and encouraged by Mao and others on the left of the leadership. Student groups formed in Beijing calling themselves Red Guards and taking up Mao’s call to “thoroughly criticise and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of academic work, education, journalism, literature and art”.38 The students produced ‘big-character posters’ (dazibao) setting out their analysis against, and making their demands of, anti-revolutionary bourgeois elements in authority. Mao was enthusiastic, writing the students in support of their initiative: “I will give enthusiastic support to all who take an attitude similar to yours in the Cultural Revolution movement.”39 He produced his own dazibao calling on the revolutionary masses to “Bombard the Headquarters” – that is, to rise up against the reformers and “bourgeois elements” in the party.

These developments were synthesised by the CPC Central Committee, which in August 1966 adopted its Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. “Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticise and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic ‘authorities’ and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.”40

Thus the aims of the Cultural Revolution were to stimulate a mass struggle against the supposedly revisionist and capitalist restorationist elements in the party; to put a stop to the hegemony of bourgeois ideas in the realms of education and culture; and to entrench a new culture – socialist, collectivist, modern. The Cultural Revolution also marked a further escalation of the Sino-Soviet split, as the revisionist illness was considered to have a Soviet etiology (Liu Shaoqi, previously considered as Mao’s successor and now the principal target of the radicals, was labelled China’s Khrushchev). Li Mingjiang notes that, “throughout the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union was systematically demonised. Sino-Soviet hostilities reached an unprecedented level, as exemplified by Mao’s designation of Moscow as China’s primary enemy.”41

Han Suyin describes the chaotic atmosphere of the early days of the Cultural Revolution: “Extensive democracy. Great criticism. Wall posters everywhere. Absolute freedom to travel. Freedom to form revolutionary exchanges. These were the rights and freedoms given to the Red Guards, and no wonder it went to their heads and very soon became total licence.” In August 1966, “the simmering Cultural Revolution exploded in a maelstrom of violence… Mao had not reckoned that he would lose control of the havoc he had launched.”42

There was widespread disruption. Universities were closed. “Red Guards occupied and ransacked the Foreign Ministry, while most ambassadors were recalled to Beijing for political education. The British embassy was attacked, and the Soviet embassy was laid under siege by youthful Maoists for several months.”43

Many of those accused by the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG, a body of the CPC initially reporting to the Politburo Standing Committee but becoming the de facto centre of power) suffered horrible fates. Posters appeared with the slogan “Down with Liu Shaoqi! Down with Deng Xiaoping! Hold high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought.” Liu’s books were burned in Tiananmen Square – “they were declared to be poisonous weeds, yet they had been a mainstay of the theoretical construct which in Yen’an in 1945-47 had brought Mao to power.”44 He was expelled from all positions and arrested. “Liu had been repeatedly tortured and interrogated, confined to an unheated cell, and denied medical care. He died in November 1969, his remains surreptitiously cremated under a false name. His death was kept from his wife for three years, and from the public for a decade.”45

Peng Dehuai, former Defence Minister and the leader of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s operations in the Korean War, had been forced into retirement in 1959 after criticising the Great Leap Forward. Jiang Qing – Mao’s wife, and a leading figure in the CRG – sent Red Guards to Sichuan, where Peng was living. “A band of thugs burst into his house, seized him, and brought him to the capital, where he was thrown into prison. Peng was tortured and beaten more than a hundred times, his ribs were broken, his face maimed, and his lungs damaged. He was repeatedly dragged to criticism and struggle meetings.”46 He died in a prison hospital in 1974.

Even Premier Zhou Enlai, unfailingly loyal in spite of his quiet horror at the CRG’s extremism, didn’t escape unscathed: in November 1966, according to Han Suyin, he had a heart attack after 22 hours of being surrounded and shouted at by Red Guards.

Although Mao had only intended it to last for a few months, the Cultural Revolution only came to its conclusion shortly before Mao’s death in 1976, albeit with varying intensity – realising that the situation was getting out of control, in 1967 Mao called on the army to help establish order and re-organise production. However, the Cultural Revolution flared up again with the ascendancy of the ‘Gang of Four’ from 1972.

Historians in the capitalist countries tend to present the Cultural Revolution in the most facile and vacuous terms. To them, it was simply the quintessential example of Mao’s obsessive love of violence and power; just another episode in the long story of communist authoritarianism. But psychopathology is rarely the principal driving force of history. In reality, the Cultural Revolution was a radical mass movement; millions of young people were inspired by the idea of moving faster towards socialism, of putting an end to feudal traditions, of creating a more egalitarian society, of fighting bureaucracy, of preventing the emergence of a capitalist class, of empowering workers and peasants, of making their contribution to a global socialist revolution, of building a proud socialist culture unfettered by thousands of years of Confucian tradition. They wanted a fast track to a socialist future. They were inspired by Mao and his allies, who were in turn inspired by them.

Such a movement can get out of control easily enough, and it did. Mao can’t be considered culpable for every excess, every act of violence, every absurd statement (indeed he intervened at several points to rein it in), but he was broadly supportive of the movement and ultimately did the most to further its aims. Mao had enormous personal influence – not solely powers granted by the party or state constitutions, but an authority that came from being the chief architect of a revolutionary process that had transformed hundreds of millions of people’s lives for the better. He was as Lenin was to the Soviet people, as Fidel Castro remains to the Cuban people. Even when he made mistakes, these mistakes were liable to be embraced by millions of people. Han Suyin comments that “Mao was prone to making contradictory remarks, but each remark had the force of an edict.”47

The Cultural Revolution is now widely understood in China to have been misguided. It was “the most severe setback … suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic.”48 The political assumptions of the movement – that the party was becoming dominated by counter-revolutionaries and capitalist-roaders; that the capitalist-roaders in the party would have to be overthrown by the masses; that continuous revolution would be required in order to stay on the road to socialism – were explicitly rejected by the post-Mao leadership of the CPC, which pointed out that “the ‘capitalist-roaders’ overthrown … were leading cadres of Party and government organisations at all levels, who formed the core force of the socialist cause.”49 Historian Rebecca Karl posits that this post-Mao leadership in fact benefitted from the Cultural Revolution, in the sense that it became “the saviour of China from chaos.”50

Unquestionably the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution impeded the country’s development and brought awful tragedy to a significant number of people. What so many historians operating in a capitalist framework fail to understand is why, in spite of the chaos and violence of the Cultural Revolution, Mao is still revered in China. For the Chinese people, the bottom line is that his errors were “the errors of a great proletarian revolutionary.”51

It was the CPC, led by Mao and on the basis of a political strategy principally devised by him, that China was liberated from foreign rule; that the country was unified; that feudalism was dismantled; that land was distributed to the peasants; that the country was industrialised; that a path to women’s liberation was forged. British academic John Ross points out that, “in the 27 years between the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, life expectancy in China increased by 31 years – or over a year per chronological year… China’s rate of increase of life expectancy in the three decades after 1949 was the fastest ever recorded in a major country in human history.”52

The excesses and errors associated with the last years of Mao’s life have to contextualised within this overall picture of unprecedented, transformative progress for the Chinese people. The pre-revolution literacy rate in China was less than 20 percent. By the time Mao died, it was around 93 percent. China’s population had remained stagnant between 400 and 500 million for a hundred years or so up to 1949. By the time Mao died, it had reached 900 million. A thriving culture of literature, music, theatre and art grew up that was accessible to the masses of the people. Land was irrigated. Famine became a thing of the past. Universal healthcare was established. China – after a century of foreign domination – maintained its sovereignty and developed the means to defend itself from imperialist attack.

Hence the Mao as monster narrative has little resonance in China. As Deng Xiaoping himself put it, “without Mao’s outstanding leadership, the Chinese revolution would still not have triumphed even today. In that case, the people of all our nationalities would still be suffering under the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism.”53 Furthermore, even the mistakes were not the product of the deranged imagination of a tyrant but, rather, creative attempts to respond to an incredibly complex and evolving set of circumstances. They were errors carried out in the cause of exploring a path to socialism – a historically novel process inevitably involving risk and experimentation.

​From 1978, the post-Mao Chinese leadership embarked on a process of ‘reform and opening up’ – gradually introducing market mechanisms to the economy, allowing elements of private property, and encouraging investment from the capitalist world. This programme of socialism with Chinese characteristics posited that, while China had established a socialist society, it would remain for some time in the primary stage of socialism, during which period it was necessary to develop a socialist market economy – combining planning, the development of a mixed economy and the profit motive – with a view to maximising the development of the productive forces.

Deng Xiaoping, who had been one of the most prominent targets of the Cultural Revolution and who had risen to become de facto leader of the CPC from 1978, theorised reform and opening up in the following terms: “Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces… [The advance towards communism] calls for highly developed productive forces and an overwhelming abundance of material wealth. Therefore, the fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated, in the final analysis, by faster and greater development of those forces than under the capitalist system. As they develop, the people’s material and cultural life will constantly improve… Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism.”54

Was this the moment the CPC gave up on its commitment to Marxism? Such is the belief of many. For supporters of capitalism, the idea that China ‘ascended’ to capitalism from 1978 onwards is a validation of their own ideology; China was socialist and poor, and then became capitalist and rich. This view is near-universal among mainstream economists. Even the well-known Keynesian Jeffrey Sachs, who is both politically progressive and friendly towards China, considers that the key turning point in Chinese history was not 1949 but 1978: “After nearly 140 years of economic and social strife, marked by foreign incursions, domestic rebellions, civil wars, and internal policy blunders of historic dimensions, China settled down after 1978 to stable, open, market-based production and trade.”55

On the other hand, for many on the left (particularly in the West), 1978 marked a turning point in the wrong direction – away from socialism, away from the cause of the working class and peasantry. The introduction of private profit, the decollectivisation of agriculture, the appearance of multinational companies and the rise of Western influence: these added up to a historic betrayal and an end to the Chinese Revolution.

The consensus view within the CPC is that socialism with Chinese characteristics is a strategy aimed at strengthening socialism, improving the lives of the Chinese people, and consolidating China’s sovereignty. Although China had taken incredible steps forward since 1949, China in 1978 remained backward in many ways. The bulk of the population lived a very precarious existence, many without access to modern energy and safe water. China’s per capita income was $210. Food production, and consequently average food consumption, was insufficient. “An estimated 30 percent of rural residents, about 250 million, lived below the poverty line, relying on small loans for production and state grants for food.”56 The low per capita income figure is deceptive in the sense that the poor in China had secure access to land and housing – by which measure they were doing much better than most of their counterparts in the developing world; nonetheless the vast majority were genuinely poor.

Meanwhile the capitalist world was making major advances in science and technology, and the gap in living standards between China and its neighbours was growing sufficiently wide as to threaten the legitimacy of the CPC government. Chinese economist Justin Yifu Lin notes that, at the time of the founding of the PRC, there was only a relatively small per capita income gap between China and its East Asian neighbours. “But by 1978 Japan had basically caught up with the United States, and South Korea and Taiwan, China, had narrowed the income gap with developed countries. China, although boasting a complete industrial system, an atomic bomb, and a man-made satellite, had a standard of living a far cry from that of the developed world.”57

In Guangdong, the southern province bordering Hong Kong, many were fleeing because, in the words of Hua Guofeng (Mao’s chosen successor as head of the CPC), “Hong Kong and Macao were wealthy and the PRC was poor.” The leadership simply decided to “change the situation and make the PRC wealthy.”58

Opening up to foreign capital, learning from foreign technology, and integrating into the global market would allow for a faster development of the productive forces. Export manufacturing would allow China to build up sufficient hard currency to acquire technology from rich countries and improve productivity. Foreign capital would be attracted by China’s virtually limitless pool of literate and diligent workers.

All this was highly unorthodox compared to the experience of the socialist world up to that point (with some partial exceptions, such as Yugoslavia and Hungary). Deng Xiaoping’s strong belief was that, unless the government delivered on a significant improvement in people’s standard of living, the entire socialist project would lose its legitimacy and therefore be in peril. Assessing that China was around 20 years behind the advanced countries in science and technology, he stated: “When a backward country is trying to build socialism, it is natural that during the long initial period its productive forces will not be up to the level of those in developed capitalist countries and that it will not be able to eliminate poverty completely. Accordingly, in building socialism we must do all we can to develop the productive forces and gradually eliminate poverty, constantly raising the people’s living standards… If we don’t do everything possible to increase production, how can we expand the economy? How can we demonstrate the superiority of socialism and communism? We have been making revolution for several decades and have been building socialism for more than three. Nevertheless, by 1978 the average monthly salary for our workers was still only 45 yuan, and most of our rural areas were still mired in poverty. Can this be called the superiority of socialism?”59

Interestingly, this sentiment contains echoes of Mao in 1949: “If we are ignorant in production, cannot grasp production work quickly … so as to improve the livelihood of workers first and then that of other ordinary people, we shall certainly not be able to maintain our political power: we shall lose our position and we shall fail.”60

Marx wrote in volume 3 of Capital that “the development of the productive forces of social labour is capital’s historic mission and justification. For that very reason, it unwittingly creates the material conditions for a higher form of production.”61 The vision of the CPC leadership was to replace “unwittingly” with “purposefully”: using capital, within strict limits and under heavy regulation, to bring China into the modern world.

Rather than selling out to capitalism, reform and opening up is better understood as a return to the policies of the New Democracy period. The CPC has always been adamant that what China is building is socialism, not capitalism – “it is for the realisation of communism that we have struggled for so many years… It was for the realisation of this ideal that countless people laid down their lives.”62 The basic guiding ideology of the CPC has not changed in its century of existence, as was summed up succinctly by Xi Jinping: “Both history and reality have shown us that only socialism can save China and only socialism with Chinese characteristics can bring development to China.”63

In borrowing certain techniques and mechanisms from capitalism, China is following a logic devised by the Bolsheviks during the New Economic Policy, using markets and investment to stimulate economic activity, whilst maintaining Communist Party rule and refusing to allow the capitalist class to dominate political power. As Lenin put it in 1921: “We must not be afraid of the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and small capital. What we must fear is protracted starvation, want and food shortage, which create the danger that the working class will be utterly exhausted and will give way to petty-bourgeois vacillation and despair. This is a much more terrible prospect.”64

Modern China has gone much further than the NEP, in the sense that private property is not limited to “the petty bourgeoisie and small capital”; there are some extremely wealthy individuals and companies controlling vast sums of capital. And yet their political status is essentially the same as it was in the early days of the PRC; their existence as a class is predicated on their acceptance of the overall socialist programme and trajectory of the country. As long as they are helping China to develop, they are tolerated. Even in 1957, with socialist construction in full swing, Mao considered that “the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people… In the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between the two classes, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods.”65

The reform strategy has been undeniably successful in terms of alleviating poverty and modernising the country. Economist Arthur Kroeber notes that workers’ wages have increased continuously, pointing out that, in 1994, a Chinese factory worker could expect to earn a quarter of what their counterpart in Thailand was earning; just 14 years later, the Chinese worker was earning 25 percent more than the Thai worker.66 Jude Woodward writes that per capita income in China doubled in the decade from 1980, “whereas it took Britain six decades to achieve the same after the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century and America five decades after the Civil War.”67

The combination of planning and ever-rising productivity has created a vast surplus, which has been used partly to “orchestrate a massive, sustained programme of infrastructure construction, including roads, railways, ports, airports, dams, electricity generation and distribution facilities, telecommunications, water and sewage systems, and housing, on a proportional scale far exceeding that of comparable developing countries, such as India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.”68

The fundamental difference between the Chinese system and capitalism is that, with capital in control, it would not be possible to prioritise the needs of the working class and peasantry; China would not have been able to achieve the largest-scale poverty alleviation in history. Deng understood this: “Ours is an economically backward country with a population of one billion. If we took the capitalist road, a small number of people in certain areas would quickly grow rich, and a new bourgeoisie would emerge along with a number of millionaires — all of these people amounting to less than one per cent of the population — while the overwhelming majority of the people would remain in poverty, scarcely able to feed and clothe themselves. Only the socialist system can eradicate poverty.”69

In adapting its strategy in accordance with new realities and a sober assessment of the past, the CPC was following the same principle it had always stood for: to seek truth from facts and to develop a reciprocal relationship between theory and practice. In Mao’s words, “the only yardstick of truth is the revolutionary practice of millions of people.”70 The CPC’s experience in practice was that “having a totally planned economy hampers the development of the productive forces to a certain extent.”71 Its leaders therefore conjectured that a combination of planning and markets would “liberate the productive forces and speed up economic growth.” This hypothesis has been proven correct by material reality. As John Ross puts it, “China’s extraordinary success during reform and opening up was based on adherence to Marxist theory and is the largest possible scale vindication of the Marxism in the framework of which reform and opening up was developed.”72

Reform and opening up wasn’t purely a correction of earlier mistakes; it was also a response to changing objective circumstances; specifically, a more favourable international environment resulting from the restoration of China’s seat at the United Nations (1971) and the rapprochement between China and the US. Thomas Orlik, chief economist at Bloomberg Economics, correctly observes that, “when Deng Xiaoping launched the reform and opening process, friendly relations with the United States provided the crucial underpinning. The path for Chinese goods to enter global markets was open.”73 So too was the door for foreign capital, technology, and expertise to enter China – first from Hong Kong and Japan, then the West. Zhou Enlai reportedly commented at the time of then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s historic visit to Beijing in 1971 that “only America can help China to modernise.”74 Even allowing for Zhou’s legendary diplomatic eloquence, this statement nevertheless contains an important kernel of truth.

Mao and Zhou had seen engagement with the US as a way to break China’s isolation. The US leadership saw engagement with China as a way to perpetuate and exacerbate the division between China and the Soviet Union. (Everyone was triangulating; for its part, the Soviet leadership was hoping to work with the US to undermine and destabilise China.75) Regardless of the complex set of intentions, one key outcome of the US-China rapprochement in the early 1970s was that a favourable external environment was created in which a policy of ‘opening up’ could feasibly be pursued.

Deng was also not the first to recognise that the productive forces were undergoing historic changes in the West and that China would have to catch up. Zhou Enlai noted that “new developments in science are bringing humanity to a new technological and industrial revolution… we must conquer these new heights in science to reach advanced world standards.”76 Indeed it was Zhou that first conceptualised the Four Modernisations that Deng made the cornerstone of his strategy. Zhou talked in January 1975 – during his last major speech – of the urgent need to take advantage of the more peaceful and stable international context and “accomplish the comprehensive modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world.”77

The economic take-off of the post-1978 period “would not have been possible without the economic, political and social foundations that had been built up in the preceding period”, in the words of the late Egyptian Marxist Samir Amin.78 Even with the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution, the early period of socialist construction achieved “progress on a scale which old China could not achieve in hundreds or even thousands of years.”79 This is widely understood within China. Prominent economist Hu Angang writes that, by 1978, all children received an education, adult illiteracy had fallen from 80 percent to 33 percent, and basic healthcare was available to everyone. Industry had been built up from almost nothing. Meanwhile, “China succeeded in feeding one-fifth of the world’s population with only 7 percent of the world’s arable land and 6.5 percent of its water. China’s pre-1978 social and economic development cannot be underestimated.”80 This can be usefully compared with the same time period in India, which following independence from the British Empire in 1947 was in a similarly parlous state, with a life expectancy of 32. At the end of the pre-reform period in China, ie 1978, India’s life expectancy had increased to 55, while China’s had increased to 67. As John Ross elucidates, “this sharply growing difference was not because India had a bad record – as an increase of 22 years in life expectancy over a 31-year period graphically shows. It is simply that China’s performance was sensational – life expectancy increasing by 32 years in a 29-year chronological period.”81

Xi Jinping has observed that, although the two major phases of the People’s Republic of China are different in many ways, “they are by no means separated from or opposed to each other. We should neither negate the pre-reform phase in comparison with the post-reform phase, nor the converse.”82

The two major phases are both consistent with the CPC’s guiding philosophy and raison d’être. Both have played an invaluable role in China’s continuing transformation from a divided, war-torn, backward and phenomenally poor country in which “approximately one of every three children died within the first year of birth”83 to a unified, peaceful, advanced and increasingly prosperous country which is blazing a trail towards a more developed socialism.

In each stage of its existence, the CPC has sought to creatively apply and develop Marxism according to the prevailing concrete circumstances; always seeking to safeguard China’s sovereignty, maintain peace, and build prosperity for the masses of the people. Through many twists and turns, this has been a constant of a hundred years of Chinese Revolution.

​After finishing their previous discussions of Chinese philosophy, [check blog archive] Karl and Fred were ready to look at the philosophy of Laozi. Karl, who knew more about Chinese philosophy than Fred, began by asking Fred what he knew about Laozi.
    
“The philosophy of Laozi is called Daoism, do you know much about it Fred?”
    
“I have read a little. Karl. I know that the philosophy of Laozi is contained in a book called the “Daode Jing” or “The Way and its Virtue”.  Also that not much is really known about him. The Chinese think he lived around the time of Confucius, maybe twenty or so years before him. It is unlikely they ever met.  It is also possible that he really lived hundreds of years after Confucius. Legend has it that he got tired of all the hassles in China and departed for the West riding on the back of an ox, but was stopped by the gatekeeper of the Western Pass and not allowed to proceed unless he wrote down his thoughts. That is how the “Daode Jing” came about. Having complied, he disappeared over the mountains heading for India--or so they say.”
    
“Pretty good introduction seeing as we don’t even know if he was a real person or a mythical one!  Well, you have the book, Chan’s translation, let’s see if we can figure out what it means.” [A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy by Wing-Tsit Chan]
    
Fred picked up the book and began to read. “I, that’s Chapter One, of eighty six,--’The Dao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Dao; The name that can be named is not the eternal name. The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; the Named is the mother of all things. Therefore let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety, And let there always be being so we may see their outcome.’ Now what is that all about?”
    
“This is a mystical book. Daoism is a tradition at odds with what will develop out of the Analects. The DAO is incapable of being pinned down by human language. If someone thinks they know what it is you can be sure they are wrong because it will be even more than that. You know, Maimonides in his “Guide for the Perplexed” says that God is undefinable so that we really can’t say anything about it correctly--in just this sense is the DAO nameless.”
    
“OK, here is 2: ‘When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recognition of ugliness. When they all know the good as good, there arises the recognition of evil. Therefore: Being and non-being produce each other; Difficult and easy complete each other; Long and short contrast each other; high and low distinguish each other; Sound and voice harmonize with each other; Front and back follow each other. Therefore the sage manages affairs without action (wu-wei) And spreads doctrines without words.’ “
    
“The term for ‘non-action’, i.e.,  wu-wei, means no action contrary to nature. I think Chan points this out. In general, we see here a dialectical approach to reality. Everything has its opposite and complements that opposite. Until we know what the ‘good’ is we don’t know ‘evil.’ It looks like we have to use a lot of ‘names’ after all since ‘good.’ ‘evil,’ ‘beauty,’ ‘ugliness,’ etc., are all names. Thus while the DAO, as ground of the world' is ‘nameless’ the things in the world are known by names. This seems not to contradict Confucius's views about the Rectification of Names--remember Rule Two from a previous discussion? [Cf. Confucius reference above. Rule Two- Language must be in accord with truth]. Also, note that Confucius did not allow himself to be drawn into discussions about the ultimate metaphysical basis of the world so he too seems not to be in disagreement with the view of the DAO as nameless. The part about spreading doctrines without words may mean that it is by EXAMPLE that influence is spread, and I don’t think Confucius would disagree with this.”
    
“I thought you said Daoism was in conflict with Confucianism. It looks like they agree on everything!”
    
“What can I say? We have only looked at the first two chapters. I’m sure the big differences will soon manifest themselves.”
    
“3: ‘Do not display objects of desire, so that the people’s hearts shall not be disturbed. Therefore in the government of the sage He keeps their hearts [peaceful and pure] (xu), Fills their bellies, Weakens their ambitions, And strengthens their bones, He always causes his people to be without knowledge (cunning) or desire, And the crafty to be afraid to act.’”
  
“I really don’t know what to make of this! The sage ruler evidently keeps his wealth under lock and key so the masses won’t see the class differences in the state. He provides bread and circuses as a Roman emperor so that the people remain content and don’t mess with the government. This is obviously the product of a feudal mentality.”
    
“5: ‘Heaven and Earth are not humane (ren). They regard all things as straw dogs. The sage is not humane. He regards all people as straw dogs.’ That doesn’t sound very good to me Karl.”
    
“Well let’s not read too much into it. I remember Chan on this selection saying that it means that Nature and the Sage are really IMPARTIAL and not playing favorites unjustly. Heaven and Earth are just following Dao, as we would say, ‘the laws of nature’, and as you know the sun shines on the just and the unjust alike. The Sage too has to be impartial and examine things according to their merits. The Prime Directive! [Cf. Confucius discussion. The Prime Directive of philosophy is ‘Always seek the truth by means of logic and reason without appeals to faith and emotion.’]
 
    
“7: ‘Heaven is eternal and Earth everlasting. They can be eternal and everlasting because they do not exist for themselves. And for this reason can exist forever. Therefore the sage places himself in the background but finds himself in the foreground’.”
    
“Now I understand the last part. Don’t toot your own horn and all that, lead by example, but the first part is just mystical excess as far as I can tell. Heaven and Earth not existing for themselves what can that mean? Perhaps he means they are manifestations of Dao, but this passage is all too mystical for me.”
 
“I like the following from 9: ‘To be proud with honor and wealth Is to cause one’s own downfall. Withdraw as soon as your work is done. Such is Heaven’s Way.’”
    
 
“Yes, don’t overstay your welcome. At least this counteracts the view that Daoists are recluses. You have a job or function to perform and you should stick with it until its done--but then leave!”  
    
“Chapter Eleven is a little mysterious. ‘Doors and windows are cut out to make a room but it is on its non-being that the utility of the room depends. Therefore turn being into advantage, and turn non-being into utility.’”
    
“I think Lao is saying that the room is ‘empty’ hence ‘non-being’ and because it is empty it can be used for something--a dining room, bedroom, study, etc. The ‘being’ would be the material of the room from which the doors and windows were cut.”
    
“And what can this mean? 12:’Goods that are hard to get injure one’s activities. For this reason, the sage is concerned with the belly and not the eyes, Therefore he rejects the one but accepts the other.’”
    
“Your guess is as good as mine Fred. But look at it this way. It is easy to get a bowl of rice to eat, all the simple fare required, really, for a Daoist sage, but you can see palaces and treasures and things of that sort which others have and will never be yours so it is better to avoid that kind of ‘concern’ and stick to your proper activities.”
    
“Sounds good to me Karl. Here is 13: ‘If I have no body, what trouble could I have? Therefore he who values the world as his body may be entrusted with the empire.’”
    
“I remember this. Chan says something about it doesn’t he?”
    
“Here is his comment on page 145 of his “Source Book”: ‘On the basis of this attitude toward the body, it is difficult to accept the theory that Yang Chu who would preserve one’s own life under any circumstances, was an early Daoist, as some have maintained.’ Remember Yang Chu was a character we ran into when we discussed Mencius.”
    
“OK, and....”
    
“And Chan is, I think, wrong. This passage from Lao is not putting down the body. He says we value it and even love it --otherwise there is trouble. Since this is the case the person who loves the world just as much as himself, since he will love himself, will be the best ruler. If Yang Chu thought as much of the world as he did of himself, he would be a good ruler. He was, however, an egotist. Yang may not have been an admirable Daoist, a sage, but his being an early Daoist hasn’t been proven wrong by this comment by Lao.”
    
“14: ‘We look at it and do not see it; Its name is the Invisible. We listen to it and do not hear it; Its name is the Inaudible. We touch it and do not find it; its name is the Subtle (formless). These three cannot be further inquired into, And hence merge into one.’”
    
“A typical mystical statement. The hidden ground of the universe is not available to our knowledge, at least not to our sense knowledge so we will have no direct empirical knowledge of it. “
   
“Chan says this view of the non-detectability of ultimate reality--the ‘formless’ is in contradistinction to the Confucian view that reality is ‘manifest.’ He also points out that as Chinese philosophy developed under the influence of Buddhism, centuries later, the so called Neo-Confucianists made a synthesis and he quotes a Neo-Confucianist Cheng Yi who wrote ‘there is no distinction between the manifest and the hidden.’”
    
“That is a very Hegelian type of synthesis. Hegel did not have a high regard for Chinese thought, perhaps because of limited access to it in his day. But Hegel taught that ‘Thought’ advances by developing concepts that engender counter concepts that then result in a synthesis of the two into a new ‘higher’ concept that combines what was the one-sidedness of the original concepts. This is really quite a simplification, but from what you just read from Chan, I’m sure Cheng YI’s unification of these two concepts the ‘hidden’ and the ‘manifest’--’there is no distinction’ would meet with Hegel’s approval.”
    
“I notice here a reference to pu in 15 and ’uncarved wood’? What is that image about?”

​“That, Fred, is one of the most famous Taoist images. A sage is like an ‘uncarved block of wood.’ I see it as meaning we are all ‘potential’. An uncarved block could become anything under the hands of an artist--a horse, a figure of a man, or anything at all. But once carved that's it--the carved horse can’t later be a carved man.  Also, Lao calls the uncarved block ‘genuine.’ So there is something artificial about the carved block. This somehow implies that human actions are not fully natural, they contrast to the Dao. This is, I think, incorrect on Lao’s part! Everything is comprehended under the Dao so humans are too and the uncarved block and the carved block originate from the same universal process. There is an unresolved contradiction at the heart of Daoism which we will have to see played out. Sartre, in his Existentialism, would say humans have to live in the world even when trying not to interfere with it--they are committed to some ‘project’ or other so even being an ‘uncarved block’ is a form of being ‘carved’. For now, I’ll leave this as an unresolved ‘Hegelian’ contradiction.”
    
“18: ‘When the great Dao declined, the doctrines of humanity (ren) and righteousness (yi) arose. When knowledge and wisdom appeared, there appeared great hypocrisy. When the six family relationships [father, son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife--Chan] are not in harmony, there will be the advocacy of filial piety and deep love to children. When a country is in disorder, there will be praise of loyal ministers.’”
    
“Pretty obvious. All of these things are a reflection that there are problems and imperfections, a sign that Dao is not working properly--the Dao of human affairs that is, the Dao of Nature is something else it seems. Look at our example.  We like to think we care about the environment and other people--but look at the reality. It is just because we degrade both the environment and our fellow beings that we have to have so many laws to protect them. Big corporations such as GE, Exxon-Mobil, etc., spend millions in ad campaigns telling us how corporate America is environmentally conscious--but the fact that we need anti-pollution laws and regulations aimed at these very companies shows that what they claim they are and what they are vastly different. Do you think that if there were freedom and equality in the United States, we would need civil rights laws? And why did they pass a law in Texas against having sex with sheep? This is the message of Laozi. “
    
“Lao goes on in 19: ‘Abandon sageliness and discard wisdom; then the people will benefit a hundredfold. Abandon humanity and discard righteousness; Then the people will return to filial piety and deep love. Abandon skill and discard profit; Then there will be no thieves or robbers. However these three things are ornament (wen) and not adequate. Therefore let people hold on to these: Manifest plainness, Embrace simplicity, Reduce selfishness, Have few desires.’”
    
“Its too late for this Daoist program, I fear. Civilization was even so far advanced in Lao’s time that a program such as this, a going back to ‘nature’ program as it were, was not realistic. Daoism is reactionary--it reacts to the problems of the times by harking back to a mythical past when the Dao was not in decline and we didn’t need all the regulations and rules that have evolved along with our social development. Nevertheless, the four rules he gives at the end are not so bad--just on utilitarian grounds--if we all practiced them many of the negative aspects of our technological world system would be mitigated. I’m sure you can see how their application would bring this about.”
    
“Now this is really important Karl--Chapter 21, Chan says it’s the most important in the entire book--philosophically that is.”
    
“Well, let’s hear it then!”
    
“OK, here goes, ‘The all-embracing quality of the great virtue (de) follows alone from the Dao. The thing that is called Dao is eluding and vague. Vague and eluding, there is in it the form. Eluding and vague, in it are things. Deep and obscure, in it is the essence [intelligence, spirit, life-force]. The essence is very real; in it are evidences. From the time of old until now, its name (manifestations) ever remains, by which we may see the beginning of all things. How do I know the beginnings of all things are so? Through this (Dao).’”
    
“In itself this passage is too vague. What do we learn from saying ‘the Tao is all encompassing and is the ultimate explanation for everything?’ Not much. Chan thinks it so important because it is similar to passages in the Book of Changes [of which more later] which were utilized in Neo-Confucianist metaphysics.”
    
“Here is 22, some more ‘mysticism’--’To have plenty is to be perplexed. Therefore the sage embraces the one and becomes the model of the world. He does not show himself; therefore he is luminous. He does not justify himself; therefore he becomes prominent. He does not boast of himself; therefore he is given credit. He does not brag; therefore he can endure for long.’”
    
“Next!”
    
“23: ‘Nature says few words. For the same reason a whirlwind does not last a whole morning, Nor does a rainstorm last a whole day. What causes them? It is Heaven and Earth (Nature). If Heaven and Earth cannot make them last long, How much less can man? Therefore he who follows Dao is identified with Dao.’”
    
“Very interesting. He seems to be saying don’t mess with Nature. You have heard of the ‘Three Gorges” dam project in China?”
    
“It’s supposed to be the world’s largest dam project--displacing thousands of people and completely changing the face of the land.”
    
“And you know that projects like this, and many other man-made attempts to change the environment have ended in disasters. Think of the problems in the Everglades since we have monkeyed around with the water levels in Florida--and the extinction of many species throughout the world due to the destruction of habitats. I think those in power could learn a thing or two from this passage in Lao. Work with Nature, don’t try to completely rearrange the natural processes that have developed on the planet--that is following Dao.”
    
“This chapter, 25, reminds me of the opening: ‘There was something undifferentiated and yet complete, which existed before heaven and earth. Soundless, and formless, it depends on nothing and does not change. It operates everywhere and is free from danger. It may be considered the mother of the universe. I do not know its name; I call it Dao. If forced to give it a name; I call it great...Being far-reaching means returning to the original point. Therefore Dao is great.’”
    
“As Chan says, this passage is representative of the Chinese view that history and nature operate cyclically. [Of course, now that they are Marxists they are not supposed to believe this.] Whereas we in the West more or less think in terms of progress and continual betterment, the Chinese in classical times thought in terms of cycles rather than progress.”
    
“26: ‘The tranquil is the ruler of the hasty. Therefore the sage travels all day Without leaving his baggage.... How is it that a lord with ten thousand chariots Should behave lightheartedly in his empire? If he is lighthearted, the minister will be destroyed. If he is hasty, the ruler is lost.’”
    
“Not really a Daoist paradox. The ruler is secure and tranquil being lighthearted is a sign of assuredness. On the other hand, the function of the minister is to carry out his duties--lightheartedness ill behooves him.”
 
“This next chapter is interesting and I don’t think it really needs any explication--27: ‘A well-tied knot needs no rope and yet none can untie it. Therefore the sage is always good at saving men and consequently no man is rejected. He is always good in saving things and consequently nothing is rejected. This is called following the light (of Nature) Therefore the good man is the teacher of the bad, And the bad is the material from which the good may learn. He who does not value the teacher, Or greatly care for the material, Is greatly deluded although he may be learned. Such is the essential mystery.’”
    
“A lot of faith in the salvation power of the sage! Confucius wants to enlighten people, this is a form of salvation but a bit more limited than Lao here. Remember the ‘square’--if you don’t get the other three sides from the one Confucius gives to you, you get dropped!” [Cf. the Confucius dialogue]
    
“I remember. Here is something about the ‘sage’--28: ‘He will be proficient in eternal virtue and returns to the state of simplicity (uncarved wood). When the uncarved wood is broken up, it is turned into concrete things (as Dao transformed into the myriad things). But when the sage uses it, he becomes the leading official. Therefore the great ruler does not cut up’”
    
“The Daoist Sage is using and not using the uncarved block it would seem. This is because he prefers things to remain in their original state of simplicity--he rules by not ruling. This is all very fine if you have a well-ordered state in the first place but what if you come along in a ‘time of troubles’ and forceful action is needed? Would this Daoist minimalism work in that case, or must the Daoist wait for a natural cyclical return to simplicity? I don’t think Lao has an answer to this problem.”
    
“Well, we may find one later on in the book. This is chapter 29, it has relevance to your questions: ‘When one desires to take over the empire and act on it (interfere with it), I see that he will not succeed. The empire is a spiritual thing and should not be acted on.’ He then says, ‘...the sage discards the extremes, the extravagant, and the excessive.’”
    
“That last part is like Aristotle’s ‘mean’--you know, virtue is a mean between two extremes--e.g., ‘courage’ is a mean between ‘foolhardiness’ and ‘cowardice.’”
    
“But what about the other part, about not ‘acting’? What if the ‘empire’ needs some ‘action’--such as tax reform or an agricultural reform or something like that? I’m beginning to agree with what you just said a few minutes ago. This might be a real problem with Lao’s views.”
    
“I’m glad you agree. What is next?”
    
“Something our gun toting friends in the NRA will appreciate. 31: ‘Fine weapons are instruments of evil. They are hated by men. Therefore those who possess Dao turn away from them.’”
     
“I remember this chapter. Forget the NRA, read some more and then try to reconcile Lao’s ideas with our government’s or any government’s obsession with military spending. This quote goes well beyond the NRA!”
    
“’Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle. Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral ceremonies.’”
    
“This shows real understanding of the horrors of war on Lao’s part. Something we have yet to understand, it seems. Yet he admits the ruler may not be able to avoid the use of weapons--think of trying to stop Hitler without them. Nevertheless, even when defeating Hitler, it was wrong to celebrate with a Roman triumph. The fact that we did so shows how far we are from the real spirit of the Dao.”
    
“I wonder what Lao would think about our current and past warlike activities in the Balkans and Iraq.”
    
“We have not very good rulers, I fear.”
    
“In 33 he says, ‘He who dies but does not really perish enjoys long life.’ Is he talking about the immortality of the soul?”

“I don’t think so. If you read on you will find that Chan points out that the Chinese think of immortality not in terms of individual survival but in terms of an immortality of reputation--your writings and your deeds. Look at it this way--some older person helps a child, say by sending her to school, she grows up to be a doctor and saves the life of someone who later becomes a ruler, etc. etc., a causal sequence extending over a thousand years--these people in the sequence, their deeds have never really perished.”
    
“OK, now I’ll read parts of 34; ‘The Great Dao flows everywhere....It clothes and feeds all things but does not claim to be master over them. Always without desires, it may be called The Small. All things come to it and it does not master them; it may be called The Great. Therefore (the sage) never strives himself for the great, and thereby the great is achieved.’”
    
“I can’t help but think of this in Western terms! It means, to my mind, that there is some universal ‘law’ or ‘power’ which is responsible for all that happens--but the expression ‘does not claim to be master’ allows for freedom of action at least on the part of self-conscious beings as ourselves, so Lao is not a Calvinist or Augustinian predestinationist. I admit, however, that this is a Western interpretation and may or may not coincide with what Lao had in mind.”
    
“Just when you think Lao isn’t so bad, he comes up with a recommendation that is just awful and shows how out of line his views are to democratic thinkers today.”
   
“What are you talking about?”
    
“Listen to this from 36: ‘Fish should not be taken away from water. And sharp weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people.’”
    
“I see what you mean, but his advice is generally followed even today by so called democratic governments, although I don’t consider governments that practice this really democratic at all in the true sense of the term.”
    
“Now what are you talking about?”
    
“You know, all this stuff you read about in the papers about the FBI and the CIA how they run all kinds of secret operations without any seeming control trying to assassinate people they deem a threat to their power--or the really terrible secret weapons systems the military creates such as the poison gases and germ warfare toxins they have made--not to mention the nuclear weapons they have and now all this information coming out about depleted uranium weapons or the training of terrorists at the School of the Americas run by the military (even if they changed the name to further conceal what goes on there). Don’t you think all this falls under Lao’s dictum that sharp weapons shouldn’t be displayed to the people?”
    
“Its all very confusing to me. I would have thought that Lao would be against ‘sharp weapons’ and things like you described. He says in the same chapter ‘The weak and the tender overcome the hard and the strong’ so he should be against ‘sharp weapons’--the state should get what it wants by being ‘weak and tender’ that is by education and treating people as people and following the Dao.”
    
“So there seems to be a contradiction in his teachings, just look back at 31 when he attacks ‘fine weapons’ and says they go against the Dao!  I’ll admit there can be a lot to argue about here.”
    
“And Chan points out that this doctrine of ‘deceit’ really upset the Confucianists. I guess Confucius would want the people to be educated and know what is going on in their state. After all, he thought government was for the benefit of the people and ultimately had to be extended to the whole world so people who are not displaying their ‘sharp weapons’ must be up to no good!”
    
“So noted! What’s next?”
    
“I’ll read part of 38: ‘The man of superior virtue is (not conscious of) his virtue, and in this way he really possesses virtue. The man of inferior virtue never loses (sight of) his virtue, and in this way he loses his virtue. The man of superior virtue takes no action, but has no ulterior motive to do so. The man of inferior virtue takes action, and has an ulterior motive to do so. The man of superior humanity takes action, but has no ulterior motive to do so. The man of superior righteousness takes action, and has an ulterior motive to do so. The man of superior propriety takes action, and when people do not respond to it, he will stretch his arms and force it on them. Therefore, only when Dao is lost does the doctrine of virtue arise...propriety is a superficial expression of loyalty and faithfulness, and the beginning of disorder...the great man...dwells in the fruit (reality), and does not rest with the flower (appearance). Therefore he rejects the one, and accepts the other.’”
    
“This is a passage which again puts forth the view that the simple and natural are best, closest to the Dao. This is almost like Rousseau in the rejection of the artificialities of civilization.”
    
“Here in 39 Lao talks about the ‘One’--which I take to be Dao-- he says ‘Heaven obtained the One and became clear.... If heaven had not thus become clear, It would soon crack.’ He makes similar remarks about the efficacy of the One with regard, for example to the earth (without the One ‘It would soon be shaken’) and about kings and barons who became rulers by it and ‘They would soon fall’ without it. But then he says ‘Therefore humble station is the basis of honor. The low is the foundation of the high.’ I just don’t understand the conclusion he draws!”
    
“Well, this isn’t a syllogism after all. If you equate the One with the Dao this implies again the power of the Dao to have the ultimate influence over reality. Lao is being ‘mystical’ not ‘logical’ by referring to the ‘humble’ and the ‘low’--you see he is using the ‘One’ as a symbol for the ‘low’--a low number--and the ‘humble’. The ‘One’ is the beginning but the ‘thousand’, so to speak, is ultimately dependent upon it.”
 
“OK Karl, here is a verse from 40--’All things in the world come from being. And being comes from non-being.’”
    
“Now is the time to bring in some outside assistance,” Karl said as he went to his bookcase and pulled down a book.
    
“What is this book,” Fred asked.
    
“This is “A Short History of Chinese Philosophy” by Fung Yu-Lan, edited by Derk Bodde. It’s really required reading if we are interested in Chinese philosophy. Fung was a major philosopher in his own right and this is based on his great two volume work “History of Chinese Philosophy”. I think it is the best of the histories because it is by one of the most important philosophers in the modern Chinese tradition. It is similar to having “A History of Western Philosophy” by Bertrand Russell, although without some of the major misinterpretations.”
    
“So now we can use Fung as well as Chan for clarification, why didn’t you bring it out earlier?”
    
“Its better to introduce these aids slowly, besides Confucius wasn’t into all this metaphysical speculation but Lao’s work is full of these kinds of statements so where Chan does not give any clarification we can turn to Fung. I remember he had interesting comments to make on this Chapter from Laozi.”
    
“Chapter 40?”
    
“That is correct,” said Karl, flipping through Fung’s book. “Ah, here is the passage I was looking for. Listen to this Fred, it’s on page 96: ‘...the being of all things implies the being of Being. This is the meaning of Laozi saying [40].... The saying of Laozi does not mean that there was a time when there was only Non-being, and that then there came a time when Being came into being from Non-being. It simply means that if we analyze the existence of things, we see there must first be Being before there can be any things. Dao is the unnamable, is Non-Being, and is that by which all things come to be. Therefore, before the being of Being, there must be Non-being, from which Being comes into being. What is here said belongs to ontology, not to cosmology. It has nothing to do with time and actuality. For in time and actuality, there is no Being; there are only beings.’”
    
“And you think that quote is helpful?”
    
“Well, it looked better when I was reading this book as a student. Fung was a metaphysician himself and sometimes requires to be explained even more than what he is explaining!”
    
“So why bring him up.”
    
“Because he brings all the latent issues to the fore.”
    
“Well then, what else is there besides ‘time and actuality’? Are not ‘time and actuality’ circumlocutions for ‘existence’ so that Fung is saying ‘in existence there is no Existence only existents’. And I would say that what is true of ‘cosmology’ is true of ‘ontology.’”
 
“Fred, I wouldn’t disagree with you. This passage from Fung is turning out to be nonsense!  I think Fung should have said ‘Being’ is a logical category that precedes ‘being’ but even that is taking us far and away from the, I think, much more simple meaning of Laozi’s words.”
    
“So, how would you explain 40?”
    
“First, I want to say these digressions are philosophically interesting. Second, I think the best way to look at Lao’s saying is to think of ‘all things come from being’ as meaning ‘whatever exists today comes from previously existing things’. Things just don’t pop up out of nothing. And ‘being comes from non-being’ means there is some principle or cause that is responsible for the state of the existing world as we know it and this is DAO which is not itself the same as the beings of this world which are ultimately dependent upon it and for this reason Lao calls it ‘non-being.’ “
     
“I’m moving on Karl, to Chapter 41.”
     
“OK”
    
“’When the highest type of men hear Dao, They diligently practice it. When the average type of men hear Dao, They half believe in it. When the lowest type of men hear Dao, They laugh heartily at it. If they did not laugh at it, it would not be Dao. Therefore there is the established saying: The Dao which is bright appears to be dark.’”
    
“Two observations about this Fred. How can the three types ‘hear Dao’ since (Chapter One) the Dao that can be spoken of isn’t the Dao. I mean, how would they know they actually knew what they heard was Tao? Second, since this is supposed to be Lao’s book introducing his views how can there be an ‘established view’? Anyway, since I’m not interested in the history of the text but the idea content, I will restrict myself to this idea of the ‘bright’ appearing as the ‘dark’. This view is right out of the species of doctrines that gave rise to Plato’s views of the reception of philosophical ‘Truth” as he expressed it in “The Republic”. I mean this is at one with the Allegory of the Cave. The ultimate ‘Truth’ is the Dao, so if we replace ‘Dao’ with ‘Truth’ in the quote you read we have the exact meaning intended by Lao. We also have a theme which is common to almost all philosophy whether in China, India or Greece at this time and that is that philosophical truth is ultimately esoteric and limited to a few individuals. The great mass of humanity, hoi polloi, are unable, why is the big question, to grasp the truth and so while it is bright for the sage or philosopher it remains dark to them. The average sort of understand it but it really doesn’t motivate them. So we have three groups of people--a small group motivated by the truth (they get into a lot of trouble most of the time), a middle group that is neither motivated nor hostile (too busy living the everyday problems of life) and a ‘low’ group that is hostile and prefers to continue along in a dark and ignorant and unthreatening life style based on unreflective acceptance of common ideas.”
    
“You seem to be giving a Confucian twist to this! Wouldn’t Lao praise the simple unreflective lifestyle as the manifestation of the Dao? In fact, once you have the ‘highest type of men’ and the ‘lowest type’ of men, hasn’t the Dao already been lost?”
     
“You know, you are right Fred. This is a bit of a contradiction. But the fact is the Dao has been lost from the point of view of Lao--and a long time ago too. So we must make do with the world we live in. “
    
“Does Fung cast any light on this?”
    
“Actually he does and his comment is based on part of Chapter 40 you didn’t quote a few minutes ago.”
    
“What was that?”
    
“Go back and read the first line.”
    
“’Reversion is the action of Dao.’”
     
“Fung points out that this sums up Lao’s views on what we would call dialectics. He says ‘The idea is that if anything develops certain extreme qualities, those qualities invariability revert to become their opposites. This constitutes a law of nature.’”
    
“Sounds like Hegel or Marx.”
    
“In a way, but Lao’s ‘law’ is more mechanical than really dialectical in the Hegelian sense.”
    
“How so?”
    
“Well, in Lao the ‘hard’ becomes the ‘soft’ and then the ‘soft’ becomes the ‘hard’ or the ‘weak’ overcomes the ‘strong’ and then the ‘strong’ becomes the ‘weak’ etc. There appears to be just alteration going on but no advance. When Hegel or Marx and Engels say something like ‘things transform into their opposites’ they don’t intend by this mere alteration back and forth ad infinitum but an advance to a higher level or if you object to ‘higher’ a radically different level. An imaginative but simple example is Lao would give opposites as water-ice, ice-water whereas Hegel might say something like ‘hydrogen is the “opposite” of oxygen, but the two opposites transform into water’ (and other things as well). Fung says this ‘law’ is so paradoxical that hoi polloi can’t grasp it and that is why they laugh at it. Anything really ‘true’ about the world is like that--if hoi polloi grasps it, it can’t be true! Of course, Marxists would like it to be the other way around.”
    
“You know, Karl, for all his praise of the simple, he is really a snob. This view of the ‘low’ never understanding anything, along with ‘hiding the sharp weapons of the state’ call into question Lao’s sincerity about the concern he is alleged to express for the ‘common people.’”
    
“A case can be made for this. It is Confucius who wants to educate as many people as possible seeing in education an almost universal panacea.”
    
“Yes, but he won’t show you the other three corners if you can’t get them yourself after he shows you the first.” [Cf. Confucius dialogue]
    
“Why don’t you read the next interesting tidbit?”
   
“This is from 42: ‘Dao produced the One. The One produced the two. The two produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand things. The ten thousand things [i.e. everything] carry the yin and embrace the yang [Chan:’ Yin is the passive, female[!] cosmic principle or force while yang is the active[!] or male principle.’] {You can see males thought this one up!}, and through the blending of the material force (qi) [Chan: ‘Variously translated as matter, matter-energy, vital force, breath, etc.] they achieve harmony.... What others have taught, I teach also: “Violent and fierce people do not die a natural death.” I shall make this the father (basis or starting point) of my teaching.’”
    
“I remember Chan on this passage. He made some good points. Why don’t you read the salient passages?”
    
“His main point is ‘...the natural evolution from the simple to the complex without any act of creation. This theory is common to practically all Chinese philosophical schools.’”
     
“The word ‘creation’ is confusing. In the West, following the developments of Neo-Platonism, the ‘ten thousand’ things also came about by emanation from the One or ‘God’ this is how they were ‘created’. I think Chan has in mind the Western notion of creation ex nihilo which was read back by Christians (and then Jews) into the Genesis creation account and has become a dogma. And out of the blue comes this new starting point--I mean, the comment about fierce people. I think it is better to retain the starting point as the Dao and regard this new passage as the starting point of his ethics or social or moral ideas.”
    
“44:’ Which is worse, gain or loss? Therefore he who has lavish desires will spend extravagantly. He who hoards will lose heavily. He who is contented suffers no disgrace. He who knows when to stop is free from danger. Therefore he can long endure.' There is a string of quotable quotes here which I will just read to give more of a flavor of Daoism in these middle chapters. Go ahead and chime in, Karl, if you think any explication is needed.”
   
  “I will.”
    
“46: ‘When Dao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields with their dung). When Dao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.’”
 
“I guess the fact that we spend so much on the military and have such big budgets dedicated to killing and maiming our fellow human beings all over the world doesn’t say much for the prevalence of the Dao in the current world order.”
    
“47: ‘The further one goes, the less one knows. Therefore the sage knows without going about, Understands without seeing, And accomplishes without any action.’”
    
“That might have been true in the days of yore, Fred, before the development of the scientific method and the realization of the importance of research programs. If Lao thinks that knowledge and understanding come about just through contemplation and intuition, he is wrong, at least by our standards. Darwin would never have come up with his theory of evolution without his ‘going about’ on the HMS Beagle.”
    
“49: ‘The sage has no fixed (personal) ideas. He regards the people’s ideas as his own. I treat those who are good with goodness, And I also treat those who are not good with goodness. Thus goodness is attained. I am honest to those who are honest, And I am also honest to those who are not honest. Thus honesty is attained.”
    
“I don’t see how this agrees with Chapter 41. The sage follows Dao on a higher level than ‘the people’ who appear to be indifferent if average or if ‘low’ laughing at it. So, it may be that the sage, like the ideal scientist or philosopher, leaves him or herself out of the equation (knowledge being ideally objective) but the ‘people’ is too much of an abstraction nowadays, especially since the Dao is not prevailing, to believe the sage’s ideas are the same as the people’s. The only way this could be the case is if the sage represents the ‘general will’ in Rousseau’s sense, and this might, after all, just be what Laozi actually means.”
    
“51: "Dao produces them (the ten thousand things). Virtue fosters them. Matter gives them physical form. The circumstances and tendencies complete them. Therefore the ten thousand things esteem Dao and honor virtue. Dao is esteemed and virtue honored without anyone’s order. They always come spontaneously. Therefore Dao produces them and virtue fosters them.’”
    
“The word being used for ‘virtue’ is ‘de'--which also means ‘power’. Fung says that Dao is the ‘ground’ and the things come to be by the power manifested in them. Think of Dao as the laws of nature by which material things come to be what they are and manifest their ‘virtue’ or power. It’s as when Aristotle said the virtue of a knife is its ability to cut. In this we see Spinoza’s universe reflected in the ideas of the Chinese sage.”
    
“54: ‘He who has a firm grasp (of Dao) cannot be separated from it.... When one cultivates virtue in the world, it becomes universal.’”
    
“The point of this chapter is that such cultivation begins with the person then extends to the family, then to the community, the country and finally the whole world.”
 
“You get the idea from this next quote of the remoteness of the sage from the concerns of most people. 56: ‘Become one with the dusty world. This is called profound identification. Therefore it is impossible either to be intimate and close to him or to be distant and indifferent to him.’ A little before this quote he says, ‘He who knows does not speak. He who speaks does not know.’”
    
“A real problem since Lao has to ‘speak’ in order to give this bit of information to us!”
    
“57: ‘The more laws and orders are made prominent, the more thieves and robbers there will be. Therefore the sage says: I take no action and the people of themselves are transformed. I love tranquility and the people of themselves become correct. I engage in no activity and the people of themselves become prosperous. I have no desires and the people of themselves become simple.’ Chan says this laissez-faire attitude was also that of Confucius.”
    
“I can’t agree with Chan. How can Confucius say ‘I take no action’ and the people are transformed. This is an attack on Confucius. Confucians seek to take a lot of actions to improve the world and correct and make new laws to govern society.  According to Fung this ‘laissez-faire’ attitude is preceded by the sage ruler first undoing ‘all the causes of trouble in the world’ which is very ‘proactive’--if I may use this pretentious and ridiculous word being currently substituted by the semi-literate for ‘active.’ After the troubles have been eliminated then the sage ruler rules by means of wu-wei--i.e., by non-action [meaning no unnatural action]. Fung says, ‘The Daoists agree with the Confucianists that the ideal state is one which has a sage as its head.’ They both agree with Plato on this. But they are different kinds of sages.
    
“I feel another rule coming on.”
    
“Why not? We can review our rules from the discussion on Confucius when we finish with Laozi but now I am proposing Rule Four-’Always strive to have a philosopher-sage as the chief executive of the state.’”
    
“That's too abstract. What really qualifies a person as a philosopher-sage? Laozi’s ideas on this are different from those of Confucius.”
    
“I know, I know. This is just the framework the rule will have to be further discussed when we evaluate the different philosophies as we go along. I now want to make a comment about the laws being made leading to the conclusion that ‘the more thieves and robbers there will be.’ Of course, there are some minimum laws that any society needs, but when the state begins to make more and more new laws it also makes criminals where there were none before.”
    
“What do you mean?”
 
“During the rise of Capitalism, for example, when the government closed off the commons to the peasants, as in England, many people were forced into criminal activity just to survive. By making new laws about who can use the commons then actions which were legal--grazing you animals on such and such land or hunting-- became illegal and you became a criminal for doing today what yesterday was a right. Prohibition in the United States turned millions of people technically into criminals and also fostered the development of criminal industries which became non-criminal as soon as prohibition was repealed. The criminalization of certain drugs in this country has filled the prisons with non-violent ‘offenders’--recreational pot smokers right along with drug gang lords. This is certainly an exemplification of Laozi’s dictum.”
    
“Here are some more political views--58: ‘When the government is non-discriminative and dull, the people are contented and generous. When the government is searching and discriminative the people are disappointed and contentious.... The people have been deluded for a long time. Therefore the sage is as pointed as a square but does not pierce.... He is as bright as light but does not dazzle.’”
    
“Well, Fred, that’s the way it is when the Dao is not being observed. Even in our world today special interest groups bombard the people with biased self-serving messages. It is so easy to delude the people about what should be done with respect to the environment, fighting diseases such as AIDS or COVID, fighting starvation in the world, or domestic homelessness. ‘Sages’, that is philosophers and scientists, may be able to devise solutions to these problems but with a ‘discriminative’ government catering to special interests rather than the general welfare, how are the deluded people to know what to do to get the Dao of society back on track?”
    
“What do you think of this? 61: ‘A big country may be compared to the lower part of a river. It is the converging point of the world; It is the female of the world. The female always overcomes the male by tranquility, and by tranquility she is underneath. A big state can take over a small state if it places itself below the small state; And the small state can take over a big state if it places itself below the big state. Thus some, by being (naturally) low, take over (other states) ....’”
    
“What is this--the political missionary position? The first part sounds like sexist nonsense, to be expected, I’m afraid, considering the time and place of Laozi. I think big states treat little states in a more canine fashion. This appears to be some more ‘mysticism’ which is impracticable in our day. Yet the recommendation that small states will be better being ‘tranquil’--I mean by humoring and trying to get along with big states--is probably good advice. In our day, however, big states try to get their way by throwing around their ‘bigness’."

​“62: ‘Dao is the storehouse of all things.... Even if a man is bad, when has (Dao) rejected him? Therefore on the occasion of crowning an emperor or installing the three ministers [grand tutor, grand preceptor, and grand protector], Rather than present large pieces of jade preceded by teams of four horses, it is better to kneel and offer this Dao’”
    
“Well, this makes sense. Wisdom, knowledge of the Dao in so far as it is knowable, is to be preferred to the outward show of ceremony. Even Confucius would agree, though he liked the ceremonies.”
     
“The next chapter is interesting both in itself and because of Chan’s comment. 63: ‘Whether it is big or small, many or few, repay hatred with virtue... Difficult undertakings have always started with what is easy, and great undertakings have always started with what is small. Therefore the sage never strives for the great, and thereby the great is achieved... He who takes things too easily will surely encounter much difficulty. For this reason, even the sage regards things as difficult, And therefore he encounters no difficulty.’  “
    
“What does Chan say?”
    
“He says this is the ‘Daoist doctrine of walking the second mile, which was unacceptable to Confucius.’  He means the comment about repaying hatred with virtue. Remember Analects 14:36? “
   
“Yes, Confucius said, repay hatred with uprightness and virtue with virtue. But uprightness is the same as impartially and that is a virtue in itself (most of the time) so this difference between Confucius and Lao doesn’t amount to a whole lot in my opinion.”
    
“Now we go to 64: ‘A journey of a thousand li [ a li = about 1/3 mile] starts from where one stands.’ Hey! I always thought that was from Confucius--’A journey of a thousand miles starts with one step’....”
    
“What’s that from --a fortune cookie?”
    
“Not funny, Karl. Well, live and learn. One of my favorite quotes turns out to come from Laozi instead of Confucius. I shall continue. ‘He who grasps things loses them. For this reason, the sage takes no action and therefore does not fail. He grasps nothing and therefore does not lose anything... If one remains as careful at the end as he was at the beginning, there will be no failure. Therefore the sage desires to have no desire... He learns to be unlearned, and returns to what the multitude has missed (Dao). Thus he supports all things in their natural state but does not take any action.’ What do you make of all this?”
    
“Again, that ‘no action’ means no unnatural action. The sage tries to understand Dao--still a dubious prospect from his opening verses! And there is another negative thought about hoi polloi. I’m still pro-Confucius here. We can study the Dao and we should then try to impart it to the multitude. I think Lao doesn’t share this idea fully.”
 
“Karl, the very next chapter bears on this question--Chapter 65 I mean.”
    
“Excellent! Read it because Fung also comments on this chapter.
    
“65: In ancient times those who practiced the Dao well did not seek to enlighten the people, but to make them ignorant. People are difficult to govern because they have too much knowledge. Therefore he who rules the state through knowledge is a robber of the state: He who rules a state not through knowledge is a blessing to the state.’ There is some more about returning to the natural standard, but what about this keeping the people ignorant?”
    
“A greater contrast to Confucius could not be found. But to understand this in the Chinese context, I’m going to read this passage from Fung. ‘”Ignorant” here is a translation of the Chinese "you", which means ignorance in the sense of simplicity and innocence. The sage not only wants his people to be you, but wants himself to be so too.... In Daoism you is not a vice, but a great virtue’ And Fung goes on to say, however, that the you of the sage is really higher than that of the common people. This means it's not really you at all! ‘The you of the sage is the result of a conscious process of cultivation. It is something higher than knowledge, something more, not less. There is a common Chinese saying: “Great wisdom is like ignorance.” The you of the sage is great wisdom, and not like the you of a child or of ordinary people. The latter kind of you is a gift of nature, while that of the sage is an achievement of the spirit. There is a great difference between the two. But in many cases the Daoists seem to have confused them.’”
    
“I’ll say! Using the same word for the uneducated ignorance of hoi polloi--and calling that a ‘gift of nature’! and the sophisticated understanding of the philosopher is no good. This is a clear case where a Confucian ‘rectification of names’ is needed!”
    
“I couldn’t agree more, Fred. Naturally people become more difficult to govern the more they get away from the ‘gift of nature’ and find out what is really going on. Thinking of all the peasant uprisings in Chinese history, I imagine that the Chinese ruling class must have identified with this passage from Laozi.”
    
“Yet they were officially Confucian and thus believed in education even if not to the extent of Confucius himself.”
    
“That’s right. It only shows how impractical Daoism is in the real world. People are not going to stay ignorant, and you need knowledge and education and Confucian norms to make sure people are not ‘over exploited’ and thus rebel. When we look at more Confucians, we will see this.”
    
“Here is Chapter 66: ‘The great rivers and seas are kings of all mountain streams Because they skillfully stay below them. That is why they can be their kings. Therefore, in order to be the superior of the people, one must, in the use of words, place himself below them. And in order to be ahead of the people, One must, in one’s own person, follow them. Therefore the sage places himself above the people and they do not feel his weight. He places himself in front of them and the people do not harm him. Therefore the world rejoices in praising him without getting tired of it. It is precisely because he does not compete that the world cannot compete with him.’”
    
“If this is interpreted as ‘learn from the people’ it would be acceptable. But with the doctrine of keeping people ignorant it looks more like a plan for simply making the ruler’s life easy. Considering the feudal system in China, I suspect that the latter interpretation may be more on the mark.”
   
“He says something incomprehensible to me in 69: ‘There is no greater disaster than to make light of the enemy. Making light of the enemy will destroy my treasures. Therefore when armies are mobilized and issues joined, The man who is sorry over the fact will win.’ Now how is being ‘sorry’ got anything to do with winning a battle?”
    
“This is mystical (that is, ‘meaningless’) to me, Fred. Unless to ‘win’ refers to some inner state. Anyway, a sage ought not to have ‘enemies’. If things come to blows, the Daoist sage must have screwed up royally!”
    
“70: ‘My doctrines are very easy to understand and very easy to practice, but none in the world can understand or practice them. My doctrines have a source (Nature); my deeds have a master (Dao). Few people know me, and therefore I am highly valued. Therefore the sage wears a coarse cloth on top and carries jade within his bosom.’”
    
“Lao seems to be preoccupied about being ‘highly valued’, but this chapter is expressing a truth that sages need to and do understand.  Most people don’t understand ‘Nature’. That is, they have no conception of science or scientific method--not that Lao did either--and so really don’t understand the workings of the world around them and this is one of the great reasons why many people are not happy and cannot attain their ends. For Lao, I think this notion of ‘Nature’ is more like ‘fatalism’ but this is an advanced concept in itself for his age. The closest thing to understanding in a scientific way is the ‘Dao’ which operates in a law-like manner. The sage tries to live according to ‘Nature’ and understand the ‘Dao’. Thus far what Lao says makes sense. The question is whose Dao, Lao’s or Confucius’s?”
    
“OK Karl, here is 71: ‘To know that you do not know is the best. To pretend to know when you do not know is a disease.’”  And Chan refers us to a part of the Analects we missed! Namely 2:17: ‘Confucius said, “Zilu, shall I teach you [the way to acquire] knowledge? To say when you know that you do know and to say that you do not know when you do not know--that is [the way to acquire] knowledge.”’
    
“Sometimes I think sages are the same the world over! Remember that Socrates' claim to wisdom was that he knew that he did not know.”
    
“And 72 has both a warning for the people and some sage advice or at least a motto for sages. ‘When the people do not have fear of what is dreadful, Then what is greatly dreadful will descend on them.’ The motto goes ‘...the sage knows himself but does not show himself. He loves himself but does not exalt himself.’”
    
“Sage advice indeed, Fred.”
    
“This is interesting, 73: ‘Who knows why Heaven dislikes what it dislikes?...Heaven’s net is indeed vast. Though its meshes are wide, it misses nothing.’ Chan says the idea of Heaven’s net greatly reinforced the Chinese idea about ‘retribution.’”
    
“Sounds like a Daoist version of karma. There is nothing directly related to the concept of karma in this quote, but it is easy to conjecture that after the arrival of Buddhism this concept was read back into Laozi.”
    
“Next we have some good social commentary, actually not at all inconsistent with Confucian notions and must have endeared Lao to many of the more uptight emperors. 75: ‘The people starve because the ruler eats too much tax-grain. Therefore they starve.They are difficult to rule because their ruler does too many things. Therefore they are difficult to rule. The people take death lightly because their ruler strives for life too vigorously. Therefore they take death lightly.’”
     
“Yes, Fred, you’re on the money. It is certainly wrong to think that Daoists, at least of the Laozi stripe, as not being interested in social questions. A Confucian could have easily stated the same ideas expressed in this passage.”
    
“How do you make sense of the following? Its number 76: ‘When man is born, he is tender and weak. At death, he is stiff and hard. All things, the grass as well as trees, are tender and supple while alive. When dead, they are withered and dried. Therefore the stiff and hard are companions of death. The tender and weak are companions of life. Therefore if the army is strong, it will not win. If a tree is stiff it will break. The strong and the great are inferior, while the tender and the weak are superior.’ I get most of it--but what can it mean to say a strong army won’t win?”
    
“I think this is very subtle, but I’ll give an example from Chinese history and you can try to think up examples from other historical periods. In 222 B.C. the first Chinese empire was created when the state of Qin vanquished all the rival petty states that existed at that time. Qin was led by a man called Zheng who was now called Qin Shi Huang or ‘First Emperor.’  He had a very strong army and ran his new empire practically like a ‘fascist’ dictator. He killed all his opponents violent and non-violent alike, and burned all the books by anyone whose philosophy he didn’t like--which was everyone except those who supported without question his government and personal rule. These methods were supposed to assure that his empire would last ten thousand generations. But he so alienated everyone that that after he died in 210 B.C. his whole empire was gone within three years. So much for having a strong army. If he had been more ‘tender’ and not so harsh perhaps his empire would have lasted and not fallen due to internal disintegration. You can perhaps make analogies to what happened to the ‘Thousand Year Reich’ and to the American Army in Vietnam which was defeated by the ‘weak’ because, while ‘strong’ it was harsh and cruel rather than showing a ‘tender’ side to the poor and impoverished peasants. So real ‘strength’ may be just the opposite of what those ignorant of the Dao think it is.”
    
“This makes sense, Karl, and seems reinforced by this from 77: ‘Heaven’s Way is indeed like the bending of a bow. When (the string) is high, bring it down. When it is low raise it up.... The Way of Heaven reduces whatever is excessive and supplements whatever is insufficient. The way of man is different. It reduces the insufficient to offer to the excessive. Who is able to have excess to offer to the world? Only the man of Dao. Therefore the sage acts, but does not rely on his own ability ‘ [i.e. he follows the Dao].”
    
“Absolutely, Fred. First Emperor was not following the Way of Heaven but that of man, that is of the man ignorant of Dao.”
    
“Right, and Lao continues in 78: ‘All the world knows that the weak overcomes the strong and the soft overcomes the hard. But none can practice it. Therefore the sage says: He who suffers disgrace for his country Is called the lord of the land. He who takes upon himself the country’s misfortunes Becomes the king of the empire. Straight words seem to be their opposite.’”
    
“I can only add, ‘in the long run.’”
    
“Now here is 79: ‘To patch up great hatred is surely to leave some hatred behind. How can this be regarded as good? Therefore the sage keeps the left-hand portion (obligation) of a contract And does not blame the other party.’ And he ends this passage with what Chan calls a ‘common ancient proverb’ to wit: ‘The Way of Heaven has no favorites. It is always with the good man.’”
    
“And the ‘good man’ is the one who follows the Dao of things of course.”
    
“Now here is an interesting quote having nothing to do with Daoism, other than Lao’s usual back to nature and down with civilization motif, I mean this from 80: ‘Let the people again knot cords and use them (in place of writing).’ What does that remind you of Karl?”
    
“It reminds me of the Inca.”
    
“That is correct. The Inca did not have a writing system and they kept records and even sent messages by means of knotted cords called quipu. I just find it very interesting that both ancient China and the Inca civilization had these methods of communication. It may even be pre-Inca. Who knows how far back in time this went?” [We can’t read the quipu today.]
    
“Well it can certainly lead to interesting speculation. Are you suggesting some prehistoric contact between the Chinese and the Inca or their predecessors? The Inca were rather late you know, around 1200 AD or so.”
    
“Not really. I just thought it was a strange coincidence.”
    
“You know, Fred, if that quote was from 80 we have come to the end of the “Daode Jing.” It only has 81 chapters.”
    
“Right you are Karl, and here is the last quote I’m going to read: ‘A good man does not argue; He who argues is not a good man. A wise man has no extensive knowledge; he who has extensive knowledge is not a wise man. The sage does not accumulate for himself. The more he uses for others, the more he has himself. The more he gives to others, the more he possesses of his own. The Way of Heaven is to benefit others and not to injure. The Way of the sage is to act but not to compete.’”
    
“I see an altruistic moral sense at work here, but it contradicts some of the previous passages about keeping the people ignorant, etc., it can’t really benefit the people to be lacking in knowledge....”
    
“Ignorance is bliss.”
    
“When knowledge is folly--but you still need knowledge to be aware of folly. If Laozi had been consistent he would have thought the “Daode Jing” itself was folly and never have written it! And he is just wrong about the relation between the wise man and knowledge. Extensive knowledge of the uses of plants and herbs, etc., in medicine or how to take care of animals, or what foods to grow and how to do it, or how to read the weather signs to be able predict storms or floods, etc., are all examples of being ‘wise’ by accumulating ‘extensive knowledge.’ I can see why the Confucian sages were upset with many of the ideas floated about in this book. But I’m glad we went over it since it is so important in the history of Chinese thought.”
 
“The most important Daoist was actually Zhuangzi (369-286 B.C.) and we won’t understand Daoism without discussing him.”
 
“OK. We will do him next. A Marxist Discussion of Zhuangzi.”

​To read the Confucius Dialogue click here.
To read the Mencius Dialogue click here.
To read the Xunzi Dialogue click here. 
​To read the Mozi Dialogue click here.

​“Well, Karl, what do you know about the Legalists and Han Fei in particular?”
 
 
“I remember what Reese [“Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion” by William L. Reese] says.  That he lived in the Third Century B.C., that he was the Prince of Han and committed suicide in 233 B.C. because the King of Qin wouldn’t accept his services. He is the major philosopher in the Legalist School.”
 
 
“Pretty good. Chan calls this school the most radical of the schools for its rejection of Confucianism (morality) and Moism (religion). Remember, the Qin Kingdom conquered the other Chinese Kingdoms and the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.) set up the imperial system, under the First Emperor, that ruled China until 1912. The dubious claim to fame of the Legalists is that they helped set up the ideological framework for the Qin. Han Fei was the most important of a line of Legalist philosophers. He also studied under Xunzi and, unjustly I think, some of his more ‘totalitarian’ tendencies have been read back into his teacher. Legalist predecessors were Kuan Chung (Seventh Century B.C.), Lord Shang, Prime Minister of Qin (Fourth Century B.C.), his contemporary, the Prime Minister of Han, Shen Buhai and Shen Dao (c.350-275 B.C.). Chan notes that his fellow student with Xunzi, Li Si, who died in 208 B.C. was behind the suicide of Han Fei. I can’t believe he killed himself just because he couldn’t get a job with the future First Emperor!”
 
 
“That does seem strange. Here is some more info in Creel [H.G. Creel “Confucius and the Chinese Way”]. It seems Li Si actually turned the King against Han Fei by telling him that he would not support Qin in a war against Han. Han Fei was tossed into prison and forced to kill himself by Li Si. That makes more sense.”
 
 
“It also makes Li Si a fake sage! That type of behavior seems completely against all the teachings of the philosophers we have so far discussed! Xunzi would not have liked that at all. Why did he do it?”
 
 
“His motive makes it even worse. He knew that Han Fei was a better philosopher than he, and he was jealous that the King would prefer him. Li Si was already a minister in Qin when Han Fei came to offer his services.”
 
 
“So, are we ready to look at the “Han Feizi” and see what this new philosophy was all about?”
 
 
“I’m ready, Fred.”
 
 
“Chan says Han Fei is most famous for his synthesis of Legalist views and for his discussion of the Dao which influenced all the Daoists of note. I will begin with Chan’s first selection ‘1. The Synthesis of Legalistic Doctrine.’ Han Fei starts by noting that Confucianism and Moism are the most popular philosophies and attacks them for trying to pretend they represent the wisdom of the old sage kings. Han Fei is against using the past as a model for the present and future. He says, since no one can really tell what the old sage-kings' true teachings were or how to apply them today, then, ‘To be sure of anything without corroborating evidence is stupidity, and to base one’s argument on anything about which one cannot be sure is perjury. Therefore those who openly base their arguments on the authority of the ancient kings and who are dogmatically certain of Yao and Shun are men either of stupidity or perjury.’ “
 
 
“Technically, while Mo may have mentioned Yao and Shun, it was Wen and Tang and Wu and Yu that he appeals to most of the time in the Chan extracts. But in principle Han Fei’s argument is against both Mo and Confucius.”
 
 
“This next quote shows that the Legalists were in favor of a government of laws and not of men! ‘Although there is a naturally straight arrow or a naturally round piece of wood [once in a hundred generations] which does not depend on any straightening or bending, the skilled workman does not value it. Why? Because it is not just one person who wishes to ride and not just one shot that the archer wishes to shoot [so bending and straightening of wood is needed as a skill-tr]. Similarly, the enlightened ruler does not value people who are naturally good and who do not depend on reward and punishment. Why? Because the laws of the state must not be neglected, and government is not for only one man. Therefore the ruler who has the technique does not follow the good that happens by chance but practices the way of necessity ....’ And Chan remarks, ‘In the necessity of straightening and bending, note the similarity to Xunzi. The theory of the originally evil nature of man is a basic assumption of the Legalists.”
 
 
“I still say that Xunzi was not like the Legalists. I pointed this out at the start of our discussion on the Xunzi.”
 
 
“And I said I agreed with you. You will be happy to know that Chan also agrees with you and not with Fung [Fung Yu-lan, “A Short History of Chinese Philosophy”] who holds that Han Fei based his doctrines on those of Xunzi.”
 
 
“Well, I like that! Just what does old Chan have to say about this issue Fred?”
 
 
“He says the bending and straightening in Xunzi meant education and the like, but Han Fei only relied on rewards and punishments. Chan said, ‘Xunzi had a firm faith in man’s moral reform but the Legalists have no such faith.’ And, he adds, ‘It is misleading, at least, to say, as Fung does, that Han Feizi based his doctrines on the teachings of Xunzi.’ This is because they ‘were utterly different in their attitudes toward man as a moral being.’”
 
 
“I’ll buy that. So, let’s go on with some more of the ‘Han Feizi’.”
 
 
“Sure. Han Feizi says the enlightened ruler needs four things to ensure his success. Namely, the ‘timeliness of the seasons,’ the support of the people, ‘skills and talents,’ and finally a position of power. He says, ‘Acting against the sentiment of the people, even Meng Pen and Xia Yu (famous men of great strength) could not make them exhaust their efforts. Therefore with timeliness of the seasons the grains will grow of themselves.’ In fact with all four conditions, then, ‘Like water flowing and like a boat floating, the ruler follows the course of Nature and enforces an infinite number of commands. Therefore he is called an enlightened ruler....’”
 
 
“Sounds like Daoism.”
 
 
“You couldn’t be more right Karl. Chan’s comment on that quote I just gave is, ‘Of all the ideas of the Legalists, perhaps the most philosophical is that of following Nature, which was derived from the Daoists.’ And, although he did not include it in his “Source Book”, Chan says that one of the chapters in the “Han Feizi” is a commentary on the thought of Laozi.”
 
 
“That’s excellent. Does he get more specific about law?”
 
 
“Try this. ‘The important thing for the ruler is either laws or statecraft. A law is that which is enacted into the statute books, kept in government offices, and proclaimed to the people. Statecraft is that which is harbored in the ruler’s own mind so as to fit all situations and control all ministers. Therefore for law there is nothing better than publicity, whereas in statecraft, secrecy is desired....’”
 
 
“Sounds a little like Machiavelli.”
 
 
“He goes on, ‘Ministers are afraid of execution and punishment but look upon congratulations and rewards as advantages. Therefore, if a ruler himself applies punishment and kindness, all ministers will fear his power and turn to the advantages.’”
 
 
“Yes, I remember this. The ‘two handles’ of government--reward and punishment. Machiavelli says a prince is better off being feared than loved, and I see that Han Fei also goes in for the fear factor.”

“Yes he does. A minister gets punished if he does something small after having said he would do something big, but also if he expects to do something small and it turns out to be big. Han Fei says, ‘It is not that the ruler is not pleased with the big accomplishments but he considers the failure of the big accomplishments to correspond to the words worse than the big accomplishments themselves. Therefore he is to be punished....’”
 
 
“That certainly won’t encourage ministers to surpass themselves! That seems counter-productive. I understand being punished for big talk and little deeds, but if you set out to do only a little yet accomplish something big despite yourself, I think it is not wise for the ruler to punish you. Suppose you said you would delay the enemy while the ruler collects his forces and instead you are able to defeat the enemy. What is the sense of being punished?”
 
 
“I agree with you Karl but that is the way Legalists play the game. Here is what Chan says about it. ‘Like practically all ancient Chinese schools, the Legalists emphasized the theory of the correspondence of names and actualities. But while the Confucianists stressed the ethical and social meaning of the theory and the Logicians stressed the logical aspect, the Legalists were interested in it primarily for the purpose of political control. With them the theory is neither ethical nor logical but a technique for regimentation.’”
 
 
“Well that it is, but it will not really work in the interests of the ruler. In fact the Qin Legalist state fell apart shortly after the death of the First Emperor. Don’t forget that Han Fei had to commit suicide, a victim perhaps of his own Machiavellian position.”
 
 
“Here is a big attack on the Confucianists.”
 
 
“This should be good!”
 
 
“This attack is also directed at Mozi so his doctrines were still around. ‘At present Confucianists and Moists all praise ancient kings for their universal love for the whole world, which means that they regarded the people as parents [regard their children].... Now, to hold that rulers and ministers act towards each other like father and son and consequently there will necessarily be orderly government, is to imply that there are no disorderly fathers or sons. According to human nature, none are more affectionate than parents who love all children, and yet not all children are necessarily orderly.’”
 
 
“So here come the ‘two handles’.”
 
 
“It seems to be the case Karl. Han Fei says that you have to have laws against the disorderly people in the state. He makes the point that ‘people are submissive to power and few of them can be influenced by the doctrines of righteousness.’”
 
 
“That’s the case in empirical states that haven’t been designed to conform to Confucian ideals. Why should we limit ourselves to these kinds of state?”
 
 
“Because that is being realistic. Look, Han Fei says, at what happened to Confucius in the real world. In the real world ‘Duke Ai of Lu was an inferior ruler. When he sat on the throne as the sovereign of the state, none within the borders of the state dared refuse to submit. For people are originally submissive to power and it is truly easy to subdue people with power. Therefore Confucius turned out to be a subordinate and Duke Ai, contrary to one’s expectation, became a ruler. Confucius was not influenced by Duke Ai’s righteousness; instead, he submitted to his power. Therefore on the basis of righteousness, Confucius would not submit to Duke Ai, but because of the manipulation of power, Confucius became a subordinate to him. Nowadays in trying to persuade rulers, scholars do not advocate the use of power which is sure to win, but say that if one is devoted to the practice of humanity and righteousness, one will become a true king.’”
 
 
“Just the view of Plato as well as al-Farabi [872-950 A.D, great Islamic Aristotelian]. But you don’t have to tell me that Han Fei thinks that that is bunk.”
 
 
“With a vengeance! It looks to me that he wouldn’t support any of the Confucian policies and would rather see a big military state--Sparta rather than Athens! He says, ‘The state supports scholars and knights-errant in times of peace, but when an emergency arises it has to use soldiers. Thus those who have been benefited by the government cannot be used by it and those used by it have not been benefited.’”
 
 
“It does look like a professional army would fulfill his ideas. But, that type of army is parasitical in times of peace and it makes oppression by the government so much the easier. I presume his reference to ‘knights-errant’ is a swipe at the Moists.”
 
 
“Here are some more of his ideas, ‘If in governmental measures one neglects ordinary affairs of the people and what even the simple folks can understand, but admires the doctrines of the highest wisdom, that would be contrary to the way of orderly government. Therefore subtle and unfathomable doctrines are no business of the people.... Therefore the way of the enlightened ruler is to unify all laws but not to seek for wisemen and firmly to adhere to statecraft but not to admire faithful persons. Thus laws will never fail and no officials will ever commit treachery or deception.’”
 
 
“You know Fred, I don’t think that this is an either/or type of situation. I’m sure the Confucians would also agree that the people should not be left out of consideration. They always advocated education. That doesn’t mean that just because you have the elementary schools you have to abandon the university--which is what Han Fei seems to be saying. His emphasis on ‘statecraft’--the secret machinations of the ruler’s brain seems to conflict with his confidence in the ‘laws’ and introduces arbitrariness into the system. As for officials never committing treachery or deception--look what happened to him. Either Li Si, a Legalist himself, committed treachery or Han Fei was engaged in deception and the future First Emperor was right to imprison him. But the consensus is that Han Fei was innocent. Therefore he was the victim of ‘statecraft’ and in this instance the laws failed. I think it was this contradiction in his system that led to its untenability in the long run and why Confucianism, which is more balanced and nuanced, somewhat succeeded. I would also like to point out that his stress on the ‘common people’ is probably due to the influence of Daoism and this influence is also the reason he failed to integrate popular education and ‘the doctrines of the highest wisdom.’ For him these doctrines didn’t exist in the Confucian or Moist sense.”
 
 
“I think you are right Karl. These next words have a real Daoist flavor. He says, ‘In regard to the words [of traveling scholars], rulers of today like their arguments but do not find out if they correspond to the facts. In regard to the application of these words to practice, they praise their fame but do not demand accomplishment. Therefore there are many in the world whose talks are devoted to argumentation and who are not thorough when it comes to practical utility.... In their deeds scholars struggle for eminence but there is nothing in them that is suitable for real accomplishment. Therefore wise scholars withdraw to caves and decline the offering of positions.’”
 
 
“Very Daoist! Too bad Han Fei did not take his own advice. If he had gone to live in a cave somewhere instead of going off to take a position in Qin, and struggling for eminence with Li Si, he would not have ended up having to commit suicide.”
 
 
“Here is the last quote from this section of Chan. ‘Therefore in the state of the enlightened ruler, there is no literature of books and records but the laws serve as the teaching. There are no sayings of ancient kings but the officials act as teachers. And there are no rash acts of the assassin; instead, courage will be demonstrated by those who decapitate the enemy [in battle]. Consequently, among the people within the borders of the state, whoever talks must follow the law, whoever acts must aim at accomplishment, and whoever shows courage must do so entirely in the army. Thus the state will be rich when at peace and the army will be strong when things happen.’”
 
 
 
“Wow! This is no good. ‘No literature of books’--this will result in a violation of the Prime Directive as the only views available will be Legalist and thus authority rather than reason will end up ruling people’s minds.”

“Chan says, ‘The advocation of prohibiting the propagation of private doctrines eventually led to the Burning of Books in 213 B.C. and in the periodic prohibitions of the propagation of personal doctrines throughout Chinese history.’”
 

“Chan wrote that before the ‘Cultural Revolution’, which was neither ‘cultural’ nor a ‘revolution,’ we can see the bad effects of this doctrine are still alive. Not allowing ‘personal doctrines’ means only state sanctioned ‘truth’ is allowed, a sure condition for ending up as far away from being able to find ‘truth’ as you can imagine. I hate to seem critical of the Chinese government, especially as it has raised the Chinese people out of feudal despair and into the modern world, but they should heed Carl Sagan’s advice that ‘The cure for a fallacious argument is a better argument, not the suppression of ideas.’” I’m not singling out China. Every government in the world could do better in this respect.”
 
 
“Well put Karl, but now I’m going to go over the other section that Chan has in his “Source Book”, namely Han Fei’s discussion of Daoism, which Chan calls ‘one of the most important.’ Chan calls this section ‘Interpretations of Dao.’ Are you ready for this?”
 
 
“Ready!”

 
“OK, here goes, ‘Dao is that by which all things become what they are. It is that with which all principles are commensurable. Principles are patterns (wen) according to which all things come into being, and Dao is the cause of their being. Therefore it is said that Dao puts things in order (li). Things have their respective principles and cannot interfere with each other, therefore principles are controlling factors in things. Everything has its own principle different from that of others, and Dao is commensurate with all of them [as one]. Consequently, everything has to go through the process of transformation. Since everything has to go through the process of transformation, it has no fixed mode of life. As it has no fixed mode of life, its life and death depend on the endowment of material force (qi) [by Dao]. Countless wisdom depends on it for consideration. And the rise and fall of all things is because of it. Heaven obtains it and therefore becomes high. The earth obtains it and therefore can hold everything....’”
 
 
“He seems to be following Laozi fairly closely.”
 
 
“Yes indeed, as the following shows as well. ‘Whatever people use for imagining the real [as the skeleton to image the elephant] is called form (xiang). Although Dao cannot be heard or seen, the sage decides and sees its features on the basis of its effects. Therefore it is called [in the ‘Laozi ] “shape without shape and form without objects.”’”
 
 
“Sort of like ‘Gravity” with Newton. It couldn’t be seen or heard but the effects, as with the falling apple, led Newton to work out its features. The great law that controls everything, like Gravity, that is the Dao.”
 
 
“Han Fei goes on. ‘In all cases principle is that which distinguishes the square from the round, the short from the long, the course from the refined, and the hard from the brittle. Consequently, it is only after principles become definite that Dao can be realized.’”
 
 
“But Dao is the basis of principle! To keep my Newton analogy going, I would have to say that it is only when objects are manifesting their attraction that Gravity can be realized.”
 
 
“It is the ‘eternal’ Dao that Han Fei is interested in. He says, ‘Only that which exists from the very beginning of the universe and neither dies nor declines until heaven and earth disintegrate can be called eternal. What is eternal has neither change nor any definite particular principle itself. Since it has no definite particular principle itself, it is not bound in any particular locality. This is why [it is said in the ‘Laozi’] that it cannot be told. The sage sees its profound vacuity (xu) and utilizes its operation everywhere. He is forced to give it the name Dao. Only then can it be talked about. Therefore it is said, “The Dao that can be told of is not the eternal Dao.”’”
 
 
“Does Chan say why this is ‘most important’?”
 
 
“Yes he does. He goes into this passage with a long comment. ‘This is one of the earliest and most important discussions of Dao. It is of great importance for two reasons. First, principle (li) has been the central concept in Chinese philosophy for the last eight hundred years, and Han Fei was one of the earliest to employ the concept. Secondly, to him Dao is not an undifferentiated continuum in which all distinctions disappear. On the contrary, Dao is the very reason why things are specific and determinate. This is a radical advance and anticipated the growth of Neo-Daoism along this direction in the third and fourth centuries A.D.’”
 
 
“That completes our treatment of Han Fei?”
 
 
“It does. You know, I think we need to discuss Laozi and Daoism as this philosophy is almost equal to Confucianism in Chinese thought. If we want to really understand China today then we must understand the ‘Dao’ of Chinese Communism so we should get a grip on the thought of Laozi.
 
 
O.K., let’s do it next.

​To read the Confucius Dialogue click here.
To read the Mencius Dialogue click here.
To read the Xunzi Dialogue click here. 
To read the Mozi Dialogue click here.

​As rich nations stockpile COVID-19 vaccines, China is providing a lifeline to Global South nations spurned by Western pharmaceuticals and excluded by the West’s neocolonial vaccine nationalism. So why is China being smeared for its efforts?

​United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called it “the biggest moral test” facing the world today. World Health Organization Director General Tedros Adhanom warned of a “catastrophic moral failure” whose price would be paid with the lives of those in the world’s poorest countries. 
​   
Such cautionings of inequitable global vaccine distribution have been shunted to the margins; instead, optimistic chatter of “returning to normal” is circulating once again as Global North citizens line up for their long-awaited COVID-19 vaccine. But normal, as ever, is relative: public health advocates warn that some countries may not be able to even begin their vaccination campaigns until 2024.      

Vaccine apartheid is here, and it is revealing once more the ways our world continues to be structured by the geopolitical binaries of colonialism, capitalism, and racism. The People’s Vaccine Alliance reports that rich countries have bought enough doses to vaccinate their populations three times over. Canada alone has ordered enough vaccines to cover each Canadian five times over. Until March, the United States was hoarding tens of millions of AstraZeneca vaccines—not yet approved for domestic use—and refusing to share them with other countries (only under immense pressure did the Biden administration announce it would send doses to Mexico and Canada). Israeli officials, lauded for delivering a first dose to more than half of its citizens, have likened their responsibility to vaccinate Palestinians living under apartheid to Palestinians’ obligation to “take care of dolphins in the Mediterranean.” The European Union has extended controversial “ban options” which allow member states to block vaccine exports to non-EU nations. Meanwhile, countries like South Africa and Uganda are paying two to three times more for vaccines than the EU.

As of March 2021, China had shared 48% of domestically-manufactured vaccines with other countries through donations and exports. By contrast, the United States and United Kingdom had shared zero. ​

While the Global North hoards global vaccine stockpiles, China—alongside other much-maligned states such as Russia and Cuba—is modeling a very different practice of vaccine internationalism. As of April 5th, the Foreign Ministry reported that China had donated vaccines to more than 80 countries and exported vaccines to more than 40 countries. Science analytics firm Airfinity reported that as of March 2021, China had shared 48% of domestically-manufactured vaccines with other countries through donations and exports. By contrast, the United States and United Kingdom had shared zero. China has also partnered with more than 10 countries on vaccine research, development, and production, including a joint vaccine in collaboration with Cuba.   
​
Crucially, China’s vaccine sharing has provided a lifeline to low-income Global South nations who have been out-bidded by rich nations racing to stockpile Western-made vaccines. Donations to African nations including Zimbabwe and Republic of Guinea, which both received 200,000 Sinopharm doses in February, have allowed those countries to begin vaccine rollouts for medical workers and the elderly rather than wait months or even years for access to vaccines through other channels. Just a week after Joe Biden ruled out sharing vaccines with Mexico in the short term, the country finalized an order for 22 million doses of China’s Sinovac vaccine to fill critical shortages.

Even more, Chinese vaccine aid has reached countries isolated from global markets by sanctions and embargoes enforced by the United States and its allies. In March, China donated 100,000 vaccines to Palestine, a move praised by the Palestinian health ministry for enabling the inoculation of 50,000 health workers and eldery in Gaza and the West Bank who have been cut off from accessing Israeli vaccine rollouts. Venezuela, with many of its overseas assets frozen by U.S. sanctions, received 500,000 vaccines donated by China in a gesture praised by Nicolás Maduro as a sign of the Chinese people’s “spirit of cooperation and solidarity.” China’s international vaccine policy follows the broad pattern of China’s early pandemic aid, which similarly equipped low-income and sanctions-starved nations with the tools to combat the pandemic at home. 

In the face of a global pandemic that the U.S. alliance has used as a political cudgel against China, China’s vaccine internationalism has been a natural outgrowth of its philosophy of mutual cooperation and solidarity. From rapidly sequencing the viral genome and making it immediately publicly accessible to world researchers, to sending medical delegations to dozens of nations around the world, China’s pandemic response has been guided by a simple axiom of global solidarity. Xi Jinping made China the first nation to commit to making a COVID-19 vaccine a global public good in May 2020, meaning any Chinese vaccine would be produced and distributed on a non-rivalrous, non-excludable basis. In a telling contrast, that commitment came just as President Donald Trump threatened to permanently freeze U.S. funding to the World Health Organization in an attempt to punish the organization for daring to work cooperatively with Chinese health officials. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has similarly emphasized vaccine solidarity, urging his colleagues at the United Nations Human Rights Council in February that “solidarity and cooperation is our only option.” Wang chastised countries that he noted are “obsessed with politicizing the virus and stigmatizing other nations” and implored that global vaccine distribution be made “accessible and affordable to developing countries.” China’s record to date shows it is working to follow through on the lofty rhetoric its officials have used to implore global solidarity to defeat the pandemic. ​

Because China’s vaccine internationalism models a form of multilateral cooperation beyond the scope of U.S. hegemony, it has been met with relentless media propaganda designed to cast China’s vaccination efforts as shady, manipulative, and unsafe. In November 2020, the Wall Street Journal gleefully announced that Brazil had suspended trials of the Sinovac vaccine following an “severe adverse event.” Jair Bolsonaro, the right-wing Brazilian president and Trump ally, declared it a “victory.” Casual observers would reasonably assume that there were serious safety issues with the Chinese vaccine; only closer reading would fill in the crucial context, that the cause of death of the participant was in fact suicide. A similar ruse was exploited in January, as headlines blasted that a Peruvian volunteer had died in the midst of a Sinopharm vaccine trial. Again, behind the salacious headlines was a crucial detail: the volunteer, who died of COVID-19 complications, had received the placebo rather than the vaccine.  ​

As study after study shows the efficacy of Chinese and Russian vaccines, the media has turned to painting vaccine aid and exports as a dangerous form of “vaccine diplomacy.” Human Rights Watch nonsensically described China’s vaccine aid as a “dangerous game,” citing conspiracies about the research development of Chinese-made vaccines. The New York Times wondered if China had “done too well” against COVID-19, claiming that the government was “over-exporting vaccines made in China in a bid to expand its influence internationally.” Headline after headline bemoaned that China was “winning” at vaccine diplomacy, making clear that Western pundits view the lives of Global South peoples as pawns in a zero-sum game valued only insofar as they further the interests of Western hegemony.   

Some advocates say the bias against Chinese vaccines is based both on geopolitics and racist notions of scientific expertise. Achal Prabhala, coordinator of the AccessIBSA project, which coordinates medical access in India, Brazil and South Africa, said “the entire world—not just the West—is incredulous at the idea that you could have useful science in this pandemic come out of places not in the West.” Yet he emphasized the importance of Chinese and Indian vaccines as a “lifeline” to low and middle-income countries, both in addressing vaccine gaps in the developing world and as a “useful cudgel” for negotiations with Western pharmaceuticals. 

Despite mainstream media tropes of Chinese “vaccine diplomacy,” it is the United States—not China—whose pharmaceutical companies are employing exploitative tactics to profit from vaccine sales. Pfizer, for instance, has been accused of “intimidating” Latin American governments in their vaccine sale negotiations, asking countries to put up embassy buildings and military bases as collateral to reimburse any future litigation costs—leading countries like Argentina and Brazil to reject the vaccine outright. One can only imagine the media hysteria which would ensue were Sinopharm to be caught demanding overseas military bases as collateral for its vaccine exports. But because it is a U.S. company, Pfizer’s medical neocolonialism has been absolved and flown under the radar. 

Despite allegations of Chinese vaccine opportunism, it is the United States which has politicized its recent foray into vaccine exports. During his first meeting with leaders of the “Quad,” an anti-China alliance likened to NATO and consisting of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, Joe Biden announced his intention to use the alliance to produce one billion vaccines for distribution in Asia in an explicit bid to “counter” China. It is telling that while China stresses global cooperation through channels such as COVAX (to which it has donated 10 million doses) the WHO, and the UN peacekeeper’s vaccination program, the United States is pursuing vaccine diplomacy through a highly-politicized military alliance designed to contain China. Likewise, despite the Biden administration’s lofty rhetoric about its leadership over a global “rules-based order,” it is the United States which has violated a UN Security Council resolution demanding a global military ceasefire to facilitate pandemic cooperation with recent airstrikes in Syria.    
​
Perhaps most egregiously, the United States and other rich nations have blocked a proposed World Trade Organization waiver on intellectual property restrictions which would enable Global South countries to manufacture generic versions of COVID-19 vaccines. Proposed by South Africa and India with the backing of China, Russia, and the majority of Global South nations, Global North obstruction of vaccine IP waivers in the WTO makes clear that the status quo of vaccine apartheid is not an accident, but a product of deliberate policy by Western nations to put the profits of their pharmaceutical companies above the lives of the world’s poor.

​Obstruction of vaccine IP waivers in the WTO makes clear that the status quo of vaccine apartheid is not an accident, but a product of deliberate policy by Western nations to put the profits of their pharmaceutical companies above the lives of the world’s poor.

With Global North nations stockpiling vaccines and experts warning that new rounds of vaccinations may be necessary to combat COVID-19 variants, critical vaccine shortages are here to stay. China’s manufacturing power and macroeconomic policy puts it in a position to continue to be the world leader in vaccine production. As of April, China’s Sinovac announced it had reached the capacity to produce a whopping 2 billion doses of CoronaVac per year, thanks in part to Beijing district government efforts to secure the company additional land for vaccine production. China’s vaccine production builds on the successful model of state intervention and coordination through which state-owned enterprises and private companies rallied to construct hospitals, manufacture PPE, and coordinate food supplies during China’s February 2020 outbreak. 

The vaccine policies forwarded by China versus the U.S. and its allies serves as a microcosm for two very different worldviews: where China has insisted on global solidarity to defeat the pandemic, the Western world has refused to ease the pressures of its neocolonial regime. While China supports bids for vaccine equity in the WTO and UN, the Global North is bolstering vaccine apartheid for the sake of corporate profits. These differences alone ought to be enough to put to rest vacuous assertions that render U.S.-China conflict as a matter of “competing imperialisms.”  
​
Xi Jinping stressed at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic a commitment to “protect people's lives and health at all costs.” Not when it is profitable, not when it is geopolitically expedient—at all costs. Western obstruction of efforts towards vaccine equity forwarded by China, Cuba, South Africa, and other Global South nations only reveals the very different calculus which governs the West’s continuing neocolonial regime.

​“Good morning Fred Are you ready to begin our discussion of Mozi?”
 
“I certainly am, but he is rather new to me. I mean, everyone has heard of Confucius and Laozi.”
 
“It's true. Mozi is not as well known as the other two. Mozi lived around 479 to 381 B.C.--somewhere in that range. We really don’t know too much about him. We have a 53-chapter book called the “Mozi” which is made up of his writings and those of some of his followers. He lived at the end of the feudal period of the Zhou Dynasty a little after the time of Confucius and was in the ‘warrior class.’  This class somewhat resembled and probably inspired what the Japanese developed as the class of the Samurai. Mo, (the “zi” is an honorific suffix meaning “master”—i.e., “teacher”) thought up a philosophy contrary to the Confucians and which he hoped would solve all the practical problems of humanity. He was the leader of a band of warriors--such bands were quite common in those days--but he would only go into action to try and prevent war or to protect the underdog who was being unjustly attacked. This was not common for those days or any days including our own (with the possible exception of the type of military aid given by the Cubans).”
 
“Well, Karl, I have my copy of Chan [W.T. Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy] which starts with Chapter 15 on ‘Universal Love’. It begins with a question ‘But what are the benefits and harm of the world?’ To which Mozi responds, “Take the present cases of mutual attacks among states, mutual usurpation among families, and mutual injuries among individuals, or the lack of kindness and loyalty between ruler and minister, of parental affection and filial piety between father and son, and of harmony and peace among brothers.’”
 
“OK Fred, that pretty much sums up the ‘harm of the world’ and it is as true of our times as it was in Ancient China even if Mo only makes male references due to his patriarchal culture. We will have to add ‘mothers and daughters’ as well as ‘sisters’ to the mix.”
 
“Mozi next explains why the world is in such sad shape, that is, where did all these problems come from. Mo says “They arise out of want of mutual love. At present feudal lords know only to love their own states and not those of others. Therefore they do not hesitate to mobilize their states to attack others. Heads of families know only to love their own families and not those of others. Therefore they do not hesitate to mobilize their families to usurp others. And individuals know only to love their own persons and not those of others. Therefore they do not hesitate to mobilize their own persons to injure others.’”
 
“So, ‘want of mutual love’ is the source of our woes!”
 
“Exactly, he says ‘Because of want of mutual love, all the calamities, usurpations, hatred, and animosity in the world have arisen. Therefore the man of humanity condemns it.’”
 
“And with what is he going to replace it?”
 
“'It should be replaced by the way of universal love and mutual benefit.’”
 
“Which is?”
 
"'It is to regard other people’s countries as one’s own. Regard other people’s families as one’s own. Regard other people’s person as one’s own. Consequently, when feudal lords love one another, they will not fight in the fields.... Because of universal love, all the calamities, usurpations, hatred, and animosity in the world may be prevented from arising. Therefore the man of humanity praises it.’” [“Universal love” is a traditional translation of the Chinese jiān'ài, 兼愛 which is also rendered “impartial care.”]
 
“You know, many great philosophers and some, but not all, religious leaders have said more or less the same thing. I think all the great humanist thinkers, West or East, would be in general agreement. But they will differ with Mo about the practicality of his proposal and if there should be some distinctions within his concept of ‘universal’. This will be the ‘battle line’. Mo will want absolute universality which he thinks is the only way peace and harmony will come about.”
 
“That is right, Karl, and Mo takes up the challenge as I will now read. Here is the objection: ‘But now gentlemen of the world would say: Yes, it will be good if love becomes universal. Nevertheless, it is something distant and difficult to practice.’ To which Mo responds, ‘This is simply because gentlemen of the world fail to recognize its benefit and understand its reason.’”
 
“I remember Chan’s comment on this passage. That Mo used ‘benefits’ or ‘results’ as the motivation for his doctrines. This is similar to our philosophy of pragmatism. C.S. Peirce had something called the ‘pragmatic maxim’ his own Prime Directive as it were: ‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’ Granted that this is a theory of meaning but we can see its relation to Mo. Mo is saying, the ‘Mohist Maxim’: ‘Consider what benefits we conceive our belief to have. Then, our conception of the benefits is the whole of our conception of the rightness of our belief.’ This is the theory of truth of Mohism.”
 
“I have the Chan comment right here Karl. He doesn’t make the point you do but does contrast the ‘Mohist Maxim’ of yours with Confucianism. The Confucian thinks the ‘inferior’ man is after ‘benefits’. The Confucian is interested in ‘righteousness.’ “
 
“Does he give references?”
 
“He cites the Analects 4:11,16; 15:17; 17:23”
 
“Let me see.” Karl took Chan’s book and looked through it. “The last two are not in here,” he said. He then pulled down a copy of the complete work (the “Analects”) and looked at it.
 
“Well, none of these references are quite on the mark. Confucius is really condemning material goodies and profit. I think the ‘Mohist Maxim’ goes way beyond this limited conception of ‘benefits.’ World peace would be a Mohist ‘benefit’ and that is not the same as ‘profit’. World peace would even be a motivation to action for a Confucianist who could interpret it as ‘righteousness’ to benefit humanity (ren).”
 
“I will continue with the Mo quote. In this passage he explains how universal love even though difficult can be brought about. ‘Formerly Duke Wen [ruled 636 to 628 B.C.] of Jin liked his officers to wear coarse clothing. Therefore all his ministers wore [simple] sheepskin garments, carried their swords in [unadorned] leather girdles, and put on hats of plain cloth. Thus attired, they appeared before the ruler inside and walked around the court outside. What was the reason for this? It was because the ruler liked it and therefore the ministers could do it. Formerly, King Ling of Chu [ruled 530 to 527 B.C.] wanted people to have slender waists. Therefore all his ministers limited themselves to one meal a day. They exhaled before they tied their belts.... What was the reason for this? It was because the ruler liked it and therefore the ministers could do it.”
 
“This looks like ‘revolution from above’!”
 
“Wait! There is more. ‘Therefore Master Mo said: Now to eat little, to wear coarse clothing and to sacrifice one’s life for fame are things all people in the world consider difficult. But if the ruler likes them, the multitude can do them.... What difficulty is there in this (universal love)? Only the ruler does not make it his governmental measure and officers do not make it their conduct.’”
 
“This is definitely ‘revolution from above’! The Ruler only has to desire that a policy be carried out and voilà! He also mixes up the ‘ministers’ with the ‘multitude’. It's one thing to order the ministers to implement a policy, it's really quite another to think that the people will just obey and carry out the directions because ‘the ruler liked it.’
 
“Chan has a comment about this too Karl. He says “Universal love is promoted by Mohism because of its beneficial results. There is no conviction that it is dictated by the inherently good nature of man or by the inherent goodness of the act. Although Confucianism teaches love with distinctions, it also teaches love for all, but it does so on the grounds of moral necessity and of the innate goodness of man.’”
 
“Well that’s interesting. There seems some confusion in what Chan says, however. I can agree that the Mohist Maxim is at work here and not a belief in the innate goodness of humans but I must demur concerning Chan’s comment about the ‘inherent goodness of the act.’ That comment makes no sense to a Mohist because the ‘inherent goodness’ of an act just is the ‘benefits’ that result from it. The real question revolves around the nature of man, which is the basis for the Confucian critique. 
 
“Mo thinks that there are historical examples of the practice of his philosophy. To the objection that his theory is impracticable, and that universal love and mutual benefit cannot be put into action he replies, “Ancient sage kings did practice them. How do we know this to be the case? In ancient times, when Yu [first ruler of the Xia Dynasty, he ruled c. 2183-2175 BC] was ruling the empire, he dug the West and the Yu-tou rivers in the west to release the water from the Chu-sun-huang River [he did similar works in the east, north and south]...in order to benefit the peoples of Ching, Chu, Kan, and Yueh and the barbarians of the south. This is the story of Yu’s accomplishments. This shows that my doctrine of universal love has been practiced.’” 
 
“Weak!”
 
“Chan finds another contrast with the Confucians here. ‘While Confucianists cited historical examples for inspiration and as models, Mozi cited them to show that his teachings had been demonstrated. The difference between the idealistic and practical approach is clear.’”
 
“For whatever reason it seems like a common practice to refer to tradition for authority even if your ideas are new. This is not a uniquely Chinese practice.”
 
“Here is another of Mo’s arguments: ‘In ancient times, when King Wen [first ruler of the Zhou Dynasty who ruled c. 1751-1739 BC] ruled the Western Land, he shone like the sun and the moon all over the four quarters as well as the Western Land. He did not permit a big state to oppress a small state, or the multitude to oppress the widow or widower, or the ruthless and powerful to rob people’s grains or livestock. Heaven recognized his deeds and visited him with blessings. Consequently, the old and childless were well adjusted and enjoyed their full life span, the lonely had opportunity to fulfill their work among mankind, and the orphaned had the support to grow up....It shows that my doctrine of universal love has been practiced.’”
 
“I need to make two comments here. ‘Heaven recognized his deeds, etc...’ seems too anthropomorphic for Chinese thought at least on the ‘sage’ level....”
 
“Wait up, Karl, the next section is all about ‘The Will of Heaven.”
 
“OK, then. My second comment is that it seems that universal love is just the construction of a welfare state. There is obviously more to it than that or the Confucians would not be so upset with Mo.”
 
“OK Karl, before turning to ‘The Will of Heaven”, Chapter 26 of the Mozi, I’ll let Mo have the last word on ‘Universal Love’: ‘If rulers of the world today really want the empire to be wealthy and hate to have it poor, want it to be orderly and hate to have it chaotic, they should practice universal love and mutual benefit. This is the way of the sage-kings and the principle of governing the empire, and it should not be neglected.’”
 
“Even today Mo’s words are worth listening to. The ‘rulers of the world today’ have no concern for these ideas. Instead, with their aggressive military plans, their failure to help the poor and starving throughout the world, their do nothing environmental and AIDS policies, they seem to be just like the rulers of Mo’s day, only out to aggrandize their own selfish interests (Cuba excepted since its history of extension of medical aid and moral support to oppressed people everywhere is well known).
 
“Here is what Mo has to say about ‘righteousness’ and ‘heaven’. ‘Now what does heaven want and what does heaven dislike? Heaven wants righteousness and dislikes unrighteousness. Therefore, in leading the people of the world to engage in practicing righteousness, I should be doing what heaven wants.’”
 
“We must, Fred, keep in mind that, ‘righteousness’, for Mo means his doctrine of Universal Love. This is not the same meaning that Confucius gave to the term. As Fung points out [Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy], the term for Confucius was a ‘categorical imperative’ (although this is not the correct term). Confucius just meant there are unalterable moral duties which must be done out of duty regardless of consequences. Of course, other considerations, as long as they are moral, can override what may seem to be, at first glance, a particular duty. Notice also Mo’s appeal to ‘heaven’. This is similar to claims made by Western religious leaders, usually when reason is not on their side.”
 
“Mo continues: ‘I say: With righteousness the world lives and without righteousness the world dies, with it the world becomes orderly and without it the world becomes chaotic. Now, Heaven wants to have the world live and dislikes to have it die, wants to have it rich and dislikes to have it poor, wants to have it orderly and dislikes to have it chaotic. Therefore I know Heaven wants righteousness and dislikes unrighteousness.’”
 
“This expresses Mo’s view all right, but is not a very good argument despite the ‘therefore.’ How do you know Heaven wants righteousness? Because righteousness makes the world live and Heaven wants the world to live, ergo. This is R=L, H=L | H=R. Something like Nazis like their mothers, so do communists, therefore communists like Nazis. So, besides being a poor argument, even were it a good argument it just pushes the problem back a step--i.e., how do you know Heaven wants the world to live (as opposed to being indifferent). Because Heaven likes righteousness? And Heaven likes righteousness because it wants the world to live? He is running around in a circle here. His argument for Universal Love will have to stand on its own merits which right now means an appeal to the benefits it will bring the world. Despite Mo’s plans there is no ‘divine’ or ‘heavenly’ sanction for the Mohist Maxim.”

​“And Chan makes the following observation: ‘Even the will of Heaven and righteousness are explained in terms of practical results.’”
 
“Yes, but I think it important to look at the logic involved as well.”
 
“Now he says, ‘Moreover, righteousness is the standard. It is not to be given by the subordinate to the superior but be given from the superior to the subordinate. Therefore the common people should attend to their work with all their might, and should not forthwith set up the standard themselves.’”
 
“I am afraid we are about to discover the feudal limitations to Mo’s views.”
 
“Well Karl, he says, ‘Gentlemen of the world of course clearly understand that the emperor gives the standard to the three ministers, the several feudal lords, the minor officials, and the common people, but the common people of the world do not clearly understand that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor. Therefore the ancient sage-kings of the Three Dynasties [Xia, Shang, and Zhou]. Yu, Tang, and Wu, desiring to make it clear to the common people that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor, all fed oxen and sheep with grass and dogs and pigs with grain, and cleanly prepared pastry and wine to sacrifice to the Lord on High and spiritual beings and pray to Heaven for blessing. But I have not heard of Heaven praying to the emperor for blessing. I therefore know that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor. Thus the emperor is the most honorable in the world and the richest in the world. Therefore those who desire honor and wealth cannot but obey the will of Heaven.’”
 
“I don’t know about feeding grain to dogs, but this sounds like an accurate view of the feudal mentality at this time in China and even right up until a hundred or so years ago. At this time the Greeks already were experimenting with democracy and letting the common people [hoi polloi] have their say. The Chinese are thinking more along the lines of the Persians. I think this shows the advantages of the city state or polis over larger territorial entities. Meanwhile notice all this ‘Heaven’ and ‘spiritual beings’ talk. Unlike Confucius, Mo is trying to give an aura of popular religion, quite foreign to the sentiments of most educated Chinese, to his philosophy. This is a real violation of the Prime Directive of Philosophy [only use Reason].”
 
“The Mozi goes on: ‘Well, how did Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu obtain rewards? Mozi said: On the highest level they honored Heaven, on the middle level they served spiritual beings, and on the lower level they loved the people. Therefore the will of Heaven proclaimed, “They love universally those whom I love. They benefit universally those whom I benefit. Such love of people is really universal and such benefit to people is really substantial.” Therefore Heaven caused them to have the honor of being Sons of Heaven and possess the wealth of the whole empire.’”
 
“More religious coloring.”
 
“Even more coming up because now we see what happens to bad rulers! ‘Well how did Jie [last of the Xia dynasty], Zhou, Yu [R. 781-771 BC], and Li [R. 878-842 BC] incur punishment? Mozi said: On the highest level they blasphemed against Heaven, on the middle level they blasphemed against spiritual beings, and on the lower level they injured the people. Therefore the will of Heaven proclaimed, “They set themselves apart from those whom I love and hated them. They injure all those whom I benefit. Such hatred of people is really universal and such injury to people is really substantial.” Therefore Heaven caused them not to live out their life-span or to survive their generation.’”
 
“And what conclusions can be drawn from all this?”
 
“It's as Mo says--the ruler must follow righteousness i.e., practice universal love. Not doing so means that one has to rule by means of violence against the people! This leads to your undoing. Therefore following Mo’s philosophy ‘is beneficial to Heaven on the highest level, beneficial to spiritual beings on the middle level, and beneficial to man on the lower level. Being beneficial to these three means being beneficial to all. Therefore the whole world gives them a good name and calls them sage-kings.’ As for those bad rulers that go against Heaven, spiritual beings, and the people, ‘Not being beneficial to these three means not being beneficial to all. Therefore the whole world gives them a bad name and calls them wicked kings.’”
 
“I can’t think of any other Chinese philosopher who made such a pitch to religion. Mo was obviously trying to spread his ideas to the common people, not the educated elite!”
 
“Chan would agree with you Karl. His comment on all this is as follows: ‘In teaching obedience to the will of Heaven, Mozi was the most religious of ancient Chinese philosophers’”
 
“Unless he was a hypocrite.”
 
“A hypocrite? Why would you say that?”
 
“Listen to what Fung says about this. ‘Mozi’s proof of the existence of spirits is done primarily in order that he may introduce a religious sanction for his doctrine of all-embracing love, rather than because of any real interest in supernatural matters.’ He then quotes a passage not found in Chan’s book. This is from Chapter 31 of the Mozi: ‘If now all the people of the world could be made to believe that the spirits can reward the good and punish the bad, would the world then be in chaos?’ On the basis of this Fung concludes that Mo’s ‘doctrine of the Will of God and the existence of spirits is only to induce people to believe that they will be rewarded if they practice all-embracing love, and punished if they do not. Such a belief among the people was something useful; hence Mozi wanted it.’”
 
“That is highly speculative. Fung can’t know what Mo really thought. Are we not bound to respect the text, everything else being equal?”
 
“Oh, I think so. The Prime Directive and the text are all we have to go on. But it would not be, if Fung is right anyway, the only instance of a philosopher, or religious leader, telling one thing to hoi polloi while having another doctrine--the ‘real’ doctrine--for his followers.”
 
“The next selection in Chan is from Chapter 35 and he calls it ‘Attack on Fatalism. Pt. 1’. “
 
“This is the Chinese word “ming” which we translate as fate. “
 
“Yes, and Mozi used it to describe people both he and we would call ‘fatalists.’ Why do anything since Fate has already determined everything that will happen?”
 
“Those people are like those who think that since God is all powerful everything that happens happens according to His will. Some Marxists are like that too. Since ‘socialism’ is inevitable all we have to do is sit back and wait for it to happen. Another word we could use is ‘determinism.’ Everything is determined by the laws of nature and the previous state of the universe so we really can’t do anything except what has been predestined or predetermined. That, Fred, pretty much catches what Mo means by ming.”
 
“Well Mo does not approve of them. He says, ‘With this doctrine they tried to persuade the kings, dukes, and great officials above and to prevent the common people from doing their work. Therefore the fatalists are not men of humanity. Their doctrine must be clearly examined.’”
 
“I remember this. Mo puts forth a scientific procedure for looking at knowledge claims. Very advanced for his time.”
 
“That it is. He says that in order to examine a doctrine or knowledge claim some ‘standard’ must be adopted. Actually, he will have three standards. ‘For any doctrine some standard must be adopted. To expound a doctrine without a standard is like determining the directions of sunrise and sunset on a revolving potter’s wheel. In this way the distinction of right and wrong and benefit and harm cannot be clearly known. Therefore for any doctrine there must be the three standards. What are the three standards? Mozi said: [1] There must be a basis or foundation. [2] There must be an examination. [3] And there must be practical application. [1] Where to find the basis? Find it in the [will of Heaven and the spirits] the experiences of the ancient sage-kings above. [2] How is it to be examined? It is to be examined by inquiring into the actual experience of the eyes and ears of the people below. [3] How to apply it? Put it into law and governmental measures and see if they bring about benefits to the state and the people. These are called the three standards.’”
 
“This is a very good passage Fred. It could be updated to apply to the Chinese government today .”
 
“How so?”
 
“Well, [1] would be replaced by the experiences of the international communist and worker’s movements as well as what happens when you join the World Bank and the IMF. [2] This means that there should be more democratic procedures by which the masses of the Chinese people can get their opinions taken into consideration. I’m not saying the Party has to back off, but that it should be more inclusive and democratic. [3] This can stand as it is!”
 
“Chan agrees with this procedure. I think he calls it ‘pragmatic’. You can see the Mohist Maxim at work in [3] and his religious views in [1]. I can see why the Chinese government of today would have to change that. Chan actually says this is a ‘surprisingly scientific procedure: basis, examination, and application.’”
 
“Does he say anything else about fatalism, Fred?”
 
“He ends the discussion by reiterating the dangers of the idea and that human action is not all that important. He really opposes the “que será,será” attitude. ‘If the doctrine of the fatalist is put into practice, the ruler above would not attend to government, and the people below would not attend to their work.’ He is also upset because he says the religious duties won’t be carried out either. Why bother if you are a fatalist? ‘Therefore on the higher level fatalism is not beneficial to heaven, on the middle level it is not beneficial to spiritual beings, and on the lower level it is not beneficial to men. The unreasoning adherence to this doctrine is the source of evil ideas and the way of the wicked man. Therefore Mozi said: If the gentlemen of the world today really want the world to be rich and dislike it to be poor, and want the world to be orderly and dislike it to be chaotic, they must condemn the doctrine of fatalism. It is a great harm to the world.’”
 
“I can tell you that if you were a contemporary Mohist you would think the gentlemen of today in our new century do not really want the world to be rich rather than poor, nor do they dislike its being chaotic.”
 
“How so, Karl?”
 
“Because our so-called leaders don’t apply the Mohist Maxim to the problems confronting mankind today. Take the position of universal love for example. We have to think of all peoples and nations the same way--try to show love and understanding to everyone. This would mean in our own country that Blacks and Hispanics as well as whites, Amerindians, and others would all be the same--really not in just theory. Yet our leaders are still playing games with affirmative action, equal access to jobs and education. This shows they prefer evil ideas to universal love. There would also have to be an end to all the nonsense about ‘illegal aliens’ and hunting poor people down on the borders and trying to deport them. That doesn’t show any kind of universal love. The leaders would have to provide medical care and medicines, and housing, and education, and decent food for everyone without worrying that this might conflict with the so-called ‘rights’ of certain people or corporations to make money at the expense of these services not being available to everyone on an ‘as needed’ basis. This is all demanded in the name of ‘universal love.’ The military would have to go too. We have to share all the world's goodies with all the people of the world--love demands nothing less. That means the Arabs and the Jews in the Middle East have to start loving each other--and it is up to the leaders to set the example for the people to follow. The land has to be shared and in fact, Jews, Muslims and Christians, as well as Buddhists and others have to get together on one religion for everyone.”
 
“Oh Boy!”
 
“What can I say. Anything that divides the people and causes hatred and violence contradicts universal love and must go. Different religions do just that. Remember the Mohist Maxim. ‘Consider what benefits we conceive our belief to have., etc.’ If the gentlemen of today really want a peaceful and caring world they have to get together and start practicing universal love. But I think you would agree that they really only care about their own nations and groups and within their own groups and the rich and powerful only want to perpetuate their own selfish interests. Therefore a contemporary Mohist would be most upset with the gentlemen of today.”
 
“Did you say ‘Mohist’ or ‘Maoist’?”
 
“I know. But I said ‘Mohist.’ We will discuss Mao some other time and see if your snide comment is justified.”
 
“Now there are six more points which Chan thinks are important for a good understanding of Mohism.”
 
“So let’s get on with it. What is the first?”
 
“We discussed his ‘utilitarianism’ or ‘pragmatism’ before, but we should note these additional quotes. ‘Mozi said: Any word or action that is beneficial to Heaven, spiritual beings, and the people is to be undertaken.... Any doctrine that can elevate conduct should be perpetuated....In issuing orders, promoting any undertaking, employing the people, or expending wealth, the sage-kings in their administration never do anything that is not useful. Therefore re- sources are not wasted and the people can be freed from being overworked, and many benefits will be promoted....’”
 
“Again, this shows the Chinese penchant of trying to justify the ideas of the present by an appeal to the way things were done in the past. This is not just a Chinese trait! I think this quote agrees with my views about contemporary Mohism expressed a little while ago. What is the second point?”
 
“The second point is his condemnation of war. Mo hated war even though he was in the professional mercenary class! He would only fight defensive wars. As far as war is concerned, He wrote: ‘The multitude are injured and oppressed and the people are scattered.... Does it mean to benefit the people? The benefit to the people from killing the people of Heaven is slight indeed! And calculate the cost! This is the root of destruction of life. It exhausts the people to an immeasurable degree. Thus... no benefit to the people can be attained.’”

“Mo may have been the most concerned for the welfare of the common people, at least in this respect, than any of the ancient philosophers--east or west! What is the third point?”
 
“This is his condemnation of music. He talks about music, but you could extend his critique to art as such, all forms of art. Again he sounds like Mao. That’s why I asked you ‘Mo or Mao’?”
 
“Ok, Ok! What’s the passage?”
 
“’The reason why Mozi condemns music is not because the sounds of the big bells, resounding drums, harps and pipes are not delightful.... But set against the past it is not in accord with the deeds of the sage-kings and checked with the present it is not in accord with the benefits of the people. Therefore Mozi said: To engage in music is wrong.... To levy heavy taxes on the people in order to produce the sounds of big bells, resounding drums, harps, and pipes does not help the promotion of benefits and the removal of harms in the world.... Now kings, dukes, and great officials engage in music. To strike musical instruments they loot the people’s resources for food and clothing to such an extent.... Now kings, dukes, and great officials love music and listen to it, they certainly cannot go to court early and retire late in order to listen to litigations and administer the government. Therefore the country is in chaos and the state in danger.... Therefore Mozi said: To engage in music is wrong.’”
 
“Well, Fred, the condemnation is not against music per se. I can see no objection to folk music or the music the peasants might be playing in the villages. He is attacking the exploitation of the people by the court in order to support the official music [and art] productions of the state. This even sounds a little Daoist. Under appropriate non-exploitative social arrangements, even Mo would approve of music as ‘delightful’. This is the Mohist Maxim again. If we could create a society where music was beneficial and not based on exploitation of the people, I can’t see why a modern Mohist would object. As far as your reference to Mao, this was the original intention of Mao, however it may have turned out.”
 
“The fourth point is the condemnation of elaborate funerals. ‘Now the gentlemen of the world still doubt whether elaborate funerals and extended mourning are right or wrong, beneficial or harmful. Therefore Mozi said: I have inquired into the matter.... So, much wealth is buried in elaborate funerals and long periods of work are suspended in extended mourning. Wealth that is already produced is carried to be buried and wealth yet to be produced is long delayed. To seek wealth in this way is like seeking a harvest by stopping farming....’”
 
“This is very much in tune with his condemnation of music. Archaeologists won’t like this point! What’s the fifth point?”
 
“This is a point about who should be getting government positions. ‘How do we know elevating the worthy is the foundation of government? The answer is: When the honorable and the wise run the government, the ignorant and the humble remain orderly, but when the ignorant and the humble run the government, the honorable and the wise become rebellious. Therefore we know that elevating the worthy is the foundation of government.’”
 
“Very good, Fred. But who are the ‘honorable and wise’?”
 
“Who? I’ll tell you. They are the practitioners of universal love. That is, they should be. They should be true sages and philosophers. So Mo is saying just what Plato said. Philosophers should be the ones running the show! And of course the Confucians would be in agreement with Mo. Only instead of Mohist sages, Confucian sages would be in charge.”
 
“But who would be the true sages?”
 
“I’ll let you decide. We have covered some Confucians: Kongzi (Confucius) himself, Mengzi (Mencius) and he attacked Mo’s views on universal love, and we have discussed Xunzi to see whose arguments appear the better.”
 
“Well, Karl, here is our sixth and last point. Chan calls it ‘Agreement with the Superior.’ I’m not sure Mo looks too good in this section.”
 
“Let’s get with it!”
 
“He says: ‘Now, the frequent arrival of hurricanes and torrents are the punishment from Heaven upon the people for their failure to agree with Heaven....’”
 
“Yes, that is very bad, very superstitious. Like blaming God for the Lisbon earthquake in Voltaire’s day. This is retrograde compared to Confucius and Xunzi. This really calls in question Fung’s apologetics concerning Mo’s belief in the supernatural.”
 
“Now we get an answer to the question ‘How do we know that the principle of agreement with the superior can be used to govern the empire?’ This principle is important to Mo who after all was the supremo of a band of warriors and who definitely thought in terms of military obedience to the ‘superior.’ We get this answer from a consideration of Mo’s theory of the beginning of government.”
 
“This should be interesting!”
 
“Mo thinks that originally people did not have rulers. Everybody had their own way of doing things and their own moral and ethical system. ‘All of them considered their own concepts of right as correct and other people’s concepts as wrong. And there was strife among the strong and quarrels among the weak. Thereupon Heaven wished to unify all concepts of right in the world. The worthy were therefore selected and made emperor.’ The emperor then selected the ministers who then divided up the land and created the feudal lords all in the furtherance of better government since the emperor could not do everything by himself.”
 
“This sounds like the ‘Divine Right of Kings’ in so far as it appears that ‘Heaven’ somehow chose the emperor and while all other authority is delegated from him, his rests on that original choice. The ‘Mandate of Heaven’ is due to the desire of ‘Heaven’--Mo’s anthropomorphic god concept-- to have only one universal standard of ‘right’ prevail. Just like the Christians and others following Augustine’s views that there is a universal standard ‘God’s Will’.
 
“Muslims and Jews too, Karl.”
 
“Everybody gets into the act. At least Mo appeals to his utilitarian principles of benefit so that the sages have to figure out Heaven’s will. He doesn’t maintain that ‘Heaven” or its representatives came down and told him what its will was.”
 
“Yes, but if the sage gets it wrong there is Zeus with his thunderbolt!”
 
“Finish the passage.”
 
“’The feudal lords, realizing their inadequate wisdom and ability to govern the lands within the four borders by themselves, selected the next best in virtue.... Therefore, in appointing the three ministers, the feudal lords, the great officers, the prime minister, the village elders, and the heads of households, the emperor of old did not select them because of their wealth, high position, or leisure, but employed them to assist in bringing political order and administering the government.... When order prevails in the empire, the emperor further unifies all concepts of right as one in the empire and makes it agree with [the will of] Heaven. Therefore the principle of agreement with the superior can be applied by the emperor to govern the empire, by the feudal lords to govern the state, and the heads of households to govern the family....’”
 
“I remember Chan’s saying that many thought this smacked of absolutism. It reminds me of the Führerprinzip in a way, only it’s Heaven rather than a plebiscite that determines the ruler--but then vox populi, vox dei.”
 
“I thought you liked Mo’s views.”
 
“I like some of them. This Führerprinzip is not one of them. But, I suppose that it derives from the ideal of a sage king who understands the will of Heaven. This could also reflect back negatively on Plato’s philosopher kings.”
 
“Listen, Karl, Chan plays down the absolutism. After all, that's a concern of modern times not ancient China with its emperor system. Although I can see how some people might think of Mao again--with the will of the Party rather than the will of Heaven. Or was Mao’s will the will of the Party rather than the other way around?”
 
“Well, I suppose the saving grace here is that it is not a subjective will which is at stake. Philosophy is called in to determine what is the best thing to do to promote the general good (by definition the will of Heaven) and this is to be objectively determined by the sage or philosopher king. So it’s really not absolutism in the sense of the personal will of the ruler. So Mo, Mao and Plato may be off the hook!”
 
“Well, that's it for the Mozi selections in Chan. Who's next?”
 
“I think we should look at Daoism and discuss Laozi.”
 
“Fine. Let's do him next"

​To read the Confucius Dialogue click here.
To read the Mencius Dialogue click here.
To read the Xunzi Dialogue click here. 

​After a restful evening, Karl and Fred were together again in Karl’s study for an early morning discussion of the philosophy of Xunzi. 
 
“I see you have Chan’s text [Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy] of The Xunzi open before you Fred. Are you ready to begin our discussion? Let's find out if his views are compatible with Marxism or, as they say: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics."
 
“Ready and willing Karl.”
 
“Well then, let's begin.”
 
“What do you know about Xunzi?”
 
“Only that he lived a couple of generations after Mencius. I remember that Mencius was born around 371 and died around 289 BC, while Xunzi lived from about 298 to 238 BC. I also know that he is usually considered the anti-Mencius because, as opposed to Mencius’ view that people are born naturally ‘good’, he said they are naturally ‘evil’. And I do remember reading in Chan that ancient Confucianism is seen as developing along two different roads leading away from Confucius himself. Namely, the Idealist School or Road of Mencius and the Naturalistic School or road of Xunzi.
 
“What else do you remember?”
 
“Let’s see. You better help me out.”
 
“Ok. Chan remarks that 1. His philosophy was dominant over that of Mencius up until and throughout the Han period--206 BC to 220 AD. He is also said to have been partially responsible for the Qin Dynasty and the repressive dictatorship of the ‘First Emperor’. That must be the first ‘modern’ emperor as we have those olden time emperors the sages are always talking about. The Qin Dynasty was short lived--221-206 BC....”
 
“Don’t forget we have Goodrich’s Short History here [L. Carrington Goodrich, A Short History of the Chinese People]. Qin unified China under the First Emperor (Qin Shi Huang). The first one to unify China into a large empire--a unification that has lasted until modern times. He was a real tyrant, and his empire was overthrown a few years after his death by the people who founded the Han Dynasty. He is, as I recall, best known to most people today as the emperor who had all those terracotta warriors made that are such a tourist attraction in modern day China. He also has an opera written about him named “The First Emperor.’”
 
“That’s right Karl. And Chan says two of Xunzi’s students Han Fei and Li Si were ministers of Qin.”
 
“I don’t see how Xunzi can be tarred with the brush of Qin totalitarianism. He died before the rise of the Qin to total control of China. Anyway, he was honored as the greatest Confucianist until the end of Han times and the Han would never have allowed him that status if they considered him as an ideological forerunner of their mortal enemies the Qin.”
 
“That sounds right. But to continue. Chan points out that he was a native of Zhao one of the seven major states of ancient China and moved to Qi when he was fifty so he could hang out with other scholars. Later he went to Chu, served briefly as a magistrate, taught students, and then died there. He wrote his own book rather than relying on his students to make a compilation of his sayings. Chan writes that he ‘was contemporaneous with Mencius but there is no evidence that the two ever met.’”
 
“Which is not too strange as by Chan’s own dates for these two Xunzi would have been nine years old when Mencius died!”
 
“Chan has translated three of the most important chapters of the Xunzi which covers all the main points of Xunz’s philosophy. There are thirty-two chapters in the Xunzi, but these are the big one’s for philosophy. Ready?”
 
“Ready!”
 
“We begin with chapter seventeen, ‘On Nature.’ Xunzi says, ‘Nature (Tian, Heaven) operates with constant regularity.... Respond to it with peace and order, and good fortune will result. Respond to it with disorder, and disaster will follow.... If the Way is cultivated [followed?] without deviation then Nature cannot cause misfortune. Therefore flood and drought cannot cause a famine, extreme cold or heat cannot cause illness, and evil spiritual beings cannot cause misfortune. But if the foundations of living are neglected and used extravagantly. the Nature cannot make the country rich.’”
 
“It is obvious that this is an advanced view for the times Fred. The laws of nature are invariable and if human beings learn them and work with them all will be well. Nature does not cause famines is a good example of this. We can figure out the cycles of Nature, knowing that droughts, etc., are common, that floods occur, etc., we make sure we plan on storing up food for the lean years. If we fail to take proper actions we will have a famine. It is not to be blamed on Nature but on our lack of foresight and knowledge.”
 
“That makes sense, he continues saying famines, sickness, etc., ‘cannot be blamed on Heaven: this is how the Way works. Therefore one who understands the distinctive functions of Heaven and man may be called a perfect man.’ But you know, this sounds like ‘guns don’t kill people, people kill people.’”
 
“It certainly does. I think Xunzi would agree with that. But note, since we know that people use guns to kill people and there are many irresponsible people, it would make sense to limit the gun supply. This would be knowing ‘the distinctive functions of Heaven and man.’”
 
“Chan’s comment is interesting. ‘Xunzi’s concept of Heaven is obviously closer to the Dao of the Daoists than to the Tian (Heaven) of Confucius and Mencius. Their Tian is still purposive, and the source and ultimate control of man’s destiny, but Xunzi’s Tian is purely Nature so that in most cases the word has to be translated as Nature rather than as Heaven. The marvelous thing is that while he accepted the Daoists’ naturalistic view, he was not influenced by their intuitionism and mysticism. In Xunzi, we have rationalism and empiricism instead.’”
 
"While there may be relics of ‘purpose’ in the Tian of Confucius and Mencius it is nothing like we would find Mozi. I think the position adopted by Xunzi is the culmination of tendencies already at work in Confucius and Mencius. This naturalistic way of thinking has simply become more completely manifest in Xunzi. His concept of Heaven is similar to Spinoza’s concept of God. Where Spinoza says ‘Deus siva Natura’, Xunzi says ‘Heaven or Nature’."
 
“We see this naturalism pretty well in the next quote Karl. Xunzi says, ‘Each of the ten thousand things [idiom for ‘everything’] attains its harmony, and thus grows. Each obtains its nourishment and thus achieves full development.... The heart (mind) occupies the cavity in the center to control the five organs. This is called the natural ruler.... The sage purifies his natural ruler, rectifies his natural organs, sufficiently provides for his natural nourishment, follows the natural government, and nourishes his natural feelings so as to bring to completion the work of Nature. In this way he knows what to do and what not to do. Thus he rules heaven and earth and directs the ten thousand things.’”
 
“Except for the usual ancient mix up of the heart and brain, this is well said: an appeal to the use of our reason to guide both our social life and our understanding of Nature.”
 
“He then goes on to say, ‘Therefore great skill consists in not doing certain things, and great wisdom consists in not debating over certain things.’ He illustrates this by pointing out that we should study the stars and the earth and the four seasons, the yin and yang [positive and negative forces], etc., in order to discover the regularities of Heaven/Nature. And Chan adds, ‘Most ancient Confucianists either emphasized humanity (ren) and wisdom equally or stressed humanity. Xunzi, however, emphasizes wisdom. Obviously, inborn humanity has no room in his theory of the innate evil nature of man. As an acquired virtue, humanity is valued. But being a tough-minded realist, he relies on wisdom rather than such an idealistic quality in humanity.’”
 
“Please note that he is not saying that there are no inborn qualities, what today would be called instincts, but that the Confucian idea of ren is not inborn. Specifically he is rejecting the Mencius’ notion of ‘The Four Beginnings’.”
 
“Xunzi also sounds very modern when he proclaims that Heaven’s laws are not designed with humanity in mind. ‘Heaven does not give up winter because people dislike cold.’ And, ‘Heaven has a constant way of action, earth has a constant size, and the superior man has a constant personal demonstration of virtue. The superior man pursues the constant principle, but the inferior man calculates results.’ How does this jive with what you said in our Mencius discussion about Fletcher and situation ethics?”
 
“What do you mean?”
 
“I mean, does not the ‘constant principle’ put Xunzi in the Kantian camp. Wouldn’t he have to be for ‘calculating results’ if he was for situation ethics? So this seems to be another big difference between him and Mencius.”
 
“Wait a minute Fred. I don’t want to concede this point. Let’s look a little more closely at this quote. I think it can be legitimately interpreted to show that Xunzi and Mencius are not really in disagreement.”
 
“I’m all ears.”
 
“Xunzi says what is constant is ‘personal demonstration of virtue’. This amounts to doing the right thing in every circumstance or situation. This is what he means by the ‘constant principle’. The non-philosopher ‘calculates results.’ I take this to mean that he looks for personal advantage and not necessarily what is the right thing to do. Morality is not something you just look up in a book or some iron clad rule [never have an abortion, never mislead someone, etc.] it does depend on results. So when Xunzi says the inferior man ‘calculates results’ he means how the ‘results’ relate to him personally or some plan of his that he wants to accomplish. It can’t mean that the philosopher does not also calculate results. He does. He calculates if his action furthers virtue or not.”
 
“What about this then? ‘As to cultivating one’s will, to be earnest in one’s moral conduct, to be clear in one’s knowledge and deliberations, to live in this age but to set his mind on the ancients (as models), that depends on the person himself. Therefore the superior man is serious (jing) about what lies in himself and does not desire what comes from Heaven. The inferior man neglects what is in himself and desires what comes from Heaven.’ I would think Xunzi would say just the opposite. Heaven’s laws are constant or the same thing, Nature’s. We are part of Nature so we should follow what comes from Nature and just do it. This would be following the Way. The inferior man would try to get out of it and just do what he wants to do--what ‘lies in himself.’”
 
“Hmmm! I see the difficulty, but I think there is an easy explanation of this seeming conundrum. Look back at the word ‘seriousness’ in the quote, the word ‘jing.’ If I remember correctly that word conjures up the idea of ‘effort’ of working hard at attaining something. This is the clue to Xunzi’s meaning. Heaven is neutral, remember, no ‘Four Beginnings’, so we have to work at cultivating virtue. What ‘lies in himself’ is the product of one’s education and struggle to attain virtue. For example, some knowledge of Chinese philosophy now lies within you Fred. This is because you are making efforts to learn about it. What lies in you is a desire to improve yourself and work hard to attain wisdom. The inferior man does not delve into his internal resources to make this effort. He just expects to attain what he wants out of life automatically without making much effort, without seriousness. This is what Xunzi means by saying the inferior man neglects what is in himself and just wants what comes from Heaven.”
 
“Well, that makes sense but seems a little forced to me. But let’s proceed. Things will become clearer as we go along, I’m sure.”
 
“Ok!”

​“I think we are getting into his naturalism in these next quotes. ‘When stars fall or trees make a [strange] noise, all people in the state are afraid and ask, “Why?” I reply: There is no need to ask why. These are changes of heaven and earth, the transformation of yin and yang, and rare occurrences. It is all right to marvel at them, but wrong to fear them. For there has been no age that has not had the experience of eclipses of the sun and moon, unseasonable rain or wind or occasional appearance of strange stars.”
 
“It is obvious Fred, that Xunzi doesn’t believe in portents and the like. There is no supernatural message to be conveyed by what happens in nature.”
 
“And this reinforces his views, ‘When people pray for rain, it rains. Why? I say: There is no need to ask why. It is the same as when it rains when no one prays for it. When people try to save the sun or moon from being eclipsed, or when they pray for rain in a drought, or when they decide an important affair only after divination, they do so not because they believe they will get what they are after, but to use them as ornament (wen) to governmental measures. Hence the ruler intends them to be an ornament, but the common people think they are supernatural. It is good fortune to regard them as ornamental but it is evil fortune to regard them as supernatural.’”
 
“Meaning that if you realize they are ornamental you are one of the educated people and have some idea as to how the world is actually constituted--otherwise you are hoi polloi and will be a manipulated fool for your whole life!”
 
“That is a bit strong don’t you think?”
 
“Not at all Fred. The common people have been manipulated by their rulers since the beginning of history by means of religion and other superstitious beliefs. Even today the government makes sure it has religious professionals on its staff in the armed forces to reinforce and bolster up the superstitious ideas of the soldiers and other cannon fodder it recruits. You see religion being encouraged everywhere. It’s a method for keeping people stupid and docile. Xunzi realizes that and simply explains it so his fellow Confucians will be free from its baneful influence, having as he says ‘good fortune.’ I needn’t tell you how stupid people can be manipulated by religion Fred, just look out of the window at our altered New York skyline after 9/11.
 
“Well, Chan says about the same thing but he is not as vitriolic as you Karl. His comment is as follows, ‘The influence of supernatural forces over man is completely ruled out by Xunzi. What he called spirit is but cosmic change and evolution. To him, in religious sacrifice, whether there are really spiritual beings to receive them does not matter. The important thing is one’s attitude, especially sincerity, in the performance. The sacrifices are “ornaments,” or refined manifestation of an inner attitude.’”
 
“I don’t know if that is really the ‘important thing’ i.e., a refined inner attitude. I don’t know what to make of that. I agree that attitude is important--the attitude of not really believing in the efficacy of the ceremonies. This is what Fung [A Short History of Chinese Philosophy] says in the passage, ‘We pray for rain, and divine before we make any important decision, because we want to express our anxiety. That is all. If we were to take prayer as really able to move the gods, or divination as being really able to make predictions about the future, this would result in superstition with all its consequences (p.150).’”
 
“There is a problematic quote coming up which Chan says looks like it contradicts what has gone before.”
 
“That is just great. There is nothing like an inconsistent opinion to knock over a nice tidy interpretation.
 
Let’s hear it.”
 
"'If propriety and righteousness are not applied in the country, then accomplishments and fame would not shine. Therefore the destiny of man lies in Heaven, and the destiny of the state lies in propriety.’”
 
“I see. This looks like the inferior man is right after all--to want what comes from Heaven since that is where his destiny lies.”
 
“So we do have a contradiction! “
 
“What does he say next? Maybe that will clear up this problem.”
 
“He lists six questions he thinks we should consider. I think these two are the most germane. ‘Instead of regarding Heaven as great and admiring it, Why not foster it as a thing and regulate it? Instead of obeying Heaven and singing praise to it, why not control the Mandate of Heaven and use it?’”
 
“This answers our question about a contradiction. Now I don’t see any. If we would view the rule of propriety to be the constitution of the state, then of course the destiny of the state lies in its constitution, in following its fundamental laws. In China these would be based on Confucian philosophy, so we see where Xunzi is coming from in this respect. Heaven or Nature also follows laws, what we think of as the ‘laws of nature.’ If we understand the laws of nature we can use them to enhance our lives, such as knowing how to control floods, have better agricultural yields, cure disease, etc. That is what he means by ‘the destiny of man lies in Heaven’, he means in the study of its laws, in what we call science. When he says the inferior man just relies on what comes from Heaven he means that kind of man does not see Nature as an object to study and manipulation but, as Spinoza said, prefers ‘to gape at it like a fool.’ When Xunzi said the philosopher cares about ‘what lies in himself and does not desire what comes from Heaven’ he means he doesn’t just wait around to see what happens in Nature. Again, as Spinoza said, he ‘desires as a wise man to understand Nature.’ He doesn’t just sit around and ‘desire’ Nature. He works at trying to understand and manipulate it.”
 
“Yes, that must be the meaning for he goes on to say, ‘Therefore to neglect human effort and admire Heaven is to miss the nature of things.’ And Chan follows this up with the comment, ‘Nowhere else in the history of Chinese thought is the idea of controlling nature so definite and so strong. It is a pity that this did not lead to a development of natural science. One explanation is that although Xunzi enjoyed great prestige in the Han dynasty, his theory of overcoming nature was not strong enough to compete with the prevalent doctrine of harmony of man and nature, which both Confucianism and Taoism promoted.’”
 
“I think we have solved this problem of a potential contradiction in the Xunzi.”
 
“Now we have a quote which shows that situation ethics, which you used to explain some of Mencius’ views, won’t do at all with respect to Xunzi. Listen to this: ‘The [moral principles] that have remained unchanged through the time of all kings are sufficient to be the central thread running through the Way. Things come and go, but if they are responded to according to this central thread, one will find that the principle runs through all without any disorder. He who does not know this central thread does not know how to respond to changing conditions. The essential nature of the central thread has never ceased to be. Chaos is the result of a wrong application of the central thread, whereas order is the result of a complete application of it. For what is considered good according to the Way, namely, the Mean, should be followed.’”
 
“I hope we can deal with a work called The Doctrine of the Mean later Fred, but even so I think this quote does not mean that Xunzi and Mencius are not reconcilable. I said Mencius was not an absolutist and you think this passage shows that Xunzi was, but it is more complicated than that.”
 
“How so? Xunzi definitely speaks of unchanged moral principles--that sounds absolutist to me.”
 
“I think ‘absolutist’ should be used to describe positions that consider both the moral position AND its application as unchanging. Xunzi says that there is a ‘central thread’ but also ‘changing conditions’ and that while the ‘essential nature of the central thread’ doesn’t change only the person who knows how to apply it in ‘changing conditions’ really understands it. Say for a Christian that practicing agape is the central thread. That would be the unchanging moral principle. Now take the idea of ‘abortion’. Is it right or wrong to have an abortion? The Christian thinker would have to look at the situation of the person involved. Following agape the Christian might recommend an abortion to person A and not to person B. The central thread and unchanging moral principal isn’t ‘abortions are bad’ or vice versa but what agape requires. This is situational and is exactly what both Mencius and Xunzi would advocate, except that ren (jen) is substituted for agape. In fact, I would maintain that stripped of the mythological shell that has congealed around its essential heart, Christianity boils down to ren and there is a dialectical identity with Confucianism.”
 
“What!”
 
“Confucianism and Christianity are an identity in difference. They are the same in the same way that ice and steam are the same. They appear different but are really the same. I mean in respect to a humanist morality, a Christianity such as Thomas Jefferson indicated without supernatural overtones added to it.
 
“Well, that is a different conversation entirely Karl. But you have at least convinced me that Xunzi is no absolutist in the way I originally thought.”
 
“That’s good.”
 
“Maybe we will get to your great theory after we finish with Chinese philosophy, but now there is one more point to be made regarding this chapter from the Xunzi. Xunzi makes a lot of comments about other philosophers both of his own times as well as the past. I’m not going into specific criticisms, the point to be made is the following observation by Chan ‘that Xunzi was the most critical of ancient Chinese philosophers. [And] that a great variety of thought and extreme freedom of discussion existed in ancient China, a situation comparable to that in ancient Greece.’”
 
“What is the next chapter in Chan’s translation?”
 
“The next one is chapter twenty-two from the Xunzi, Chan’s selection 2, ‘On the Rectification of Names.’”
 
“A major topic for the ancient Chinese. Please begin Fred.”
 
“Xunzi has reference to the olden days of the sage-kings when he writes, ‘Then the people were carefully led and unified. Therefore, the practice of splitting terms and arbitrarily creating names to confuse correct names, thus causing much doubt in people’s minds and bringing about much litigation, was called great wickedness. It was a crime, like private manufacturing of credentials and measurements, and therefore the people dared not rely on strange terms created to confuse correct names. Hence the people were honest.’”
 
“It looks as if this problem originally arose as a practical problem, a problem of the marketplace. Later, however, it became a more abstract philosophical problem of name rectification.”
 
“I agree. Xunzi thinks that there are three issues involved here. He writes, ‘Should a true king appear, he would certainly retain some old names and create new ones. This being the case, [1] the reason for having names, [2] the causes for the similarities and differences in names, and [3] the fundamental principles on which names are instituted, must be clearly understood.’”
 
“What is the reason he gives for having names?”
 
“’ When different forms are separated from the mind and denote each other, and when different things are made mutually identified in name and actuality, the distinction between the noble and the humble is not clear and similarities and differences are not discriminated. Under such circumstances, there is bound to be danger that ideas will be misunderstood and work will encounter difficulty or be neglected. Therefore men of wisdom sought to establish distinctions and instituted names to indicate actualities, on the one hand clearly to distinguish the noble and the humble and, on the other, to discriminate between similarities and differences.’”
 
“That sounds like a good reason Fred. How does he account for the similarities and differences of names?”
 
“He says, ‘It is because of the natural organs. The organs of members of the same species with the same feelings perceive things in the same way. Therefore things are compared and those that are seemingly alike are generalized. ... The mind [actively] collects the knowledge of the senses. ...But the collection of knowledge must also depend on the natural organs first registering it according to its classification. If the five organs register it without knowing what it is, and the mind collects it without understanding it, then everyone says there is no knowledge. These are the causes for the similarities and differences in names.’”
 
“This sounds just like Hume’s theory of the ‘Association of Ideas!’ It is really amazing how philosophical traditions parallel one another!”
 
“What is this reference to Hume all about?”
 
“Hume thought that ideas also naturally associated. They would sort of stick together and the world would appear to us. Hume used Resemblance, Contiguity (in space and/or time) and Cause and Effect. But this even goes back as far as Plato. He spoke of Contiguity and Similarity [Resemblance] in the Phaedo.”
 
“Well, based on this Karl, we come to the third point Xunzi wanted to make. He continues, right after the last quote I read, ‘Then, accordingly, names are given to things. Similar things are given the same name and different things are given different names.’ But it is very important to note the following: ‘Names have no correctness on their own. The correctness is given by convention. When the convention is established and the custom is formed, they are called correct names. If they are contrary to convention, they are called incorrect names. Names have no corresponding actualities by themselves. The actualities ascribed to them are given by convention. When the convention is established and the custom is formed, they are called the names of such-and-such actualities.’”
 
“And yet, Fred, these conventions are not just arbitrary. If the conventions don’t somehow correspond to reality then names won’t be of much help!”
 
“Xunzi next criticizes the ‘School of Names’--i.e., the so-called ‘Logicians.’ There are three big fallacies he wants to expose. So he begins. ‘”It is no disgrace to be insulted.” “The sage does not love himself.” “To kill a robber is not to kill a man.” These are examples of the fallacy of so using names as to confuse names.’ “Mountains are on the same level as marshes. “The desires seek to be few.” “Tender meat adds nothing to sweet taste, and the great bell adds nothing to music.” These are examples of the fallacy of so using actualities as to confuse names.’ And now this most famous example from the School of Names “’A [white] horse is not a horse.’ “Which he says is an example of the fallacy of so using names as to confuse actualities.’ And finally, the chapter ends with Chan’s comment about all this: ‘The rectification of names was a common topic of discussion among ancient Chinese philosophical schools. Only in Xunzi, however, did it develop into some sort of systematic logical theory.... In fact, this is the nearest approach to logic in Ancient Chinese philosophy.’”
 
“Very informative indeed, Fred. So this brings us to the last excerpt from Chan, doesn’t it?”

“That’s right Karl. Chan’s ‘3. The Nature of Man is Evil’ from chapter 23 of the Xunzi.’
 
“OK, let’s get on with it. What are Xunzi’s reasons for taking this diametrically opposed view to Mencius?”
 
“He says, ‘The nature of man is evil: his goodness is the result of his activity. Now, man’s inborn nature is to seek for gain.... By inborn nature one is envious and hates others.... If these tendencies are followed, lewdness and licentiousness result, and the pattern and order of propriety and righteousness disappear. Therefore to follow man’s nature and his feelings will inevitably result in strife and rapacity, combine with rebellion and disorder, and end in violence. Therefore there must be the civilizing influence of teachers and laws and the guidance of propriety and righteousness, and then it will result in deference and compliance, combine with pattern and order, and end in discipline. From this point of view, it is clear that the nature of man is evil and that his goodness is the result of his activity.’ And, he adds, ‘Crooked wood must be heated and bent before it becomes straight.’”
 
“So much for the ‘Four Beginnings!’ But this is only an assertion, just as in Mencius. Neither Xunzi nor Mencius give any real arguments. Except that Mencius does give some examples such as preventing the child from falling into the well.”
 
“Chan points to another big difference as well. ‘In the Xunzi, rules of propriety and law are often spoken of together, giving the impression that, unlike Confucius and Mencius who advocated propriety (li) as inner control, Xunzi advocated it for external control. Thus rules of propriety shifted from being a means of personal moral cultivation to one of social control.’”
 
“Chan should have re-thought that one Fred. Propriety doesn’t just pop up in a person. These rules are culture specific and learned as we grow up. They are the result of the crooked wood being made straight. One of the ways that social control takes place is by having accepted rules of inner moral cultivation recognized as appropriate--i.e., this is what constitutes propriety.”
 
“I suppose you are right Karl. Now here is a frontal assault on Mencius! ‘Mencius said, “Man learns because his nature is good.” This is not true. He did not know the nature of man and did not understand the distinction between man’s nature and his effort. Man’s nature is the product of Nature; it cannot be learned and cannot be worked for. Propriety and righteousness are produced by the sage. They can be learned by men and can be accomplished through work. What is in man but cannot be learned or worked for is his nature. What is in him and can be learned and accomplished through work is what can be achieved through activity. This is the difference between human nature and human activity.”
 
“I see the distinction Xunzi is trying to make, Fred, but I’m not sure this is really so different from Mencius! The Four Beginnings are, after all, potentialities that have to be cultivated by education. The seed has to be in the right soil.”
 
“Maybe this will make Xunzi’s position clearer. In this passage he further contrasts Mencius’ views with his own. ‘By the original goodness of human nature is meant that man does not depart from his primitive character but makes it beautiful and does not depart from his original capacity but utilizes it, so that beauty being [inherent] in his primitive character and goodness being [inherent] in his will are like clear vision being inherent in the eye and distinct hearing being inherent in the ear. Hence we say that the eye is clear and the ear is sharp.’ “
 
“So the question is, is this idea of Mencius true or not. Left to his or her own devices a normal baby will grow up with “good” sight and “good” hearing. That is to say, normal senses. They won’t need any special training just to work and do their function. Xunzi seems to think that Mencius’ view is that a baby will grow up morally ‘good’ as well because this kind of ‘goodness’, like the ability to see clearly, is just part of our ‘nature.’ But this is not a good analogy Fred. If you go back and look on page 66 of Chan you will find that Mencius says that when the Four Beginnings are properly developed they will work to protect you in life but if they are not developed they won’t.”
 
Fred flipped back some pages in Chan’s book. “Here is the quote, Karl. I’ll read it. ‘When they are fully developed, they will be sufficient to protect all people within the four seas (the world). If they are not developed, they will not be sufficient even to serve one’s parents.’”
 
“So you see the Four Beginnings are not like clear vision and sharp hearing. They have to be developed by outside means which can only be a Confucian educational program in the last analysis.”
 
“I am forced to agree, Karl. But now let Xunzi continue with his notion of ‘nature’ as he wants to contrast his own opinion to that of Mencius. ‘Now by nature man desires repletion when hungry, desires warmth when cold, and desires rest when tired. This is man’s natural feeling. But now when a man is hungry and sees some elders before him, he does not eat ahead of them but yields to them. When he is tired, he dares not seek rest because he wants to take over the work [of elders].... Deference and compliance are opposed to his natural feelings. From this point of view, it is clear that man’s nature is evil and that his goodness is the result of his activity.’”
 
“It is getting more complicated. Perhaps the word ‘raw’ should be substituted for ‘evil.’ Man’s raw uncultivated nature is egocentric and needs to be socialized. But this isn’t evil, it’s natural. I am surprised that Xunzi, who is otherwise, a naturalist, is still animating Nature with a human moral concept! It is clear that by ‘activity’ he means education. So the practical result of either his view or that of Mencius is that without education we are not going to get deference and compliance. The real question is, is education helped out, given a boost as it were, by something innate such as the Four Beginnings or Four Seeds, or however you want to translate this conception.”
 
“We will have to go more deeply into Xunzi’s thought to determine this Karl. I think he was aware of your kind of comment and has an answer to it.”
 
“OK then. Let’s hear some more of the Xunzi.”
 
“'Someone may ask, “If man’s nature is evil, whence come propriety and righteousness? “I answer that all propriety and righteousness are results of activities of sages and not originally produced from man’s nature.’”
 
“And how did that come about?”
 
“He explains how that came about. ‘The sages gathered together their ideas and thoughts and became familiar with activity, facts and principles, and thus produced propriety and righteousness and instituted laws and systems.’ He goes on to point out the pleasures of the senses ‘are natural reactions to stimuli and do not require any work to be produced. But if the reaction is not naturally produced by the stimulus but requires work before it can be produced, then it is the result of activity. Here lies the evidence of the difference between what is produced by man’s nature and what is produced by his effort. Therefore the sages transformed man’s nature and aroused him to activity.’”
 
“I can see problems with this view Fred.”
 
“Just hold your horses. Xunzi is going to give what he considers some evidence for his view. He thinks loving gain and profit is natural and talks about what would naturally happen if brothers have to divide up some property. ‘If they follow their natural feelings, they will love profit and seek gain, and thus will do violence to each other and grab the property. But if they are transformed by the civilizing influence of the pattern and order of propriety and righteousness, they will even yield to outsiders. Therefore, brothers will quarrel if they follow their original nature and feeling but, if they are transformed by righteousness and propriety, they will yield to outsiders.’”
 
“Are you done?”
 
“Not yet! I want to hammer this home as I think Xunzi is onto something here. He says, ‘Now by nature a man does not originally possess propriety and righteousness; hence he makes strong effort to learn and seeks to have them. By nature he does not know propriety and righteousness; hence he thinks and deliberates and seeks to know them. Therefore, by what is inborn alone, man will not have or know propriety and righteousness. There will be disorder if man is without propriety and righteousness. There will be violence if he does not know propriety and righteousness. Consequently, by what is inborn alone, disorder and violence are within man himself.’”
 
“Well, correct me, but didn’t Mencius only propose with his ‘Four Beginnings’ that the basis or potential for propriety and righteousness was inborn? He didn’t say propriety and righteousness were inborn. They are the result of education, which if neglected will lead to the greedy brothers Xunzi speaks of.”
 
“Xunzi obviously thinks Mencius had a stronger position, but I think you are right, at least from what we read in our Mencius discussion. Nevertheless, I want to continue with Xunzi’s thought. I think you will discover that he anticipates your objection about the status of the Four Beginnings as mere potentialities.”
 
“So then, let us proceed!”
 
“He says, ‘Man’s nature is evil. Therefore the sages of antiquity, knowing that man’s nature is evil, that it is unbalanced and incorrect, that it is violent, disorderly, and undisciplined, established the authority of rulers to govern the people, set forth clearly propriety and righteousness to transform them, instituted laws and governmental measures to rule them, and made punishment severe to restrain them, so that all will result in good order and be in accord with goodness.”
 
“How nice. The Hobbesian rabble are running about unrestrained in a state of nature giving vent to their true inborn natures until they are domesticated by the sages. Only how did sages develop? How did they overcome their Hobbesian natures and arrive at propriety and righteousness? Who broke the natural order and taught them?”
 
“Before that can be answered, Xunzi’s position must be further developed. ‘In any discussion, the important things are discrimination and evidence. One can then sit down and talk about things, propagate them, and put them into practice. Now Mencius said that man’s nature is good. He had neither discrimination nor evidence. He sat down and talked about the matter but rose and could neither propagate it nor put it into practice. Is this not going too far? Therefore if man’s nature is good, sage-kings can be done away with and propriety and righteousness can be stopped.’ And he goes on again about how bent wood has to be made straight while straight wood is naturally so.”
 
“These facile analogies go both ways. The bent wood could not be made straight if being straight was not potentially in it. Anyway, Xunzi may have been correct about the propagation of Mencius’ view in his day, but as history developed Mencius’ view trumped the view of Xunzi. This is not an argument in favor of the truth of a view. Aristarchus of Samos developed what later became the Copernican view of the heliocentric solar system back in the Ancient World, but he could not propagate it and Ptolemy’s geocentric view won out until the time of the scientific revolution in the Seventeenth Century. Mencius did have evidence. Just remember the example of the child about to fall in the well--the most famous--and he gave other examples as well. So I don’t think this passage from Xunzi holds water.”
 
“Now you will see Karl, that Xunzi was aware of your type of critique, but did not accept it. He says, ‘The questioner may say, “It is by the nature of man that propriety and righteousness [can be produced] through accumulated effort and hence the sages can produce them.” I answer that this is not true. The potter pounds the clay and produces the pottery. Is the pottery [inherent] in the nature of the potter?... What the sages have done to propriety and righteousness is analogous to the potter’s pounding and producing the pottery.... With reference to the nature of man .... It is the same in the superior or inferior man.... As effort is aroused, propriety and righteousness are produced. Thus the relation between the sages and propriety and righteousness produced through accumulated effort, is like the potter pounding the clay to produce the pottery. From this point of view, is it by the nature of man that propriety and righteousness are produced through accumulated effort...? [Inferior men] are despised because they give reign to their nature, follow their feelings, and enjoy indulgence, and lead to the greed for gain, to quarrels and rapacity. It is clear that man’s nature is evil and that his goodness is the result of his activity.’”
 
“The problem with Xunzi’s position here is that it cannot explain how the sages originally got going. If the nature of man is evil, then all humans would be evil and self-indulgent, and no one would be putting out any accumulated effort to develop propriety and righteousness. We would still be running around like animals. Mencius’ position, however, allows for the show to get on the road. If the Four Beginnings are there waiting to be developed, then we can have a primal horde running about, splitting up into other hordes and the individuals finding themselves in all sorts of different existential situations some of which begin to trigger the Four Beginnings which by accumulated effort lead to being a sage and promulgating propriety and righteousness. But I can’t see how this can come about without the Four Beginnings in the first place. They have to be there as Mencius indicates in potential, so Xunzi is just wrong about this. The Four Beginnings must be accepted as a logical prerequisite to get the Confucian system started.”
 
 
“With regard to what you have just said Karl, listen to Xunzi’s explication of the following old saying.” ‘Any man in the street can become (sage-king) Yu.’ What does this ancient saying mean? I say that Yu became sage-king Yu because he practiced humanity, righteousness, laws, and correct principles. This shows that these can be known and practiced. Every man in the street possesses the faculty to know them and the capacity to practice them. This being the case, it is clear that every man can be Yu.’”
 
“Well, there you have it. The Four Beginnings are just the faculty that we have to practice the ‘good.’ I will grant this to Xunzi. That while he is wrong to say the nature of man is evil, Mencius is also wrong to say that the nature of man is good. They should have both said that man has a nature that has the capacity to be good or evil depending on the circumstances. Listen to these observations from Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. He says, ‘Virtue, then, is of two kinds, of thought and of character--of thought comes through experience and time and is the result of teaching, while virtue of character is the result of habit. Clearly, therefore, by nature, we get none of the virtues of character [1103a15]. The virtues do not arise in us either thru nature or contrary to nature. But we can by nature attain them and achieve complete perfection by means of habit [1103a25].’ And Aristotle also holds that what is by nature cannot be overcome by habit so that if people were either good or evil by nature nothing could make them different from what they are. Habit can be inculcated by education. So, this dispute on the nature of humans between Mencius and Xunzi is a non-issue. Neither of our sages has the right answer. We have the capacity to be either ‘good’ or ‘evil’-- which are social determinations anyway (for the most part). But they are both right as they believe that it takes (Confucian) education to bring about the ‘good’. Their positions are really the same and their so-called dispute is just one of words and not actualities. I think, therefore, we can keep the expression the ‘Four Beginnings’ in our philosophical terminology, but not in the sense that it implies man is ‘innately good’.”
 
“I can’t disagree with you Karl. I think you have hit the nail on the head! Just a few more quotes from Xunzi, now, to answer the question that if everyone can become a sage why don’t they do so. Xunzi’s reply is, ‘An inferior man can become a superior man, but he does not want to. A superior man can become an inferior man, but he does not want to. It is not that they cannot become each other. They do not do so because they do not want to. It is possible for every man to become Yu, but it does not follow that every man in the street is able actually to do so. However, the fact that he is not able actually to do so does not destroy the possibility of his doing so.’”
 
“I don’t think this is wrong, and it does not contradict my views at all. It is all of a piece with Mencius’ view that every man can be like Yao and Shun, also sage-kings from the past.”
 
“Finally, Xunzi concludes, ‘There is a great difference between what is possible on the one hand, and what is actually able to be done on the other.’”
 
"I think Xunzi would also be fine with both Marxism and Confucianism as both agree that it is through education that right and wrong are learned and class consciousness (education through struggle and practice) develops. Activity is required for both. They have some terminological problems, but in the end, they don’t really have any antagonistic contradictions. This applies to Mencius as well."

To read the Confucius Dialogue click here.
To read the Mencius Dialogue click here.

​“Well, Fred, I see you have the Chan book [Source Book In Chinese Philosophy]. Are you ready to begin our study of Mencius?”
 
“Yes I am Karl. But first, why don’t you see what you can remember about the background to the life and times of Mencius?”
 
“As I recall, he lived around the same time that Plato was active in Ancient Greece. What dates does the book give for him?”
 
“Around 371 to 289 BC.”
 
“Well Plato was around 447 to 327 BC.”
 
“Mencius was contemporary with Zhuanzi (Zhuang Zhou, 369-286 B.C.)  and Xunzi (Xun Kuang, c. 319-235 BC)  but it is unlikely they had any personal contact.” [The -zi suffix means “master” so Master Zhuang, Master Xun an honorific for “teacher”). 
 
“I don’t know about them, maybe we can discuss them later. Anyway I remember that Mencius’ claim to fame was his doctrine that human nature is innately good. Also that he studied under Confucius’ grandson, or under someone who had, thus unlike Confucius he had a teacher. He is also considered the second greatest Chinese philosopher after Confucius himself. I read Fung last night [Fung Yu-Lan,(modern, Feng Youlan) A Short History of Chinese Philosophy] and he said Mencius was a native of Zou in East China--modern Shantung. He also says that Mencius represents the idealist wing of Confucianism as opposed to the upcoming Xunzi who was a realist. Mencius is so important that his book, the Mencius as we will call it, was studied for the civil service exams which on and off throughout Chinese history almost everyone who wanted a government position had to take. The only philosophers as such who were so honored were he and Confucius. His life was also like Confucius’ in that he never got that big government job and he wandered about China just as Confucius had collecting a following of disciples. He retired and wrote his book. It became one of the Four Books, as I indicated, which everyone had to study for the ancient civil service tests.
 
“The ‘Four Books’?”
 
“The ones used for the tests. The Analects, of course, the Mencius, the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean.”
 
“A pretty good little introduction Karl. Now let’s look at his philosophy. I’m just going to use the headings from Chan who reproduces Book Six, Part I of the Mencius. He says this is the most important part of the book but he will quote other portions in a section of ‘Additions’. In this selection Mencius’ foil appears to be a philosopher called Gaozi who holds opposite opinions to Mencius. In 6A:2 Mencius declares ‘Man’s nature is naturally good just as water naturally flows downward.’ He doesn’t give any argument here. He is just contradicting Gaozi who said man’s nature can be good or bad just as water can flow east or west.”
 
“I think we need to get to an argument. What is next?”
 
“Next, Gaozi says that what we refer to as ‘inborn’ is the same as ‘nature.’ Mencius wants to contest everything Gao says it seems for we get the following exchange beginning with Mencius: ‘When you say that what is inborn is called nature, is that like saying that white is white?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then is the whiteness of the white feather the same as the whiteness of snow? Or again, is the whiteness of snow the same as the whiteness of white jade?’ ‘Yes.” ‘Then is the nature of a dog the same as the nature of an ox, and is the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?”
 
“That is a very bad argument. Mencius has to go take a Logic course! ‘White’ is being used as an adjective and ‘nature’ as a substantive. I feel sorry for Gaozi. I wonder how he would have fared if he composed a book?”
 
“Now in 6A4 Mencius and Gao have another exchange.”
 
“Let’s hear it. I hope the logic is a little better!”
 
“This time Gao maintains that ‘humanity’ is internal and ‘righteousness’ is external. Nature versus Nurture. He says that the pleasant feeling of love for the younger brother comes from within (humanity) but the respect for an old person is due to the person’s age (without/external). But Mencius says that we love roast beef if it’s our own or another's so would Gao say the love of roast beef is ‘external?’” This is supposed to take care of Gao’s position.”
 
“A very bad example. It might have been better if Mencius had said ‘food’ instead of roast beef since we love and need food regardless of where it comes from but ‘roast beef’ is an external culturally determined food--I doubt that Buddha would have loved it! In any event I don’t think Gao is refuted by any of these musings of Mencius.”
 
“Well, here is another bad argument. This time Meng Jizi asked Gongduzi ‘What does it mean to say that righteousness is internal?” and he gets the reply ‘We practice reverence, and therefore it is called internal.’ Not a very helpful answer if you ask me Karl. Meng Jizi now gives a lot of examples of ‘reverence’ all of which seem influenced by the context one finds oneself in so that one has to know what the external circumstances are before one can show the proper kind of ‘reverence.’ Gongduzi gets all confused and runs off to Mencius who gives him some examples which actually seem to confirm Meng Ji’s views in that they are also contextual in nature. Gongdu gets the point, even if we don't, and goes back to Meng Ji with this crushing reply: ‘In the winter we drink things hot. In the summer we drink things cold. Does it mean that what determines eating and drinking also lies outside?’”
 
“I see what you mean Fred. We would say to Gongdu, ‘of course it is--you just said its determined by winter or summer and that means by what is ‘outside’. The reasoning so far in this chapter is terrible. I hope it gets better or I won’t understand how Mencius got the reputation as a ‘sage’." 
 
“6A:6 Maybe this is a little better Karl. Gongduzi is speaking to Mencius: ‘Gaozi said that man’s nature is neither good nor evil. Some say that man’s nature may be made good or evil, therefore when King Wen and King Wu were in power [founders of the Zhou Dynasty r. 1171-1122 and 1121-1116 B.C.] the people loved virtue, and when Kings You and Li were in power [bad kings r. 781-771 and 878-842 B.C.] people loved violence. Some say some men’s nature is good and some men’s nature is evil. Therefore even under (sage emperor) Yao [3rd millennium B.C.] there was evil man Xiang [who daily plotted to kill his brother], and even with a bad father there was [a most filial] Shun (Xiang’s brother who succeeded Yao), and even with (wicked king) Zhou [last Shang Dynasty ruler 1175-1112 B.C.] as uncle and ruler, there were Viscount Qi of Wei and Prince Began [good guys]. Now you say that human nature is good. Then are those people wrong?’”
 
“I hope Mencius is convincing as most people today would think Gaozi was on the money!”
 
“Well, Mencius said ‘If you let people follow their feelings (original nature), they will be able to do good. This is what is meant by saying that human nature is good. If man does evil, it is not the fault of his natural endowment.... Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not drilled into us from outside. Only we do not think [to find them]! Therefore, it is said, ''Seek and you will find it, neglect and you will lose it.''' He thinks that different people develop their original natures more than others as ‘no one can develop his original endowment to the fullest extent.’ He then quotes the Book of Odes, ‘Heaven produces the teeming multitude. As there are things there are their specific principles. When the people keep their normal nature they will love excellent virtue.’ He also quotes Confucius to the same effect.’ Now before you say anything Karl, I want to also read you what Chan says about this passage. 'Mencius is the most important philosopher on the question of human nature, for he is the father of the theory of the original goodness of human nature. In spite of variations and modifications, this has remained the firm belief of the Chinese.’ And he adds that ‘evil or failure is not original but due to the underdevelopment of one's original endowment. Later Confucianists, especially Neo-Confucianists, devoted much of their deliberations to these subjects, but they have never deviated from the general direction laid down by Mencius.’”
 
“I’m still unimpressed Karl. Mencius is not arguing for his position he is simply declaiming his position. Look here for a moment.” Karl got up and pulled down a volume from his bookcase. “This is a classic study of Chinese thought by Herrlee G. Creel, Chinese Thought From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung. I want to read a couple of passages on what you might call Mencius’ ‘technique’ if you don’t mind.”
 
“Sure Karl, go ahead all of this is interesting to me.”
 
“Here are a couple of quotes from pages 75 and 74: ‘The discussions of Confucius with his disciples were conducted in a relatively calm atmosphere and were devoted, at least in considerable part, to an attempt to arrive at and to examine the truth. [That is the Prime Directive again Fred!] The discussions of Mencius, on the other hand, are largely taken up with the enterprise of defending and propagating the true doctrine, which is of course another thing entirely.’ He also notes that ‘Mencius was usually more interested in winning the argument than in trying to find the truth. Not that he cared nothing for the truth but that he was convinced that he had it already, and needed only to persuade his opponent of that fact.’”
 
“But you say he isn’t doing anything but disclaiming not giving arguments.”
 
“True, but some arguments are coming up I’m sure. He just hasn’t made any yet. I think Creel’s observations will be borne out the farther we progress into the text.”
 
“The following may be more like an argument Karl. 6A:7--’Although there may be a difference between the different stalks of wheat, it is due to differences in the soil, as rich or poor, to the unequal nourishment obtained from the rain and the dew, and to differences in human effort. Therefore all things of the same kind are similar to one another. Why should there be any doubt about men? The sage and I are the same in kind. Therefore Longzi [an ancient worthy] said, “If a man makes shoes without knowing the size of people’s feet, I know that he will at least not make them to be like baskets.” Mencius then says that the whole world [all men] agree with Yi Ya [ancient chef] with regard to flavor, Kuang [ancient musician] with regard to music and that Zidu [ancient handsome man] was handsome. He concludes, 'Therefore I say there is a common taste for flavor in our mouths, a common sense for sound in our ears, and a common sense for beauty in our eyes. Can it be that it is in our minds alone we are not alike? What is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the sense of principles and righteousness (i-li, moral principles). The sage is the first to possess what is common in our minds. Therefore moral principles please our minds as beef and mutton and pork please our mouths.’”
 
“Well I can tell you right off that these are very bad examples for modern people to mull over. Nothing is more relative than taste in food, music and concepts of beauty. Mencius is just taking Chinese standards as universal. This may perhaps be forgiven for someone living well over two thousand years ago except that there were people in his age, as we shall see, who were very much more advanced in their thinking. His analogy of the stalks is a bit better but only goes to show that humans may have a common nature before environmental factors come into play. It does not give any evidence that that common nature is ‘originally good.’"
 
“I agree with you completely Karl, but now I’ll read you Chan’s comment on that very same passage. ‘In saying that one is of the same kind as the sage, Mencius was pronouncing two principles of utmost significance. One is that every person can be perfect, and the other is that all people are basically equal. Also, in pointing to the moral principle which is common in our minds, he is pointing to what amounts to the Natural Law. Belief in the Natural Law has been persistent in Chinese history. It is called Principle of Nature (T’ien-li) by Neo-Confucianists. It is essentially the same as Mencius’ i-li.’”
 
“But Mencius has not established that there is any common moral principle in our minds. He has only made a lot of assertions of his opinions but these opinions have not been grounded in anything like a philosophical demonstration. One may speak of T’ien-li as the Law of Nature with regard to the physical universe that we are a part of, and of the human mental and cognitive apparatus as a part of it as well, but this should not be confused with i-li, that is to say, with principle and righteousness. I think we will have to wait until we come to the Neo-Confucianists to see if they really do, as Chan asserts, confuse moral principles with physical principles. It may be that some do and some don’t.”
 
“Here is 6A:8, ‘Mencius said, “The trees of the Ox Mountain were once beautiful.... When people see that it is so bald, they think there was never any timber on the mountain. Is this the true nature of the mountain?.... People see that [a certain man] acts like an animal, and think that he never had the original endowment (for goodness). But is that his true character? Therefore with proper nourishment and care, everything grows, whereas without proper nourishment and care, everything decays.”’
 
“This is fine Fred. He is simply saying environmental conditions are responsible for how things appear. That an original X can end up not-X due to the environment. But it proves nothing with respect to his main thesis about humanity.”
 
“Well what about this in 6A:10, ‘I like life and I also like righteousness. If I cannot have both of them, I shall give up life and choose righteousness. I love life, but there is something I love more than life, and therefore I will not do anything improper to have it. I also hate death, but there is something I hate more than death, and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger.... There are cases when a man does not take the course even if by taking it he can preserve his life, and he does not do anything even if by doing it he can avoid danger. Therefore there is something men love more than life and there is something men hate more than death. It is not only the worthies alone who have this moral sense. All men have it, but only the worthies have been able to preserve it.’”
 
“He has only established that the worthies have it. They may have gotten it by the study of philosophy. He has given no evidence that all men have it and just lost it. So far Creel is right. Mencius is just trying to convince us without any real evidence and discussion. It's as Creel said, he is convinced of his brand of truth and just keeps repeating it over and over. He is a far cry from the methods of Confucius!”
 
“6A:15, ‘The function of the mind is to think. If we think, we will get them (the principles of things). If we do not think, we will not get them. This is what Heaven has given to us. If we first build up the nobler part of our nature, then the inferior part cannot overcome it. It is simply this that makes a man great'.”
 
“Most interesting. Now he says we have 'superior' and 'inferior' parts to our nature. This is somewhat different from saying our (original) nature is 'good.' Now it appears as mixed and it is up to us to develop the right part. This is, of course, dependent on our environmental circumstances-- for which a Confucian government is responsible. This appears to me to be more realistic that the notion that our original nature is good--for which Mencius has so far provided no evidence. Indeed this passage seems to contradict it!”
 
“That is because he is so unsystematic Karl. Chen says this passage has a great influence on later Neo-Confucianists. He says, ‘that the idea of building up the nobler part of our nature became an important tenet in the moral philosophy of Lu Jiuyuan 1139-1193), leader of the idealistic school of Neo-Confucianism.’”
 
“Next!”
 
“6A:16, ‘The ancient people cultivated the nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man naturally came to them. People today cultivate the nobility of Heaven in order to seek for the nobility of man, and once they have obtained the nobility of man, they forsake the nobility of Heaven. Therefore their delusion is extreme. At the end they will surely lose (the nobility of man) also.’”
 
“Does he say what this ‘nobility’ of Heaven is?”
 
“Yes, he says it consists of, ‘Humanity, righteousness, loyalty, faithfulness, and the love of the good without getting tired of it....’”
 
“And of man?”
 
“He says it's ‘to be a grand official, a great official, and a high official....’”
 
“Ok, I’ve found Fung’s comment on this on page 77 of his book [A Short History of Chinese Philosophy]. Shall I read it to you?”
 
“Go ahead.”
 
“’According to Mencius and his school of Confucianism, the universe is essentially a moral universe. The moral principles of man are also metaphysical principles of the universe, and the nature of man is an exemplification of these principles. It is this moral universe that Mencius and his school mean when they speak of Heaven, and an understanding of this moral universe is what Mencius calls “knowing heaven.”’ And then Fung explains the meaning of that quote which you just gave Fred. He says it means that, ‘heavenly honors [the nobility of Heaven] are those to which a man can attain in the world of values, while human honors [the nobility of man] are purely material concepts in the human world. The citizen of Heaven...cares only for the honors of Heaven, but not those of man.’” Does that remind you of anything?”
 
“Plato?”
 
"Yes indeed.” Karl pulled down a copy of The Republic. “This is a quote from the end of Republic IX in Reeve’s revision of Grube published by Hackett. Plato has just finished describing the best possible state based on justice and the Good but grants that it is too ideal, perhaps, to ever be seen on earth, yet he has Socrates say there might be ‘a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the practical affairs of that city and no other.’ This is also similar to Augustine’s City of God. You know, the city of man, Rome, and then Heaven to which our real loyalties must ultimately be given. In so far as Mencius’ ‘sage’ or philosopher identifies with heaven rather than with man he and Plato are in agreement.”
 
“But how would that work Karl? How could we live in the 21st Century US of A and live by these Confucian or Platonic principles?”
 
“It would work like this Fred. I’ll use Plato as an example. Suppose you accepted Socrates’ argument for equality of the sexes. Now, if you live in a country which has sexual discrimination you will support measures for equality and your reason will be--in Plato’s republic equality is advocated and since I’m going to support his philosophy I’ll make my political, social, cultural decisions down here on earth according to the laws of the ideal republic. I may never get all the laws and customs of my country to be similar to that republic but the more they become that way the more like the republic will my actual country become.”
 
“So we have a Confucian model like a Platonic one if we are Confucians and we live according to the model, as best we can, and only really support the actual customs and conditions of our society in so far as they conform to our model.”
 
“That’s right Fred. The real crux is your qualifier ‘as best we can.’ How much will we compromise to safeguard our own personal interests, how committed are we to our beliefs, how much risk will we take in coming into conflict with the status quo? The answers to these questions define the hypocrite and the sage.”
 
“In 6A:17 Mencius says, ‘...all men have within themselves what is really honorable. Only they do not think of it. The honor conferred by men is not true honor. Whoever is made honorable by Zhao Meng [high official in Chin] can be made humble by him again. The Book of Odes says, “I am drunk with wine, and I am satiated with virtue.” It means that a man is satiated with humanity and righteousness, and therefore he does not wish for the flavor of fat meat and fine millet of men. “
 
“In his own way, I think Mencius is saying something like the quote from the Republic I gave. I think his words are just another way of saying what I just said before.”
 
“Here is 6A:19--’Mencius said, “The five kinds of grain are considered good plants, but if they are not ripe, they are worse than poor grains. So the value of humanity depends on its being brought to maturity.”’
 
“This little saying is, of course, dependent on his still unproved assumption that the original nature of human beings is ‘good’ so it only has to be properly ‘matured.’ His position is if you take a seed and put it in bad soil you get a bad plant but if you put it in good soil you get a good plant. In one sense the soil determines the type of plant. But the good soil only allows the original potency or nature within the seed to come forth to be a good plant i.e., just the type of plant it was meant to be by its internal nature. The bad plant has had its original nature destroyed or corrupted by the bad soil it was put in. The human beings’ internal nature and potency is the same. The right environment just brings out the true inner nature of the human. But this has to be better argued. Suppose the nature is really evil and sinful, as Christians maintain, what then? Or maybe the human being’s nature is a ‘blank slate’ so it is neither good nor bad. Mencius hasn’t adequately addressed these issues.”

​“We have come to the end of the main section in Chan’s anthology. Now I am going to turn to the ‘Additional Selections’ he has chosen. Hopefully he will address the problems you have raised with respect to his position on human nature.”
 
“This (1B:7) is the advice Mencius gave to King Xuan. He told him that with respect to all of his ministers and great officers telling him that such a person was worthy or unworthy or that such and such a person should be executed, that this consensus of big shots was not enough for the King to make the right decision. The King has to ask the people what they think and only if the people agree with the advice of the big shots should the King then look into the recommendations and if he follows them it can be said that the people actually are responsible for them. ‘Only in this way can a ruler become parent of the people.’ And Chan remarks, apropos, of this passage: ‘No one in the history of Chinese thought has stressed more vigorously the primary importance of the people for the state.’” Marxism would agree.
 
“And Mencius will provide other examples, Fred, of this proto democratic spirit. I think this is a good example of the positive influence some Confucians had in Chinese history. It also explains why he never got a real job at any of the Chinese courts!”
 
“Then what about this--1B:8. ‘King Xuan of Ch’i asked....”Is it all right for a minister to murder his king?” Mencius said, “He who injures humanity is a bandit. He who injures righteousness is a destructive person. Such a person is a mere fellow. I have heard of killing a mere fellow Chou [murdered an evil king], but I have not heard of murdering [him as] the ruler.”’ And Chan adds, ‘The doctrine of revolution is here boldly advanced and simply stated. A wicked king has lost the Mandate of Heaven and it should go to someone else.’” Actually this more of a revolt than a revolution.
 
“The Chinese Marxists should support Mencius on this one. It shows that the king is king only so long as he rules in the interest of the people. Since most of the people were peasants in China it appears that Mencius is in some sense a representative of peasant interests. Confucians in general favored benevolent rulers, and although the peasants were often ruthlessly exploited this was not in the spirit of Confucianism anymore than the Vietnam War, say, was waged in the spirit of Christianity whatever so called Christian leaders from Billy Graham to Cardinal Spellman may have said. This is something the Chinese party should take to heart in case the economic reforms being pushed end up only benefiting a narrow portion of Chinese society. This does not, however, seem to be the case.”
 
“Now we are coming to what looks like some ideas concerning man’s internal constitution. Mencius says (2A:2) ‘The will is the leader of the vital force, and the vital force pervades and animates the body. Therefore I say, “Hold the will firm and never do violence to the vital force.”’ Later he says, ‘I am skillful in nourishing my strong, moving power’ but he has difficulty saying just what this power is although he says, ’It is produced by the accumulation of righteous deeds but is not obtained by incidental acts of righteousness. When one’s conduct is not satisfactory to his own mind, then one will be devoid of nourishment. I therefore said that Gaozi [putting him down again!] never understood righteousness because he made it something external.’ Chan says the concept he translated as ‘strong moving power’ is hao-jan chih ch’i in Chinese.”
 
“I remember that term from Fung. He translated it as ‘Great Morale.’”
 
“That seems to be really a different concept from Chan. Read out what Fung says Karl.”
 
“You mean about why he calls it the ‘Great Morale.’ He says this is a special term for Mencius. Fung says the ‘Great Morale is a matter concerning man and the universe, and therefore is a super-moral value. It is the morale of the man who identifies himself with the universe, so that Mencius says of it that “it pervades all between Heaven and Earth.”' In order to develop this Great Morale, Fung says two things are needed: ‘One may be called the “understanding of Dao;” that is, of the way or principle that leads to the elevation of the mind.’ The other is what Mencius mentioned in the quote you read from Chan concerning the accumulation of ‘righteousness.’ The Dao and the righteousness together will produce the Great Morale, or as Chan calls it, ‘the strong moving power’ i.e., our moral identification with ‘Heaven’--but this cannot be forced.”
 
“That’s right Karl. Mencius says ‘let there be no artificial effort to help it grow.’ To underscore this he tell us not to act like the man from Sung....”
 
“Let me read the story. Its right here on page 79 of Fung. Mencius is speaking: ‘There was a man of Sung who was grieved that his grain did not grow fast enough. So he pulled it up. Then he returned to his home with great innocence, and said to his people: “I am tired to-day, for I have been helping the grain to grow.” His son ran out to look at it, and found all the grain withered.’ You can’t ‘help’ the Great Morale to grow by taking shortcuts. As Fung says, ‘If one constantly practices righteousness, the Great Morale will naturally emerge from the very center of one’s being.’ The point of all this is that Mencius still has superstitious notions about the nature of ‘Heaven.’ That it is in favor of certain moral rules and regulations and we should follow ‘Heaven’ by carrying them out. According to Fung ‘righteousness’ is similar to the Kantian concept of ‘duty.’ “
 
“Very good, Karl. Chan says more or less the same thing. Mencius is against artificial efforts. Mencius says, ‘Always be doing something [in accordance with righteousness] without expectation.’ The Great Morale will follow of its own accord. The Buddhists have similar views but they are more concerned with our mental states rather than our actions. Chan says, ‘The difference between the Buddhists and the Confucianists is that the former emphasize the state of mind while the latter emphasize activity.’”
 
“I think we have said enough about this Fred.”
 
“OK, here is some political philosophy, from 2A:3: ‘Mencius said, “A ruler who uses force to make a pretense at humanity is a despot.... When force is used to overcome people, they do not submit willingly but only because they have not sufficient strength to resist. But when virtue is used to overcome people, they are pleased in their hearts and sincerely submit, as the seventy disciples submitted to Confucius.” And he gives us a comment which encapsulates Confucian political philosophy: ‘The foundation of Confucian political philosophy is “humane government,” government of the true king, who rules through moral example. His guiding principle is righteousness, whereas that of the despot is profit. This contrast between kingliness and despotism has always remained sharp in the minds of Confucian political thinkers.’”
 
"That is a good summary, Fred. I think if we looked at the policies of our own government and many others which are based on the control of the world’s oil resources and hegemony over financial and other markets backed up with the use of military might we would find this contradicts Confucianism completely.”
 
“This next quote isn’t very philosophical but it affords us a glimpse of economic life in ancient China. We can see what type of rules and regulations were considered good and bad by what Mencius approves of. There are FIVE THINGS which the ruler must do in order to have his neighbors ‘look up to him as parent.’ So here is Mencius version of NAFTA: 1.) honor the worthy and employ the competent; 2.) in cities if he charges rent but does tax goods OR enforces the regulations but does not charge rent; 3.) at his borders--inspections but no tax; 4.) the farmers should mutually cultivate the public field and pay no taxes: 5.) no fines for idlers or families who fail to meet the cloth quota. Mencius adds, this is all in 2A:5, ‘Ever since there has been mankind, none has succeeded in leading children to attack their parents. Thus such a ruler will have no enemy anywhere in the world, and having no enemy in the world, he will be an official appointed by Heaven.’”
 
“A little optimistic, I think. Such a ruler would presumably have a prosperous kingdom so Mencius should not discount the desire of greedy rival kingdoms or barbarian nations to take over his country. Having a good constitution is no guarantee that you ‘will have no enemy anywhere in the world.’”
 
"Now we have a VIP [Very Important Passage]! This quote (2A:6) is a major statement of Mencius’ doctrine about the ‘innate goodness’ of humankind. Mencius details what he means by THE FOUR BEGINNINGS and Chan says, ‘Practically all later Confucianists have accepted the Four Beginnings as the innate moral qualities.’”
 
“So let’s hear the quote Fred!”
 
“’Mencius said, “All men have the mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others. The ancient kings had this in mind and therefore they had a government that could not bear to see the suffering of the people....When I say that all men have the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: Now, when men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the child’s parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity if they did not rescue the child]. From such a case, we see that a man without the feeling of commiseration is not a man; a man without the feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; a man without the feeling of deference and compliance is not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Men have these Four Beginnings just have they have their four limbs.”’”
 
“He thinks his example proves all this! Actually he has only shown that some people experience a feeling of alarm when they see a child about to fall into a well. This might be the beginning of a feeling of humanity. I think this is the only immediate feeling. The others come about as a result of reflection. Mencius’ views are of course a result of his having lived in ancient China. I doubt that today we would consider these attitudes ‘innate’, that is, genetically constituted. We will see a better account of all this if we discuss Xunzi down the line. In the meantime I can only say that Mencius’ views have deleteriously affected all subsequent Chinese thought by having pushed Xunzi s theories [man’s original nature is evil] into the background.
 
“More political philosophy in 3A:3. ‘Duke Wen of Teng asked about the proper way of government. Mencius said, “The business of the people should not be delayed.”’ He means that the government should be making sure that the people have secure living arrangements, education, etc. He has in mind a government, within the feudal context, that is ‘for the people’. The welfare state or a socialist approach as in Cuba would be a contemporary example of his basic attitude. If the government fails to provide for the people--say there is a lot of homelessness, drug addition, unemployment [to use modern examples]-- the people will not be secure in their minds. ‘And,’ Mencius goes on, ‘if they have no secure mind, there is nothing they will not do in the way of self-abandonment, moral defection, depravity, and wild license. When they fall into crime, to pursue and punish them is to entrap them. How can such a thing as entrapping the people be allowed under the rule of a man of humanity? Therefore a worthy ruler will be gravely complaisant and thrifty, showing a respectful politeness to his subordinates, and taking from the people according to regulations.’ The ruler must also: ‘Establish seminaries, academies, schools, and institutes to teach the people.’ It is the responsibility of the ruler to set a good moral example and to instruct the people. ‘If human relations are made clear and prominent above, then the common people below will have affection to one another. When a true king arises, he will surely come to take you [Duke Wen] as an example, and thus you will be the teacher of kingly rulers.' Duke Wen was impressed by all this and sent Bi Chan to consult with Mencius about the ‘well-field’ land system.’ What is that Karl?”
 
“It is the system of land tenure recommended by Mencius. He claims it was the system of olden times but many scholars doubt that it ever existed. The land was to be divided into nine equal sections. Eight families would cultivate their own plots and the left over plot would belong to the state and all eight families would take turns cultivating it. Since the state would own zillions of these plots it would have much wealth of produce, etc., to do all the state business and every family would enough for its needs as well. A perfect mixture of state and individual ownership [with respect to the technical developments of the time]. What a fortunate country China would have been had Mencius’ theory been put into practice!”
 
“Anyway, this is what Bi Chan was told by Mencius: ‘Now that your ruler is about to put in practice humane government and has chosen you for this service, you must do your best. Humane government must begin by defining the boundaries of land. If the boundaries are not defined correctly, the division of the land into squares will not be equal, and the produce available for official salaries will not be fairly distributed. Therefore oppressive rulers and corrupt officials are sure to neglect the defining of the boundaries.’”
 
“To better understand the wisdom of Mencius as a practical reformer, Fred, I just want to mention that most of the suffering and killing and tyrannical government behaviors of the last century, and so far in this one too, has been the result of a failure to have fair land distribution and neglect in the ‘defining of the boundaries’. This is what is behind all the massacres and killing of people from the Palestinians, to the Mayan Indians in Guatemala, also the Indians in Mexico and throughout Brazil and the rest of South America. the Bantu and others in South Africa, the people in Zimbabwe, in India, it was behind the Russian [and French] revolutions, the Communist victories in China, Cuba, and Vietnam, it's one of the reasons behind the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan, it's the reason Turkey and Iraq kill Kurds and American Indians are confined to reservations. Everywhere you look the big, powerful governments of today spend trillions of dollars just to repress and kill the poor all over the world so that they won’t have to be fair about sharing the land. Humane government is very rare indeed.”
 
“I agree with that Karl, and you haven’t begun to list all the examples!”
 
“Enough of my going on about this. What is next Mencius?”
 
“Next is 3A:4 which has been criticized for being undemocratic. It also discusses what are called the ‘Five Relations.’ Here is what Mencius said: ‘If one must make the things himself before he uses them, this would make the whole empire run about on the road. Therefore it is said, “Some labor with their minds and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others.” Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern them are supported by them. This is the universal principle....’ It’s a little like Plato’s Republic. Chan has the following comment ‘Mencius, generally considered the most democratic of Chinese philosophers, has been severely criticized for this undemocratic class distinction. It does not seem to be in harmony with his idea of the basic equality of the people [Chan then gives a reference,7A:4, that has nothing to do with anything]. We should not overlook, however, that the distinction is essentially one of function, not of status, as in Plato, for no one is confined to one class by birth.’ “
 
“I don’t think we should be calling Mencius ‘democratic.’ The concept of democracy was not in use in China at this period. It developed in Greece around this time, or a little before, with its system of city states, but China was not organized into city states and did not have democratic ideals at this time. Mencius’ philosophy grew up in a system of feuding feudal territories based on a hereditary nobility. His thrust is to try to humanize this system and minimize the suffering and degradation within it. He should not be faulted for having ‘feudal’ notions--that is, the notions more or less of his historical time. He is simply describing the actual social reality around him. It is also ingenuous for Chan to say that people are not confined to one class by birth. In reality 99.9% are.
 
“I think you are correct Karl. Mencius goes on to say that the people will be like animals if they are only fed and looked after by the lords. Education is needed. He said, ‘The Sage (emperor Shun) worried about it and he appointed Xie to be minister of education and teach people human relations, that between father and son, there should be affection; between ruler and minister, there should be righteousness; between husband and wife, there should be attention to their separate functions; between old and young, there should be a proper order; and between friends, there should be faithfulness.’ Chan then makes the following comment about the FIVE RELATIONS. ‘It is often said that these do include the stranger and the enemy. But to Confucianists, no one is unrelated, and a stranger is therefore inconceivable. He is at least related as older and younger. As to the enemy, there should never be such a person, for all people should be friends.’ Finally a bon mot as it were from Mencius: ‘It is the nature of things to be unequal.’”
 
“Just a minute Fred. I remember that bon mot. It has to do with his attack on equality of prices, the economic theory of some other scholar of the day.”
 
“Yes, Xu Xing. Most of what Mencius said before in this chapter was in response to Xu and so was the bon mot.” 
 
“Well, I think you should go ahead and contextualize the whole thing.”
 
“Xu Xing had put forth the theory of economic equality. ‘Linen and silk of the same length should be sold at the same price. Bundles of hemp and silk of the same weight should be sold at the same price. Grains of the same quantity should be sold at the same price. And shoes of the same size would be sold at the same price.’ You can see that he knows nothing about the cost of production of different things!”
 
“What else does he say?”
 
“After he says things are unequal he says ‘If you equalize them all, you will throw the world into confusion. If large shoes and small shoes were of the same price, who would make them? If the doctrines of Xuzi were followed, people would lead one another to practice deceit. How can these doctrines be employed to govern a state?’”
 
“Here again, Fred, is an example of the lack of logical training, or if not that, of not paying attention to an opponent’s argument.”
 
“What do you mean?”
 
“Xu said ‘shoes of the same size would be sold at the same price’ and we get a criticism from Mencius referring to large shoes and small shoes for the same price. This is not really attacking Xu on what he actually said. Mencius should have criticized his views on hemp and silk of the same weight being sold for the same price where he could have made a point, if he really understood economics, that silk costs more to produce than hemp on an equal weight basis. I mean, Mencius had a valid point to make but he used sloppy logic.”
 
“Regardless, Chan thinks the bon mot that came out of all this is important because it was later used by the Neo-Confucianists to argue against a metaphysical point, namely ‘that reality is not an undifferentiated continuum’.”
 
“That is even better. A casual comment regarding an economic theory in the context of a political discussion is used by his successors to bolster a metaphysical position! We may eventually get to the Neo-Confucianists but I hope they have better arguments for their positions that you just indicated a la Chan.”
 
“We will find out. Now I have a great comment of Mencius that shows his attitude towards women. An attitude I fear that was pervasive in Chinese society and is even today a big problem in China. Remember the FIVE RELATIONS? Well, here is an elaboration of that between men and women. Mencius is speaking in 3B:2, ‘At the marriage of a young woman, her mother instructs her. She accompanies the daughter to the door on her leaving and admonishes her, saying, “Go to your home. Always be respectful and careful. Never disobey your husband.” Thus, to regard obedience as the correct course of conduct is the way for women.’”
 
“This will have to go, of course, if Confucianism is to be updated for our new century. The idea that women are somehow inferior to men is just rampant, not only in China, but in India, in Islamic lands (the Koran even says men are ‘superior’) in the plethora of Christian sects (with maybe a few exceptions) and in most third world countries (always excepting Cuba where a real struggle is being waged by the government for sexual equality.) It is a shame that neither Confucius nor Mencius recognized the potential of women, especially since such philosophers as Pythagorus, Plato, and Epicurus did so and encouraged women to study philosophy. Hypatia was in fact a famous woman philosopher (brutally murdered by Christians) in the ancient world. I can’t think of an equivalent in ancient China.”

​“In 3B:9 Mencius proclaims his purpose in being a philosopher, his ‘Manifesto’ as it were.”
 
“Let’s hear it!”
 
“’Do I like to argue? I cannot help it.... Sage emperors have ceased to appear. Feudal lords have become reckless and idle scholars have indulged in unreasonable opinions. The words of Yang Zhu and Mo Di [Mozi] fill the world. Yang advocated egoism, which means a denial of the special relationship with the ruler. Mo advocated universal love, which means a denial of the special relationship with the father. To deny the special relationship with the father and the ruler is to become an animal.... If the principles of Yang and Mo are not stopped, and if the principles of Confucius are not brought to light, perverse doctrines will delude the people and obstruct the path of humanity and righteousness.... I am alarmed by these things, and defend the doctrines of the ancient kings and oppose Yang and Mo.’’
 
“Of course we must remember that ‘the doctrines of the ancient kings’ is just code for ‘the principles of Confucius.’
 
It seems to be de rigor for a Chinese philosopher to make appeals to mythological past policies of ancient kings.”
 
“And Chan makes the following comment on this passage: ‘The dispute between Mencius and the Moists involves a fundamental issue of ethics, namely, whether there should be distinction in love....Applied to ethics, this means that while love is universal, its applications to the various [human] relations are different.”
 
“I know that Fred. Mencius thinks we must love our own parents, kin and countrymen more than other people’s in the sense that we owe our first responsibilities to them and then we should love the parents, kin and countrymen of others, while Mo says we should make no distinctions in love.” 
 
“Karl, here is an interesting observation in 4A:12. ‘If one does not understand what is good, he will not be sincere with himself. Therefore sincerity is the way of Heaven, and to think how to be sincere is the way of man.’”
 
“Actually the way of the philosopher or sage. People ignorant of the ethical requirements of jen [ren] or humanity really don’t know the ‘good’ they will not be sincere because knowing and doing the good are not priorities for them. To be ‘sincere’ of course means to be trying to implement the Confucian ideals of humanity. Otherwise people just try to do what is good for themselves without much thought of the consequences for others or at least not for others outside their own immediate circle and sometimes not even then. Examples are everywhere. Every time a business person or corporate executive makes a decision to cut costs in order to increase profits--as in moving a factory to a cheaper labor zone, skimping on safety checks (almost the rule in business) it is obvious these people, and they dominate the world system we live under, are enemies of the Confucian ideal of the good and of humanity.”
 
“You are a little too radical Karl, but Mencius might just be radical too. Here is what he thinks about war for territory. I can’t help but think of the constant fighting in the West Bank and Gaza that is going on. 
 
This is 4A:14--’Mencius said, ”When a ruler failed to practice humane government. all those ministers who enriched him were rejected by Confucius. How much more would he have rejected those who are vehement to fight for their rulers? When they fight for territory, they slaughter so many people that the field is full of them. When they fight for a city, they slaughter so many people that the city is full of them. This is what is called leading on the land to devour human flesh. Death is not enough for such a crime. Therefore those who are skillful in fighting should suffer the heaviest punishment.”’”
 
“It is fairly obvious that Mencius and Mozi at least agree that only a defensive war not one to take some other people’s land is acceptable. In today’s world the equivalent to land taking is resource taking. Wars to get control of other peoples resources is equally a great crime. There are very few governments of today, at least in the so-called capitalist world, that a Confucian sage could work for. In fact the so called ‘free enterprise’ system itself, since it puts profits before humanity, might be totally inconsistent with a modern day Confucianism.”
 
“Or maybe, like feudalism Karl, the Confucian should work in the system to try and mitigate its worst features.”
 
“Maybe.”
 
“At any rate this is 4B:11: ‘Mencius said, “The great man does not insist that his words be necessarily truthful [at all times and under (all) circumstances] or his actions be necessarily resolute. He acts only according to righteousness.”’”
 
“This is really interesting for it shows that Mencius was a precursor of situation ethics.”
 
“What is that?”
 
“Look Fred, take Kant for instance. He would say you should never lie or steal in general you can never break any ethical commandments--no exceptions. But Mencius has just said you don’t have to always be truthful--it depends on righteousness. This can only mean that you can sometimes lie, etc., if righteousness is promoted. Suppose you had to lie in order to save the child from falling into the well? There are situations in which righteousness outweighs our common notions of truth telling, etc. As for ‘situation ethics,’ let me read to you from Reese’s dictionary (1980: p. 531), ‘The position of Joseph Fletcher (Situation Ethics, 1966) that any action may be good or bad depending on the situation. What is wrong in most situations may sometimes be right if the end it serves is sufficiently good.’ There is more about how this works in Christianity (it's based on agape) but it applies to Confucian ends as well i.e., jen or ren.”
 
“Sounds like ‘the end justifies the means’ to me and that can lead to all kinds of problems. What Hitler considers ‘sufficiently good’ may not be either agape or ren.”
 
“I understand the complications Fred. I just wanted to point out that Mencius is not an ‘absolutist’ except on the ren question which is, after all, the basis of Confucianism. It's their prime directive and for us, we can make it the second directive after our own prime directive we set up in the discussion we had on Confucius.”
 
“First the truth of reason then the good of humanity. It doesn’t sound right. Shouldn’t it be reversed or the two rules given equal status?”
 
“This can take all day. Since I think that we can’t begin to know what constitutes ren without recourse to the Prime Directive given before, that is why I put them in that order. But they are inextricably bonded.”
 
“Here is 4B26: ‘Mencius said, “All who talk about the nature of things need only [reason from] facts [and principles will be clear]. The fundamental principle [of reasoning] from facts is to follow [their natural tendencies].”’”
 
“This is practically our own Prime Directive!”
 
“This next quote (4B:30) is just to remind us of the special role of ‘family values’ in Ancient China. ‘Mencius said, “There are five things which in common practice are considered unfilial. The first is laziness in the use of one’s body without attending to the support and care of one’s parents. The second is chess-playing and fondness for wine, without attending to the support and care of one’s parents. The third is love of things and money and being exclusively attached to one’s wife and children, without attending to the support and care of one’s parents. The fourth is following the desires of one’s ears and eyes, thus bringing his parents to disgrace. And the fifth is being fond of bravery, fighting and quarreling, thus endangering one’s parents.”’”
 
“Well, I think these five rules could be boiled down to ‘attend to the support and care of one’s parents’--i.e., ‘Honor thy father and thy mother.’”
 
“Sounds familiar.”
 
“What’s next?”
 
“In 5A:5 there is a discussion of just how we should understand the term ‘the will of heaven’ when we are using it politically. It is a rather long passage but the gist of it goes like this. In ancient times the good emperor Yao gave the empire not to his own son but to Shun. One of Mencius’ students, Wan Chang, asks him about this. Mencius replies that only Heaven can give the empire to someone. So how does Heaven show it’s ‘will’ so to speak. Well, Yao presented Shun to the people and, Mencius says, ‘the people accepted him. I therefore say that Heaven did nor speak, but that it simply indicated its will by his character and his conduct of affairs.’ The people were aware of the type of person Shun was and it ‘was Heaven that gave the empire to him. It was the people that gave the empire to him. Therefore I said, “The emperor cannot give the empire to another person.”’ Now after the death of Yao, Shun withdrew from Yao’s son but the people went to him anyway. ‘The feudal lords of the empire, however, going to court, went not to the son of Yao but to Shun, litigants went not to the son of Yao but to Shun, and singers sang not to the son of Yao but to Shun. Therefore I said, “Heaven [gave the empire to him].”’”
 
“This is vox populi, vox dei. Mencius is saying that the will of Heaven is made known through the consciousness of the people, intimations of democracy, and that the person the people think most likely to champion their interests, peace, fair taxation, eliminating poverty, feeding the poor, preventing famines, etc., is the person they would support. This is a good Confucian notion--the ruler is last, the people first and the will of Heaven is just a symbolic way of saying the Dao of Government is the Dao of the interests of the masses of people."
 
“So you think, Karl, that ‘Heaven’ is just a metaphor for conditions and events that can be given more properly a naturalistic or ‘scientific’ explanation. Do you think that was all ‘Heaven’ meant to Mencius?”
 
“I think that was the track that he was on. The fully developed logical conclusion of his ideas would end up with what you just said. I’m not sure Mencius was fully conscious of this conclusion which first becomes explicit in the thought of Xunzi which we are yet to discuss.”
 
“Well, Chan gives a comment on all this as a part of 7A:1 when he discusses the different notions the Chinese had of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ or ming = ‘fate’. Here is what Chan says: ‘In ancient China there were five theories about destiny or the Mandate of Heaven. The first was fatalism: the Mandate was fixed and unchangeable. The second was moral determinism: Heaven always encourages virtue and punishes evil; therefore man can determine his reward and punishment through moral deeds. The third was anti-fatalism, advocated by the Moist school. The fourth was naturalistic fatalism which means that destiny is not controlled by Heaven in the sense of an anthropomorphic God but by Nature and works automatically. Lastly, there was the Confucian theory of “waiting for destiny.” According to this doctrine, man should exert his utmost in moral endeavor and leave whatever is beyond our control to fate. It frankly admits that there are things beyond our control but that is no reason why one should relax in his moral endeavor. The tendency was definitely one of moralism and humanism. The Confucian theory represents the conviction of enlightened Chinese in general.’”
 
“I would say about these, Fred, that the first theory is just classical determinism--no event could have happened otherwise. The second theory is like karma but is confusing because people argue about what ‘moral deeds’ are. It also opens up the option of an anthropomorphic God. The third one of Chan, Mo’s view, I hope we can discuss later if have a talk on his philosophy. I don’t get the fourth one--it just seems to be a rehash of the first in other words. This fifth one, the Confucian, does not seem very clear. What does it mean to leave what is beyond our control to ‘fate’. It can only mean that we live in a non-deterministic universe but one which has deterministic sequences in it. We should do our best to live according to morality but when we bump into one of the deterministic sequences we just go with the flow. That doesn’t sound right at all. And what does it mean to say ‘we leave whatever is beyond our control to fate.’ What is beyond our control is going to happen whether we ‘leave it’ or not. I don’t think Chan really clears up the notion of ‘fate’ very well.
 
“This next quote from Mencius (7A:2) is even more confusing. ‘Everything is destiny (ming). A man should accept obediently what is correct [in one’s destiny]. Therefore, he who knows destiny does not stand beneath a precipitous wall. Death sustained in the course of carrying out the Way to the limit is correct destiny. But death under handcuffs and fetters is not due to correct destiny.’”
 
“So ming isn’t really ‘fate’. There seems to be a configuration of factors making up the world at any given time and one of those factors is the individual and his or her mental make up and ability to make choices based on the educational level of the person, position in society, etc. Its like Sartre’s being thrown into the world then you have to make choices. You make the best choices you can given your circumstances but since you don’t have control over all the factors you can’t really control ming. Even looked at this way Mencius’ statement still has some problems. Suppose, in correctly following the Way, you end up in fetters? E.g., suppose you oppose some unjust action of the government. Was it not ‘correct destiny’ for Martin Luther King, Jr. to end up in the Birmingham jail?"
 
“Like most philosophers, from the Ancient Greeks to modern times, Mencius doesn’t think much of hoi polloi! Here is what he says in 7A:5-- ‘To act without understanding and to do so habitually without examination, following certain courses all their lives without knowing the principles behind them--this is the way of the multitude.’”
 
“Yes, Fred, this is the traditional view but it does not mean that the multitude should be abused or exploited by the rulers who must be guided by the Confucian principles of ren. And please note, that in the historical circumstances of the past this attitude is justified. Only now have we the ability to see to it that all humans can have the educational opportunities such that the ‘multitude’ will be able to approach the wisdom of the Sage. Remember 6A:7? In theory Mencius held that every person could be a sage [he may not have included women, so I am updating him] it was the material conditions of his time that held people back. In our time it is possible to achieve this goal or at least lay the foundations for it but for us it is the property relations not the material conditions [i.e, scarcity as a brute rather than social fact] that are holding us back. The institution of socialism would lead to the educational advance of the multitude and without a ruling class there would be no motivation to impart a false consciousness to the people.”
 
“Here is a good passage that really spells out Mencius’ view of ‘love’. Mencius says, in 7A:45, ‘In regard to [inferior] creatures, the superior man loves them but is not humane to them (that is, showing them the feelings due human beings). In regard to people generally, he is humane to them but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his parents and humane to all people. He is humane to all people and feels love for all creatures.’”
 
“Nicely put. If humanity could just get to this level, as opposed to the almost impossible level of ‘love’ that Mozi aspires to (equal love) it would be a great advance. This position is possible, I think, with proper education and the restructuring of society to human needs rather than the accumulation of money and wealth and profit. One thing should be noted. When Mencius says ‘love for all creatures’, I think that commits him to vegetarianism and an anti-hunting ethic, neither of which, as far as I know, the historical Mencius committed himself to.”
 
“OK, Karl, here is the last passage from Mencius. This is 7B:14, ‘Mencius said, “[In a state] the people are the most important; the spirits of the land and grain (guardians of territory) are the next; the ruler is of slight importance” Oops, and one more [7B:33] to just sum up--’The superior man practices principle (Natural Law) and waits for destiny (ming, Mandate of Heaven) to take its own course.’”
 
“So, Fred, this has been a long discussion, but I think we have a pretty good idea of Mencius’ philosophy and its relation to Confucius and how Marxists could deal with it in a positive way.”

Let us run through a brief history of US-China relations, starting from the Communist revolution in China led by Mao Zedong from 1948-1952. In the Chinese Civil war, Mao and his communist party fought mostly against the Kuomintang Nationalist Party. Both parties supported Chinese independence from the Japanese, but Mao’s party wished to establish a Marxist economic system, while the Nationalists would continue with capitalism, albeit capitalism independent from Japanese colonizers. The United States heavily funded the Kuomintang Nationalist Army, which was formed in Taiwan, and remains independent of China to this day. The Chinese Communist Party on the other hand received funding from the Soviet Union, making China one of the many proxy battlefields that came about during the Cold War, and the ideological war being waged between Communism and Capitalism. By 1949 the Communists controlled most of China, and the war began to draw to an end. When the fighting ceased an estimated 1.5 million communists, 600,000 nationalists, and 5 million civilians, had been killed. [3] 
              
Following the Communist victory, and establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Harry Truman and the United States refused to recognize the new Chinese Government and continued funding the Kuomintang in Taiwan. Additionally, the PRC and United States fought against each other during both the Korean and Vietnam wars. [4] Wars which were also proxy battlefields between the Capitalist and Communist nations during the Cold War. It is worth mentioning that Mao Anying, the son of PRC leader Mao Zedong, was killed by a US airstrike during the Korean War.[5] Relations between China and the United States following the Chinese civil war were marked by hostility, and warfare, which was fought on the proxy battlefields of Korea and Vietnam.
              
However, in the 1970s relations between China and the US would take a turn. By 1970 China had emerged as an important geopolitical player, including increasing steel production by four times. In addition, agriculture had skyrocketed in the country. Despite many who died during the famine which occurred during implementation of Mao’s Great Leap Forward policy, the country did in the end greatly increase agricultural output.[6] Another factor in the increase of US China diplomacy, was the fact that China had split with the Soviet Union, after the Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s foreign policy. This originally turned the Cold War from a Bi-polar, to a tri-polar war. However, it would eventually allow the US and China to repair relations, now having the USSR as a common enemy of sorts.
              
In 1972 Richard Nixon travelled to the Peoples Republic of China to speak with Chinese leadership for the first time in 25 years.[7] At this point, relations between the countries became more diplomatic than ever before. This would only increase with the rise of Deng Xiaoping as leader of the PRC in 1978. China’s rapid industrialization had US business interests salivating at the opportunity to gain access to Chinese markets. At this point Deng made one of the most important geopolitical decisions of the 20th century, choosing to open China to foreign capital. Deng himself was exiled by the Cultural Revolution of Mao before rising to power in the Communist Party. While in Power he denounced both Mao, and the Cultural Revolution, and proposed a new economic path for China. China would remain a Marxist-Leninist state, striving for the creation of socialism. However, they would simultaneously allow foreign capital into the country. In addition, Chinese State-run industries, such as steel, would begin trading goods on the global market, and use the revenue to reinvest in China.
              
Deng’s reforms brought US- China diplomacy to its peak. The US seemed to have no problem with China’s Marxist ideology, so long as US capital was allowed to make a profit in China. In 1978 Jimmy Carter announced that he US would recognize the People’s Republic of China for the first time in history.[8] The US and China had seemingly found a sort of middle ground between Marxist and Capitalist ideology. However, the US may have underestimated the speed and extent to which China would continue to grow.
              
Over the next 40-year period, China has continued to grow their economy. Currently China is the second most powerful economy on the planet, with a GDP only bested by that of the United States. China has come to dominate the steel industry globally through their state-run steel companies. [9] This allows vast amounts of money to flow to the Chinese state, which is of course, reinvested in China. In addition, China’s tech sector has expanded at an astounding rate, now making up 30% of the Chinese GDP.[10] China’s centrally planned economy has allowed them to put the most resources into sectors of the economy which are the most lucrative on the global market. A positive effect of China’s rapid growth has been the raising of 850 million people from poverty, according to the World Bank. [11]

So why, in the year 2020, are tensions between the US and China escalating once again? The answer, as is the case with most US foreign intervention, can be found by studying the current situation of the global economy.
              
The US playbook on foreign intervention since the mass public outrage sparked by the brutality of US forces in Vietnam, has been to portray whatever regime the US wishes to overthrow as an unimaginable evil, who are oppressing their country’s civilians. The US then postures as the hero in this situation, asserting that we will use our vast military power to overthrow the evil regime, and liberate the oppressed civilians. The war in Iraq offers a salient example of this strategy, as the US public was promised the war would be a short campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein, liberate the Iraqi people, and then withdraw US troops. Former Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld famously said of the intervention in Iraq “Five days, five weeks, or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” [12] Fast forward 17 years from Rumsfeld’s comments, and the United States remains in Iraq, trying to stabilize a region thrown into chaos after the overthrow of the regime in power.
              
Even most corporate media outlets now admit the Iraq war was fought for control of Iraqi oil. Prior to the invasion US media uniformly told the public that the goal of intervention in Iraq was to overthrow the brutal dictator that was Saddam Hussein, when in reality the goal was to free up new oil markets for corporate America to exploit. Journalist Antonio Juasz explains in his 2013 write up on the war that “Before the 2003 invasion. Iraq’s domestic oil industry was nationalized and closed to Western oil companies. A decade of war later, it is largely privatized, and utterly dominated by foreign firms.”[13] The report was published by CNN, who now openly admit the catastrophic role they played in pushing public opinion towards support for war in Iraq. However, CNN claims that the press has learned from their mistakes.[14] This claim is false. The corporate media have continued to use the same playbook from Iraq, to push for more US intervention abroad. This includes China, who corporate media now portrays as possibly the greatest evil of the 21st century.

So, if the economic basis for regime change in Iraq was oil, what is the true motivation, or economic basis, for regime change in China?
              
As we said earlier, China has gone from a colonized nation to the second most powerful economy on earth in the 70 years following the Communist Revolution. While the US developed a cooperative relationship with China following Deng’s decision to open China up to foreign capital, China has now begun to challenge the United States as the world’s leading economic superpower. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has felt little resistance to their economic global dominance, nor their policies of military intervention in foreign countries. That is quickly changing however, as now in the year 2020, China provides the US with a rival in geopolitical dominance. The newfound competition between pro Communist China, and the pro Capitalist United States, is creating a sort of 20th century cold war between the two nations.
              
The Chinese tech sector clearly presents a challenge to US tech, where companies like Apple have long dominated the Global tech market. Kenneth Lee of the South China Morning Post writes “For the past few decades, the US market has dominated the listing of technology stock” He goes on to say later “However, investor interest in the United States- and the resulting effect on share prices- has been declining for Chinese Issuers”[15]  It is clear that Chinese based tech companies are now challenging US companies in an unprecedented fashion.
              
Tech giants such as Apple now face stiff completion from the Chinese phone producers Huawei and ZTE. In a letter to Shareholders, Apple CEO Tim Cook wrote “Lower than anticipated iPhone revenue, primarily in greater China, accounts for all of our revenue shortfall.” [16] US tech companies are no longer profiting from China’s policy of allowing foreign capital inside the country. Chinese companies are simply offering a better product, cutting into the revenue of firms like Apple, who are accustomed to seeing revenue from selling their products to China’s population of 1.3 billion.
              
Apple was recently outed for purposely slowing down their phones when users update the IOS software. This of course would encourage IPhone users to buy the newest version of the IPhone, in order to have a fully functioning device.[17] It should come as no surprise that Chinese citizens with a better alternative available to them, would stop purchasing from apple, and instead buy a phone that won’t break when updated.

However, rather than creating a better product than the Chinese companies, the way advocates of the so called “free market” argue that firms will always do, US tech giants have begun pressuring the Government  to use sanctions, and other methods to hamper China’s economy. This, as well as other economic sectors such as agriculture, are what have been the true motivation for Trump’s trade war being waged against China. The tech industry spends $582 million lobbying the US government for this purpose exactly.[18] When big tech loses their stranglehold on a foreign market, they can call in the state apparatus to do something about it.

​If economic sanctions fail to reestablish US tech dominance in China, it is likely that the US tech sector will begin pushing the Government towards real military intervention. This is why I have chosen to write this article. To argue to my fellow Americans that risking a hot war between the two largest world superpowers, is not worth increasing the profits of the already vastly wealthy US tech giants.

A simple google search of China will reveal that the US media has begun reporting frequently on human rights abuses committed by the Chinese Government. The Chinese are typically described in Western Media as authoritarian, a dictatorship, a “regime”, and it is frequently mentioned that they are communist, or Marxist. This is wording the Media uses to invoke fear, or negative feelings towards foreign governments. Fear is a powerful emotion, which often can override our critical thinking skills. If the American public fears China, they are more likely to support regime change in the country.
              
​Prior to the Covid-19 breakout, which President Trump has dubbed “Kung Flu”, in an attempt shift blame for the pandemic from himself onto China, the primary criticism the US media used to spread contempt towards China, is the Chinese Government’s treatment of Uygur Muslims.  A quick google search will show that any US media outlet in existence can be found condemning China’s treatment of the Uyghurs.
              
The media claims that China is doing a genocide of the Uyghur Muslim population, attempting an ethnic cleansing of the Uyghur people. Atrocities such as forced sterilization are among the list of accusations being hurled at the Chinese Government by the West. Recently, 22 Western countries signed a letter condemning China for their treatment of the Uyghurs. On the other hand, 37 countries, more than half of which are Muslim majority nations, have come to China’s defense. China, and the nations who support them, claim the camps are ethically run vocational training facilities, which also focus on de-radicalization from extremist ideology. They claim that this was a response to a spike in extremist terrorism committed by the Uyghurs.
              
Honestly, I’m not here to tell you which side is correct. I have never been to China, I’ve never investigated the Uyghur territory, and therefore, I will not pretend that I have enough knowledge to inform you about what exactly is happening. However, I will tell you that it is extremely naïve to believe that the United States Government cares deeply for the Human Rights of Muslims. If the US had such respect for the lives of Muslims, they would not have invaded Iraq, killing over 200,000 Muslim Civilians.[19] If the US really feels they must protect Islamic people, then why are they funding a bombing campaign in the Islamic country of Yemen, which targets the water sanitation facilities that Yemeni Civilians depend on?[20]
              
Friends, I am not arguing that China is a perfect country, who are above criticism. What I am telling you is that the United States is following the exact same playbook in China, as they have with every other foreign intervention since World War 2. They claim that a state enemy is committing unimaginable human rights abuses, which gets the public to support military or economic intervention. In reality the reasoning for every intervention is purely economic, and is driven by a ruling class of CEOS and stockholders, who have near full control over the US Government.
              
Do not fall for this same playbook once again. Criticize China’s human rights violations if you wish, but when the US Government begins pushing for intervention in China, the response from the public must be a loud, and resounding “NO”.
 

In conclusion, the US does not need any more wars. The official stance of the Chinese Government towards the US is to have a harmonious relationship, which allows for the peaceful development of both countries. This is a policy which the US should adopt towards China. We can always be critical of their policies; however, the US Government can no longer be allowed to act as an apparatus which serves only to further the accumulation of capital. The Human cost of a war between two nuclear powers in the 21st century is unimaginable. We must loudly reject any attempts by our government to interfere with Chinese affairs. This includes bringing an end to the trade war, as well as removing US presence from Hong Kong and Taiwan.
              
​China is not a perfect country, but that does not mean we should invade them. Let’s begin to focus our resources here at home.

​
[1] Axelrod, T. (2020, May 07). Trump campaign releases new ad attacking Biden on China. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/496591-trump-campaign-releases-new-ad-attacking-biden-on-china
 

[2] Zhou, C., & Huang, K. (2020, June 06). Why Beijing sees US election as battle of 'anti-China hawks'. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3087873/either-way-anti-china-hawk-wins-why-beijing-does-not-expect
 

[3] The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2020, February 18). The tide turns (1947–48). Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.britannica.com/event/Chinese-Civil-War/The-tide-turns-1947-48
 

[4] Editors, H. (2009, November 13). United States announces that it will recognize communist China. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-announces-that-it-will-recognize-communist-china
 

[5] Roblin, S. (2017, May 07). A U.S. Bombing Run in North Korea Wiped Out Mao Zedong's Dynasty. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-bombing-run-north-korea-wiped-out-mao-zedongs-dynasty-20550
 

[6] Ghosh, I. (2019, October 12). The People's Republic of China: 70 Years of Economic History. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/china-economic-growth-history/
 

[7] Editors, H. (2009, November 13). President Nixon arrives in China for talks. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nixon-arrives-in-china-for-talks
 

[8] Editors, H. (2009, November 13). United States announces that it will recognize communist China. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-announces-that-it-will-recognize-communist-china
 

[9] Braw, E. (2020, May 19). Don't Let China Steal Your Steel Industry. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/19/dont-let-china-steal-your-steel-industry/
 

[10] Dace, H. (n.d.). China's Tech Landscape: A Primer. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://institute.global/policy/chinas-tech-landscape-primer
 

[11] Overview. (n.d.). Retrieved September 02, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview
 

[12] Esterbrook, J. (2002, November 15). Rumsfeld: It Would Be A Short War. Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rumsfeld-it-would-be-a-short-war/
 

[13] Juhasz, A. (2013, April 15). Why the war in Iraq was fought for Big Oil. Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html
 

[14] Waldman, P. (2013, March 19). Opinion: Duped on Iraq War, has press learned? Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/waldman-media-iraq/index.html
 

[15] Lee, K. (2020, September 01). Why US-listed Chinese tech firms are heading to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3099420/how-us-china-tensions-are-pushing-us-listed-chinese-tech-firms-hong
 

[16] Howley, D. (2019, January 03). Apple's Chinese competitors figured out how to make better Apple products than Apple. Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://finance.yahoo.com/news/apples-chinese-competitors-figured-better-184935389.html
 

[17] Sulleyman, A. (n.d.). Apple admits it deliberately slows down iPhones as they get older. Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/apple-iphones-slow-down-old-models-smartphone-speed-ios-updates-a8121906.html
 

[18] Henney, M. (2019). Big tech has spent $582M lobbying Congress. Here's where that money went. Retrieved 2020, from https://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/amazon-apple-facebook-google-microsoft-lobbying-congress
 

[19] Iraq Body Count. (2020). Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.iraqbodycount.org/
 

[20] Summers, K. (2019, January 28). The US's Role in the Hidden Genocide in Yemen. Retrieved September 04, 2020, from https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20190128-the-us-s-role-in-the-hidden-genocide-in-yemen.cfm