​After a restful evening, Karl and Fred were together again in Karl’s study for an early morning discussion of the philosophy of Xunzi. 
 
“I see you have Chan’s text [Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy] of The Xunzi open before you Fred. Are you ready to begin our discussion? Let's find out if his views are compatible with Marxism or, as they say: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics."
 
“Ready and willing Karl.”
 
“Well then, let's begin.”
 
“What do you know about Xunzi?”
 
“Only that he lived a couple of generations after Mencius. I remember that Mencius was born around 371 and died around 289 BC, while Xunzi lived from about 298 to 238 BC. I also know that he is usually considered the anti-Mencius because, as opposed to Mencius’ view that people are born naturally ‘good’, he said they are naturally ‘evil’. And I do remember reading in Chan that ancient Confucianism is seen as developing along two different roads leading away from Confucius himself. Namely, the Idealist School or Road of Mencius and the Naturalistic School or road of Xunzi.
 
“What else do you remember?”
 
“Let’s see. You better help me out.”
 
“Ok. Chan remarks that 1. His philosophy was dominant over that of Mencius up until and throughout the Han period--206 BC to 220 AD. He is also said to have been partially responsible for the Qin Dynasty and the repressive dictatorship of the ‘First Emperor’. That must be the first ‘modern’ emperor as we have those olden time emperors the sages are always talking about. The Qin Dynasty was short lived--221-206 BC....”
 
“Don’t forget we have Goodrich’s Short History here [L. Carrington Goodrich, A Short History of the Chinese People]. Qin unified China under the First Emperor (Qin Shi Huang). The first one to unify China into a large empire--a unification that has lasted until modern times. He was a real tyrant, and his empire was overthrown a few years after his death by the people who founded the Han Dynasty. He is, as I recall, best known to most people today as the emperor who had all those terracotta warriors made that are such a tourist attraction in modern day China. He also has an opera written about him named “The First Emperor.’”
 
“That’s right Karl. And Chan says two of Xunzi’s students Han Fei and Li Si were ministers of Qin.”
 
“I don’t see how Xunzi can be tarred with the brush of Qin totalitarianism. He died before the rise of the Qin to total control of China. Anyway, he was honored as the greatest Confucianist until the end of Han times and the Han would never have allowed him that status if they considered him as an ideological forerunner of their mortal enemies the Qin.”
 
“That sounds right. But to continue. Chan points out that he was a native of Zhao one of the seven major states of ancient China and moved to Qi when he was fifty so he could hang out with other scholars. Later he went to Chu, served briefly as a magistrate, taught students, and then died there. He wrote his own book rather than relying on his students to make a compilation of his sayings. Chan writes that he ‘was contemporaneous with Mencius but there is no evidence that the two ever met.’”
 
“Which is not too strange as by Chan’s own dates for these two Xunzi would have been nine years old when Mencius died!”
 
“Chan has translated three of the most important chapters of the Xunzi which covers all the main points of Xunz’s philosophy. There are thirty-two chapters in the Xunzi, but these are the big one’s for philosophy. Ready?”
 
“Ready!”
 
“We begin with chapter seventeen, ‘On Nature.’ Xunzi says, ‘Nature (Tian, Heaven) operates with constant regularity.... Respond to it with peace and order, and good fortune will result. Respond to it with disorder, and disaster will follow.... If the Way is cultivated [followed?] without deviation then Nature cannot cause misfortune. Therefore flood and drought cannot cause a famine, extreme cold or heat cannot cause illness, and evil spiritual beings cannot cause misfortune. But if the foundations of living are neglected and used extravagantly. the Nature cannot make the country rich.’”
 
“It is obvious that this is an advanced view for the times Fred. The laws of nature are invariable and if human beings learn them and work with them all will be well. Nature does not cause famines is a good example of this. We can figure out the cycles of Nature, knowing that droughts, etc., are common, that floods occur, etc., we make sure we plan on storing up food for the lean years. If we fail to take proper actions we will have a famine. It is not to be blamed on Nature but on our lack of foresight and knowledge.”
 
“That makes sense, he continues saying famines, sickness, etc., ‘cannot be blamed on Heaven: this is how the Way works. Therefore one who understands the distinctive functions of Heaven and man may be called a perfect man.’ But you know, this sounds like ‘guns don’t kill people, people kill people.’”
 
“It certainly does. I think Xunzi would agree with that. But note, since we know that people use guns to kill people and there are many irresponsible people, it would make sense to limit the gun supply. This would be knowing ‘the distinctive functions of Heaven and man.’”
 
“Chan’s comment is interesting. ‘Xunzi’s concept of Heaven is obviously closer to the Dao of the Daoists than to the Tian (Heaven) of Confucius and Mencius. Their Tian is still purposive, and the source and ultimate control of man’s destiny, but Xunzi’s Tian is purely Nature so that in most cases the word has to be translated as Nature rather than as Heaven. The marvelous thing is that while he accepted the Daoists’ naturalistic view, he was not influenced by their intuitionism and mysticism. In Xunzi, we have rationalism and empiricism instead.’”
 
"While there may be relics of ‘purpose’ in the Tian of Confucius and Mencius it is nothing like we would find Mozi. I think the position adopted by Xunzi is the culmination of tendencies already at work in Confucius and Mencius. This naturalistic way of thinking has simply become more completely manifest in Xunzi. His concept of Heaven is similar to Spinoza’s concept of God. Where Spinoza says ‘Deus siva Natura’, Xunzi says ‘Heaven or Nature’."
 
“We see this naturalism pretty well in the next quote Karl. Xunzi says, ‘Each of the ten thousand things [idiom for ‘everything’] attains its harmony, and thus grows. Each obtains its nourishment and thus achieves full development.... The heart (mind) occupies the cavity in the center to control the five organs. This is called the natural ruler.... The sage purifies his natural ruler, rectifies his natural organs, sufficiently provides for his natural nourishment, follows the natural government, and nourishes his natural feelings so as to bring to completion the work of Nature. In this way he knows what to do and what not to do. Thus he rules heaven and earth and directs the ten thousand things.’”
 
“Except for the usual ancient mix up of the heart and brain, this is well said: an appeal to the use of our reason to guide both our social life and our understanding of Nature.”
 
“He then goes on to say, ‘Therefore great skill consists in not doing certain things, and great wisdom consists in not debating over certain things.’ He illustrates this by pointing out that we should study the stars and the earth and the four seasons, the yin and yang [positive and negative forces], etc., in order to discover the regularities of Heaven/Nature. And Chan adds, ‘Most ancient Confucianists either emphasized humanity (ren) and wisdom equally or stressed humanity. Xunzi, however, emphasizes wisdom. Obviously, inborn humanity has no room in his theory of the innate evil nature of man. As an acquired virtue, humanity is valued. But being a tough-minded realist, he relies on wisdom rather than such an idealistic quality in humanity.’”
 
“Please note that he is not saying that there are no inborn qualities, what today would be called instincts, but that the Confucian idea of ren is not inborn. Specifically he is rejecting the Mencius’ notion of ‘The Four Beginnings’.”
 
“Xunzi also sounds very modern when he proclaims that Heaven’s laws are not designed with humanity in mind. ‘Heaven does not give up winter because people dislike cold.’ And, ‘Heaven has a constant way of action, earth has a constant size, and the superior man has a constant personal demonstration of virtue. The superior man pursues the constant principle, but the inferior man calculates results.’ How does this jive with what you said in our Mencius discussion about Fletcher and situation ethics?”
 
“What do you mean?”
 
“I mean, does not the ‘constant principle’ put Xunzi in the Kantian camp. Wouldn’t he have to be for ‘calculating results’ if he was for situation ethics? So this seems to be another big difference between him and Mencius.”
 
“Wait a minute Fred. I don’t want to concede this point. Let’s look a little more closely at this quote. I think it can be legitimately interpreted to show that Xunzi and Mencius are not really in disagreement.”
 
“I’m all ears.”
 
“Xunzi says what is constant is ‘personal demonstration of virtue’. This amounts to doing the right thing in every circumstance or situation. This is what he means by the ‘constant principle’. The non-philosopher ‘calculates results.’ I take this to mean that he looks for personal advantage and not necessarily what is the right thing to do. Morality is not something you just look up in a book or some iron clad rule [never have an abortion, never mislead someone, etc.] it does depend on results. So when Xunzi says the inferior man ‘calculates results’ he means how the ‘results’ relate to him personally or some plan of his that he wants to accomplish. It can’t mean that the philosopher does not also calculate results. He does. He calculates if his action furthers virtue or not.”
 
“What about this then? ‘As to cultivating one’s will, to be earnest in one’s moral conduct, to be clear in one’s knowledge and deliberations, to live in this age but to set his mind on the ancients (as models), that depends on the person himself. Therefore the superior man is serious (jing) about what lies in himself and does not desire what comes from Heaven. The inferior man neglects what is in himself and desires what comes from Heaven.’ I would think Xunzi would say just the opposite. Heaven’s laws are constant or the same thing, Nature’s. We are part of Nature so we should follow what comes from Nature and just do it. This would be following the Way. The inferior man would try to get out of it and just do what he wants to do--what ‘lies in himself.’”
 
“Hmmm! I see the difficulty, but I think there is an easy explanation of this seeming conundrum. Look back at the word ‘seriousness’ in the quote, the word ‘jing.’ If I remember correctly that word conjures up the idea of ‘effort’ of working hard at attaining something. This is the clue to Xunzi’s meaning. Heaven is neutral, remember, no ‘Four Beginnings’, so we have to work at cultivating virtue. What ‘lies in himself’ is the product of one’s education and struggle to attain virtue. For example, some knowledge of Chinese philosophy now lies within you Fred. This is because you are making efforts to learn about it. What lies in you is a desire to improve yourself and work hard to attain wisdom. The inferior man does not delve into his internal resources to make this effort. He just expects to attain what he wants out of life automatically without making much effort, without seriousness. This is what Xunzi means by saying the inferior man neglects what is in himself and just wants what comes from Heaven.”
 
“Well, that makes sense but seems a little forced to me. But let’s proceed. Things will become clearer as we go along, I’m sure.”
 
“Ok!”

​“I think we are getting into his naturalism in these next quotes. ‘When stars fall or trees make a [strange] noise, all people in the state are afraid and ask, “Why?” I reply: There is no need to ask why. These are changes of heaven and earth, the transformation of yin and yang, and rare occurrences. It is all right to marvel at them, but wrong to fear them. For there has been no age that has not had the experience of eclipses of the sun and moon, unseasonable rain or wind or occasional appearance of strange stars.”
 
“It is obvious Fred, that Xunzi doesn’t believe in portents and the like. There is no supernatural message to be conveyed by what happens in nature.”
 
“And this reinforces his views, ‘When people pray for rain, it rains. Why? I say: There is no need to ask why. It is the same as when it rains when no one prays for it. When people try to save the sun or moon from being eclipsed, or when they pray for rain in a drought, or when they decide an important affair only after divination, they do so not because they believe they will get what they are after, but to use them as ornament (wen) to governmental measures. Hence the ruler intends them to be an ornament, but the common people think they are supernatural. It is good fortune to regard them as ornamental but it is evil fortune to regard them as supernatural.’”
 
“Meaning that if you realize they are ornamental you are one of the educated people and have some idea as to how the world is actually constituted--otherwise you are hoi polloi and will be a manipulated fool for your whole life!”
 
“That is a bit strong don’t you think?”
 
“Not at all Fred. The common people have been manipulated by their rulers since the beginning of history by means of religion and other superstitious beliefs. Even today the government makes sure it has religious professionals on its staff in the armed forces to reinforce and bolster up the superstitious ideas of the soldiers and other cannon fodder it recruits. You see religion being encouraged everywhere. It’s a method for keeping people stupid and docile. Xunzi realizes that and simply explains it so his fellow Confucians will be free from its baneful influence, having as he says ‘good fortune.’ I needn’t tell you how stupid people can be manipulated by religion Fred, just look out of the window at our altered New York skyline after 9/11.
 
“Well, Chan says about the same thing but he is not as vitriolic as you Karl. His comment is as follows, ‘The influence of supernatural forces over man is completely ruled out by Xunzi. What he called spirit is but cosmic change and evolution. To him, in religious sacrifice, whether there are really spiritual beings to receive them does not matter. The important thing is one’s attitude, especially sincerity, in the performance. The sacrifices are “ornaments,” or refined manifestation of an inner attitude.’”
 
“I don’t know if that is really the ‘important thing’ i.e., a refined inner attitude. I don’t know what to make of that. I agree that attitude is important--the attitude of not really believing in the efficacy of the ceremonies. This is what Fung [A Short History of Chinese Philosophy] says in the passage, ‘We pray for rain, and divine before we make any important decision, because we want to express our anxiety. That is all. If we were to take prayer as really able to move the gods, or divination as being really able to make predictions about the future, this would result in superstition with all its consequences (p.150).’”
 
“There is a problematic quote coming up which Chan says looks like it contradicts what has gone before.”
 
“That is just great. There is nothing like an inconsistent opinion to knock over a nice tidy interpretation.
 
Let’s hear it.”
 
"'If propriety and righteousness are not applied in the country, then accomplishments and fame would not shine. Therefore the destiny of man lies in Heaven, and the destiny of the state lies in propriety.’”
 
“I see. This looks like the inferior man is right after all--to want what comes from Heaven since that is where his destiny lies.”
 
“So we do have a contradiction! “
 
“What does he say next? Maybe that will clear up this problem.”
 
“He lists six questions he thinks we should consider. I think these two are the most germane. ‘Instead of regarding Heaven as great and admiring it, Why not foster it as a thing and regulate it? Instead of obeying Heaven and singing praise to it, why not control the Mandate of Heaven and use it?’”
 
“This answers our question about a contradiction. Now I don’t see any. If we would view the rule of propriety to be the constitution of the state, then of course the destiny of the state lies in its constitution, in following its fundamental laws. In China these would be based on Confucian philosophy, so we see where Xunzi is coming from in this respect. Heaven or Nature also follows laws, what we think of as the ‘laws of nature.’ If we understand the laws of nature we can use them to enhance our lives, such as knowing how to control floods, have better agricultural yields, cure disease, etc. That is what he means by ‘the destiny of man lies in Heaven’, he means in the study of its laws, in what we call science. When he says the inferior man just relies on what comes from Heaven he means that kind of man does not see Nature as an object to study and manipulation but, as Spinoza said, prefers ‘to gape at it like a fool.’ When Xunzi said the philosopher cares about ‘what lies in himself and does not desire what comes from Heaven’ he means he doesn’t just wait around to see what happens in Nature. Again, as Spinoza said, he ‘desires as a wise man to understand Nature.’ He doesn’t just sit around and ‘desire’ Nature. He works at trying to understand and manipulate it.”
 
“Yes, that must be the meaning for he goes on to say, ‘Therefore to neglect human effort and admire Heaven is to miss the nature of things.’ And Chan follows this up with the comment, ‘Nowhere else in the history of Chinese thought is the idea of controlling nature so definite and so strong. It is a pity that this did not lead to a development of natural science. One explanation is that although Xunzi enjoyed great prestige in the Han dynasty, his theory of overcoming nature was not strong enough to compete with the prevalent doctrine of harmony of man and nature, which both Confucianism and Taoism promoted.’”
 
“I think we have solved this problem of a potential contradiction in the Xunzi.”
 
“Now we have a quote which shows that situation ethics, which you used to explain some of Mencius’ views, won’t do at all with respect to Xunzi. Listen to this: ‘The [moral principles] that have remained unchanged through the time of all kings are sufficient to be the central thread running through the Way. Things come and go, but if they are responded to according to this central thread, one will find that the principle runs through all without any disorder. He who does not know this central thread does not know how to respond to changing conditions. The essential nature of the central thread has never ceased to be. Chaos is the result of a wrong application of the central thread, whereas order is the result of a complete application of it. For what is considered good according to the Way, namely, the Mean, should be followed.’”
 
“I hope we can deal with a work called The Doctrine of the Mean later Fred, but even so I think this quote does not mean that Xunzi and Mencius are not reconcilable. I said Mencius was not an absolutist and you think this passage shows that Xunzi was, but it is more complicated than that.”
 
“How so? Xunzi definitely speaks of unchanged moral principles--that sounds absolutist to me.”
 
“I think ‘absolutist’ should be used to describe positions that consider both the moral position AND its application as unchanging. Xunzi says that there is a ‘central thread’ but also ‘changing conditions’ and that while the ‘essential nature of the central thread’ doesn’t change only the person who knows how to apply it in ‘changing conditions’ really understands it. Say for a Christian that practicing agape is the central thread. That would be the unchanging moral principle. Now take the idea of ‘abortion’. Is it right or wrong to have an abortion? The Christian thinker would have to look at the situation of the person involved. Following agape the Christian might recommend an abortion to person A and not to person B. The central thread and unchanging moral principal isn’t ‘abortions are bad’ or vice versa but what agape requires. This is situational and is exactly what both Mencius and Xunzi would advocate, except that ren (jen) is substituted for agape. In fact, I would maintain that stripped of the mythological shell that has congealed around its essential heart, Christianity boils down to ren and there is a dialectical identity with Confucianism.”
 
“What!”
 
“Confucianism and Christianity are an identity in difference. They are the same in the same way that ice and steam are the same. They appear different but are really the same. I mean in respect to a humanist morality, a Christianity such as Thomas Jefferson indicated without supernatural overtones added to it.
 
“Well, that is a different conversation entirely Karl. But you have at least convinced me that Xunzi is no absolutist in the way I originally thought.”
 
“That’s good.”
 
“Maybe we will get to your great theory after we finish with Chinese philosophy, but now there is one more point to be made regarding this chapter from the Xunzi. Xunzi makes a lot of comments about other philosophers both of his own times as well as the past. I’m not going into specific criticisms, the point to be made is the following observation by Chan ‘that Xunzi was the most critical of ancient Chinese philosophers. [And] that a great variety of thought and extreme freedom of discussion existed in ancient China, a situation comparable to that in ancient Greece.’”
 
“What is the next chapter in Chan’s translation?”
 
“The next one is chapter twenty-two from the Xunzi, Chan’s selection 2, ‘On the Rectification of Names.’”
 
“A major topic for the ancient Chinese. Please begin Fred.”
 
“Xunzi has reference to the olden days of the sage-kings when he writes, ‘Then the people were carefully led and unified. Therefore, the practice of splitting terms and arbitrarily creating names to confuse correct names, thus causing much doubt in people’s minds and bringing about much litigation, was called great wickedness. It was a crime, like private manufacturing of credentials and measurements, and therefore the people dared not rely on strange terms created to confuse correct names. Hence the people were honest.’”
 
“It looks as if this problem originally arose as a practical problem, a problem of the marketplace. Later, however, it became a more abstract philosophical problem of name rectification.”
 
“I agree. Xunzi thinks that there are three issues involved here. He writes, ‘Should a true king appear, he would certainly retain some old names and create new ones. This being the case, [1] the reason for having names, [2] the causes for the similarities and differences in names, and [3] the fundamental principles on which names are instituted, must be clearly understood.’”
 
“What is the reason he gives for having names?”
 
“’ When different forms are separated from the mind and denote each other, and when different things are made mutually identified in name and actuality, the distinction between the noble and the humble is not clear and similarities and differences are not discriminated. Under such circumstances, there is bound to be danger that ideas will be misunderstood and work will encounter difficulty or be neglected. Therefore men of wisdom sought to establish distinctions and instituted names to indicate actualities, on the one hand clearly to distinguish the noble and the humble and, on the other, to discriminate between similarities and differences.’”
 
“That sounds like a good reason Fred. How does he account for the similarities and differences of names?”
 
“He says, ‘It is because of the natural organs. The organs of members of the same species with the same feelings perceive things in the same way. Therefore things are compared and those that are seemingly alike are generalized. ... The mind [actively] collects the knowledge of the senses. ...But the collection of knowledge must also depend on the natural organs first registering it according to its classification. If the five organs register it without knowing what it is, and the mind collects it without understanding it, then everyone says there is no knowledge. These are the causes for the similarities and differences in names.’”
 
“This sounds just like Hume’s theory of the ‘Association of Ideas!’ It is really amazing how philosophical traditions parallel one another!”
 
“What is this reference to Hume all about?”
 
“Hume thought that ideas also naturally associated. They would sort of stick together and the world would appear to us. Hume used Resemblance, Contiguity (in space and/or time) and Cause and Effect. But this even goes back as far as Plato. He spoke of Contiguity and Similarity [Resemblance] in the Phaedo.”
 
“Well, based on this Karl, we come to the third point Xunzi wanted to make. He continues, right after the last quote I read, ‘Then, accordingly, names are given to things. Similar things are given the same name and different things are given different names.’ But it is very important to note the following: ‘Names have no correctness on their own. The correctness is given by convention. When the convention is established and the custom is formed, they are called correct names. If they are contrary to convention, they are called incorrect names. Names have no corresponding actualities by themselves. The actualities ascribed to them are given by convention. When the convention is established and the custom is formed, they are called the names of such-and-such actualities.’”
 
“And yet, Fred, these conventions are not just arbitrary. If the conventions don’t somehow correspond to reality then names won’t be of much help!”
 
“Xunzi next criticizes the ‘School of Names’--i.e., the so-called ‘Logicians.’ There are three big fallacies he wants to expose. So he begins. ‘”It is no disgrace to be insulted.” “The sage does not love himself.” “To kill a robber is not to kill a man.” These are examples of the fallacy of so using names as to confuse names.’ “Mountains are on the same level as marshes. “The desires seek to be few.” “Tender meat adds nothing to sweet taste, and the great bell adds nothing to music.” These are examples of the fallacy of so using actualities as to confuse names.’ And now this most famous example from the School of Names “’A [white] horse is not a horse.’ “Which he says is an example of the fallacy of so using names as to confuse actualities.’ And finally, the chapter ends with Chan’s comment about all this: ‘The rectification of names was a common topic of discussion among ancient Chinese philosophical schools. Only in Xunzi, however, did it develop into some sort of systematic logical theory.... In fact, this is the nearest approach to logic in Ancient Chinese philosophy.’”
 
“Very informative indeed, Fred. So this brings us to the last excerpt from Chan, doesn’t it?”

“That’s right Karl. Chan’s ‘3. The Nature of Man is Evil’ from chapter 23 of the Xunzi.’
 
“OK, let’s get on with it. What are Xunzi’s reasons for taking this diametrically opposed view to Mencius?”
 
“He says, ‘The nature of man is evil: his goodness is the result of his activity. Now, man’s inborn nature is to seek for gain.... By inborn nature one is envious and hates others.... If these tendencies are followed, lewdness and licentiousness result, and the pattern and order of propriety and righteousness disappear. Therefore to follow man’s nature and his feelings will inevitably result in strife and rapacity, combine with rebellion and disorder, and end in violence. Therefore there must be the civilizing influence of teachers and laws and the guidance of propriety and righteousness, and then it will result in deference and compliance, combine with pattern and order, and end in discipline. From this point of view, it is clear that the nature of man is evil and that his goodness is the result of his activity.’ And, he adds, ‘Crooked wood must be heated and bent before it becomes straight.’”
 
“So much for the ‘Four Beginnings!’ But this is only an assertion, just as in Mencius. Neither Xunzi nor Mencius give any real arguments. Except that Mencius does give some examples such as preventing the child from falling into the well.”
 
“Chan points to another big difference as well. ‘In the Xunzi, rules of propriety and law are often spoken of together, giving the impression that, unlike Confucius and Mencius who advocated propriety (li) as inner control, Xunzi advocated it for external control. Thus rules of propriety shifted from being a means of personal moral cultivation to one of social control.’”
 
“Chan should have re-thought that one Fred. Propriety doesn’t just pop up in a person. These rules are culture specific and learned as we grow up. They are the result of the crooked wood being made straight. One of the ways that social control takes place is by having accepted rules of inner moral cultivation recognized as appropriate--i.e., this is what constitutes propriety.”
 
“I suppose you are right Karl. Now here is a frontal assault on Mencius! ‘Mencius said, “Man learns because his nature is good.” This is not true. He did not know the nature of man and did not understand the distinction between man’s nature and his effort. Man’s nature is the product of Nature; it cannot be learned and cannot be worked for. Propriety and righteousness are produced by the sage. They can be learned by men and can be accomplished through work. What is in man but cannot be learned or worked for is his nature. What is in him and can be learned and accomplished through work is what can be achieved through activity. This is the difference between human nature and human activity.”
 
“I see the distinction Xunzi is trying to make, Fred, but I’m not sure this is really so different from Mencius! The Four Beginnings are, after all, potentialities that have to be cultivated by education. The seed has to be in the right soil.”
 
“Maybe this will make Xunzi’s position clearer. In this passage he further contrasts Mencius’ views with his own. ‘By the original goodness of human nature is meant that man does not depart from his primitive character but makes it beautiful and does not depart from his original capacity but utilizes it, so that beauty being [inherent] in his primitive character and goodness being [inherent] in his will are like clear vision being inherent in the eye and distinct hearing being inherent in the ear. Hence we say that the eye is clear and the ear is sharp.’ “
 
“So the question is, is this idea of Mencius true or not. Left to his or her own devices a normal baby will grow up with “good” sight and “good” hearing. That is to say, normal senses. They won’t need any special training just to work and do their function. Xunzi seems to think that Mencius’ view is that a baby will grow up morally ‘good’ as well because this kind of ‘goodness’, like the ability to see clearly, is just part of our ‘nature.’ But this is not a good analogy Fred. If you go back and look on page 66 of Chan you will find that Mencius says that when the Four Beginnings are properly developed they will work to protect you in life but if they are not developed they won’t.”
 
Fred flipped back some pages in Chan’s book. “Here is the quote, Karl. I’ll read it. ‘When they are fully developed, they will be sufficient to protect all people within the four seas (the world). If they are not developed, they will not be sufficient even to serve one’s parents.’”
 
“So you see the Four Beginnings are not like clear vision and sharp hearing. They have to be developed by outside means which can only be a Confucian educational program in the last analysis.”
 
“I am forced to agree, Karl. But now let Xunzi continue with his notion of ‘nature’ as he wants to contrast his own opinion to that of Mencius. ‘Now by nature man desires repletion when hungry, desires warmth when cold, and desires rest when tired. This is man’s natural feeling. But now when a man is hungry and sees some elders before him, he does not eat ahead of them but yields to them. When he is tired, he dares not seek rest because he wants to take over the work [of elders].... Deference and compliance are opposed to his natural feelings. From this point of view, it is clear that man’s nature is evil and that his goodness is the result of his activity.’”
 
“It is getting more complicated. Perhaps the word ‘raw’ should be substituted for ‘evil.’ Man’s raw uncultivated nature is egocentric and needs to be socialized. But this isn’t evil, it’s natural. I am surprised that Xunzi, who is otherwise, a naturalist, is still animating Nature with a human moral concept! It is clear that by ‘activity’ he means education. So the practical result of either his view or that of Mencius is that without education we are not going to get deference and compliance. The real question is, is education helped out, given a boost as it were, by something innate such as the Four Beginnings or Four Seeds, or however you want to translate this conception.”
 
“We will have to go more deeply into Xunzi’s thought to determine this Karl. I think he was aware of your kind of comment and has an answer to it.”
 
“OK then. Let’s hear some more of the Xunzi.”
 
“'Someone may ask, “If man’s nature is evil, whence come propriety and righteousness? “I answer that all propriety and righteousness are results of activities of sages and not originally produced from man’s nature.’”
 
“And how did that come about?”
 
“He explains how that came about. ‘The sages gathered together their ideas and thoughts and became familiar with activity, facts and principles, and thus produced propriety and righteousness and instituted laws and systems.’ He goes on to point out the pleasures of the senses ‘are natural reactions to stimuli and do not require any work to be produced. But if the reaction is not naturally produced by the stimulus but requires work before it can be produced, then it is the result of activity. Here lies the evidence of the difference between what is produced by man’s nature and what is produced by his effort. Therefore the sages transformed man’s nature and aroused him to activity.’”
 
“I can see problems with this view Fred.”
 
“Just hold your horses. Xunzi is going to give what he considers some evidence for his view. He thinks loving gain and profit is natural and talks about what would naturally happen if brothers have to divide up some property. ‘If they follow their natural feelings, they will love profit and seek gain, and thus will do violence to each other and grab the property. But if they are transformed by the civilizing influence of the pattern and order of propriety and righteousness, they will even yield to outsiders. Therefore, brothers will quarrel if they follow their original nature and feeling but, if they are transformed by righteousness and propriety, they will yield to outsiders.’”
 
“Are you done?”
 
“Not yet! I want to hammer this home as I think Xunzi is onto something here. He says, ‘Now by nature a man does not originally possess propriety and righteousness; hence he makes strong effort to learn and seeks to have them. By nature he does not know propriety and righteousness; hence he thinks and deliberates and seeks to know them. Therefore, by what is inborn alone, man will not have or know propriety and righteousness. There will be disorder if man is without propriety and righteousness. There will be violence if he does not know propriety and righteousness. Consequently, by what is inborn alone, disorder and violence are within man himself.’”
 
“Well, correct me, but didn’t Mencius only propose with his ‘Four Beginnings’ that the basis or potential for propriety and righteousness was inborn? He didn’t say propriety and righteousness were inborn. They are the result of education, which if neglected will lead to the greedy brothers Xunzi speaks of.”
 
“Xunzi obviously thinks Mencius had a stronger position, but I think you are right, at least from what we read in our Mencius discussion. Nevertheless, I want to continue with Xunzi’s thought. I think you will discover that he anticipates your objection about the status of the Four Beginnings as mere potentialities.”
 
“So then, let us proceed!”
 
“He says, ‘Man’s nature is evil. Therefore the sages of antiquity, knowing that man’s nature is evil, that it is unbalanced and incorrect, that it is violent, disorderly, and undisciplined, established the authority of rulers to govern the people, set forth clearly propriety and righteousness to transform them, instituted laws and governmental measures to rule them, and made punishment severe to restrain them, so that all will result in good order and be in accord with goodness.”
 
“How nice. The Hobbesian rabble are running about unrestrained in a state of nature giving vent to their true inborn natures until they are domesticated by the sages. Only how did sages develop? How did they overcome their Hobbesian natures and arrive at propriety and righteousness? Who broke the natural order and taught them?”
 
“Before that can be answered, Xunzi’s position must be further developed. ‘In any discussion, the important things are discrimination and evidence. One can then sit down and talk about things, propagate them, and put them into practice. Now Mencius said that man’s nature is good. He had neither discrimination nor evidence. He sat down and talked about the matter but rose and could neither propagate it nor put it into practice. Is this not going too far? Therefore if man’s nature is good, sage-kings can be done away with and propriety and righteousness can be stopped.’ And he goes on again about how bent wood has to be made straight while straight wood is naturally so.”
 
“These facile analogies go both ways. The bent wood could not be made straight if being straight was not potentially in it. Anyway, Xunzi may have been correct about the propagation of Mencius’ view in his day, but as history developed Mencius’ view trumped the view of Xunzi. This is not an argument in favor of the truth of a view. Aristarchus of Samos developed what later became the Copernican view of the heliocentric solar system back in the Ancient World, but he could not propagate it and Ptolemy’s geocentric view won out until the time of the scientific revolution in the Seventeenth Century. Mencius did have evidence. Just remember the example of the child about to fall in the well--the most famous--and he gave other examples as well. So I don’t think this passage from Xunzi holds water.”
 
“Now you will see Karl, that Xunzi was aware of your type of critique, but did not accept it. He says, ‘The questioner may say, “It is by the nature of man that propriety and righteousness [can be produced] through accumulated effort and hence the sages can produce them.” I answer that this is not true. The potter pounds the clay and produces the pottery. Is the pottery [inherent] in the nature of the potter?... What the sages have done to propriety and righteousness is analogous to the potter’s pounding and producing the pottery.... With reference to the nature of man .... It is the same in the superior or inferior man.... As effort is aroused, propriety and righteousness are produced. Thus the relation between the sages and propriety and righteousness produced through accumulated effort, is like the potter pounding the clay to produce the pottery. From this point of view, is it by the nature of man that propriety and righteousness are produced through accumulated effort...? [Inferior men] are despised because they give reign to their nature, follow their feelings, and enjoy indulgence, and lead to the greed for gain, to quarrels and rapacity. It is clear that man’s nature is evil and that his goodness is the result of his activity.’”
 
“The problem with Xunzi’s position here is that it cannot explain how the sages originally got going. If the nature of man is evil, then all humans would be evil and self-indulgent, and no one would be putting out any accumulated effort to develop propriety and righteousness. We would still be running around like animals. Mencius’ position, however, allows for the show to get on the road. If the Four Beginnings are there waiting to be developed, then we can have a primal horde running about, splitting up into other hordes and the individuals finding themselves in all sorts of different existential situations some of which begin to trigger the Four Beginnings which by accumulated effort lead to being a sage and promulgating propriety and righteousness. But I can’t see how this can come about without the Four Beginnings in the first place. They have to be there as Mencius indicates in potential, so Xunzi is just wrong about this. The Four Beginnings must be accepted as a logical prerequisite to get the Confucian system started.”
 
 
“With regard to what you have just said Karl, listen to Xunzi’s explication of the following old saying.” ‘Any man in the street can become (sage-king) Yu.’ What does this ancient saying mean? I say that Yu became sage-king Yu because he practiced humanity, righteousness, laws, and correct principles. This shows that these can be known and practiced. Every man in the street possesses the faculty to know them and the capacity to practice them. This being the case, it is clear that every man can be Yu.’”
 
“Well, there you have it. The Four Beginnings are just the faculty that we have to practice the ‘good.’ I will grant this to Xunzi. That while he is wrong to say the nature of man is evil, Mencius is also wrong to say that the nature of man is good. They should have both said that man has a nature that has the capacity to be good or evil depending on the circumstances. Listen to these observations from Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. He says, ‘Virtue, then, is of two kinds, of thought and of character--of thought comes through experience and time and is the result of teaching, while virtue of character is the result of habit. Clearly, therefore, by nature, we get none of the virtues of character [1103a15]. The virtues do not arise in us either thru nature or contrary to nature. But we can by nature attain them and achieve complete perfection by means of habit [1103a25].’ And Aristotle also holds that what is by nature cannot be overcome by habit so that if people were either good or evil by nature nothing could make them different from what they are. Habit can be inculcated by education. So, this dispute on the nature of humans between Mencius and Xunzi is a non-issue. Neither of our sages has the right answer. We have the capacity to be either ‘good’ or ‘evil’-- which are social determinations anyway (for the most part). But they are both right as they believe that it takes (Confucian) education to bring about the ‘good’. Their positions are really the same and their so-called dispute is just one of words and not actualities. I think, therefore, we can keep the expression the ‘Four Beginnings’ in our philosophical terminology, but not in the sense that it implies man is ‘innately good’.”
 
“I can’t disagree with you Karl. I think you have hit the nail on the head! Just a few more quotes from Xunzi, now, to answer the question that if everyone can become a sage why don’t they do so. Xunzi’s reply is, ‘An inferior man can become a superior man, but he does not want to. A superior man can become an inferior man, but he does not want to. It is not that they cannot become each other. They do not do so because they do not want to. It is possible for every man to become Yu, but it does not follow that every man in the street is able actually to do so. However, the fact that he is not able actually to do so does not destroy the possibility of his doing so.’”
 
“I don’t think this is wrong, and it does not contradict my views at all. It is all of a piece with Mencius’ view that every man can be like Yao and Shun, also sage-kings from the past.”
 
“Finally, Xunzi concludes, ‘There is a great difference between what is possible on the one hand, and what is actually able to be done on the other.’”
 
"I think Xunzi would also be fine with both Marxism and Confucianism as both agree that it is through education that right and wrong are learned and class consciousness (education through struggle and practice) develops. Activity is required for both. They have some terminological problems, but in the end, they don’t really have any antagonistic contradictions. This applies to Mencius as well."

To read the Confucius Dialogue click here.
To read the Mencius Dialogue click here.

​“Well, Fred, I see you have the Chan book [Source Book In Chinese Philosophy]. Are you ready to begin our study of Mencius?”
 
“Yes I am Karl. But first, why don’t you see what you can remember about the background to the life and times of Mencius?”
 
“As I recall, he lived around the same time that Plato was active in Ancient Greece. What dates does the book give for him?”
 
“Around 371 to 289 BC.”
 
“Well Plato was around 447 to 327 BC.”
 
“Mencius was contemporary with Zhuanzi (Zhuang Zhou, 369-286 B.C.)  and Xunzi (Xun Kuang, c. 319-235 BC)  but it is unlikely they had any personal contact.” [The -zi suffix means “master” so Master Zhuang, Master Xun an honorific for “teacher”). 
 
“I don’t know about them, maybe we can discuss them later. Anyway I remember that Mencius’ claim to fame was his doctrine that human nature is innately good. Also that he studied under Confucius’ grandson, or under someone who had, thus unlike Confucius he had a teacher. He is also considered the second greatest Chinese philosopher after Confucius himself. I read Fung last night [Fung Yu-Lan,(modern, Feng Youlan) A Short History of Chinese Philosophy] and he said Mencius was a native of Zou in East China--modern Shantung. He also says that Mencius represents the idealist wing of Confucianism as opposed to the upcoming Xunzi who was a realist. Mencius is so important that his book, the Mencius as we will call it, was studied for the civil service exams which on and off throughout Chinese history almost everyone who wanted a government position had to take. The only philosophers as such who were so honored were he and Confucius. His life was also like Confucius’ in that he never got that big government job and he wandered about China just as Confucius had collecting a following of disciples. He retired and wrote his book. It became one of the Four Books, as I indicated, which everyone had to study for the ancient civil service tests.
 
“The ‘Four Books’?”
 
“The ones used for the tests. The Analects, of course, the Mencius, the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean.”
 
“A pretty good little introduction Karl. Now let’s look at his philosophy. I’m just going to use the headings from Chan who reproduces Book Six, Part I of the Mencius. He says this is the most important part of the book but he will quote other portions in a section of ‘Additions’. In this selection Mencius’ foil appears to be a philosopher called Gaozi who holds opposite opinions to Mencius. In 6A:2 Mencius declares ‘Man’s nature is naturally good just as water naturally flows downward.’ He doesn’t give any argument here. He is just contradicting Gaozi who said man’s nature can be good or bad just as water can flow east or west.”
 
“I think we need to get to an argument. What is next?”
 
“Next, Gaozi says that what we refer to as ‘inborn’ is the same as ‘nature.’ Mencius wants to contest everything Gao says it seems for we get the following exchange beginning with Mencius: ‘When you say that what is inborn is called nature, is that like saying that white is white?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then is the whiteness of the white feather the same as the whiteness of snow? Or again, is the whiteness of snow the same as the whiteness of white jade?’ ‘Yes.” ‘Then is the nature of a dog the same as the nature of an ox, and is the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?”
 
“That is a very bad argument. Mencius has to go take a Logic course! ‘White’ is being used as an adjective and ‘nature’ as a substantive. I feel sorry for Gaozi. I wonder how he would have fared if he composed a book?”
 
“Now in 6A4 Mencius and Gao have another exchange.”
 
“Let’s hear it. I hope the logic is a little better!”
 
“This time Gao maintains that ‘humanity’ is internal and ‘righteousness’ is external. Nature versus Nurture. He says that the pleasant feeling of love for the younger brother comes from within (humanity) but the respect for an old person is due to the person’s age (without/external). But Mencius says that we love roast beef if it’s our own or another's so would Gao say the love of roast beef is ‘external?’” This is supposed to take care of Gao’s position.”
 
“A very bad example. It might have been better if Mencius had said ‘food’ instead of roast beef since we love and need food regardless of where it comes from but ‘roast beef’ is an external culturally determined food--I doubt that Buddha would have loved it! In any event I don’t think Gao is refuted by any of these musings of Mencius.”
 
“Well, here is another bad argument. This time Meng Jizi asked Gongduzi ‘What does it mean to say that righteousness is internal?” and he gets the reply ‘We practice reverence, and therefore it is called internal.’ Not a very helpful answer if you ask me Karl. Meng Jizi now gives a lot of examples of ‘reverence’ all of which seem influenced by the context one finds oneself in so that one has to know what the external circumstances are before one can show the proper kind of ‘reverence.’ Gongduzi gets all confused and runs off to Mencius who gives him some examples which actually seem to confirm Meng Ji’s views in that they are also contextual in nature. Gongdu gets the point, even if we don't, and goes back to Meng Ji with this crushing reply: ‘In the winter we drink things hot. In the summer we drink things cold. Does it mean that what determines eating and drinking also lies outside?’”
 
“I see what you mean Fred. We would say to Gongdu, ‘of course it is--you just said its determined by winter or summer and that means by what is ‘outside’. The reasoning so far in this chapter is terrible. I hope it gets better or I won’t understand how Mencius got the reputation as a ‘sage’." 
 
“6A:6 Maybe this is a little better Karl. Gongduzi is speaking to Mencius: ‘Gaozi said that man’s nature is neither good nor evil. Some say that man’s nature may be made good or evil, therefore when King Wen and King Wu were in power [founders of the Zhou Dynasty r. 1171-1122 and 1121-1116 B.C.] the people loved virtue, and when Kings You and Li were in power [bad kings r. 781-771 and 878-842 B.C.] people loved violence. Some say some men’s nature is good and some men’s nature is evil. Therefore even under (sage emperor) Yao [3rd millennium B.C.] there was evil man Xiang [who daily plotted to kill his brother], and even with a bad father there was [a most filial] Shun (Xiang’s brother who succeeded Yao), and even with (wicked king) Zhou [last Shang Dynasty ruler 1175-1112 B.C.] as uncle and ruler, there were Viscount Qi of Wei and Prince Began [good guys]. Now you say that human nature is good. Then are those people wrong?’”
 
“I hope Mencius is convincing as most people today would think Gaozi was on the money!”
 
“Well, Mencius said ‘If you let people follow their feelings (original nature), they will be able to do good. This is what is meant by saying that human nature is good. If man does evil, it is not the fault of his natural endowment.... Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not drilled into us from outside. Only we do not think [to find them]! Therefore, it is said, ''Seek and you will find it, neglect and you will lose it.''' He thinks that different people develop their original natures more than others as ‘no one can develop his original endowment to the fullest extent.’ He then quotes the Book of Odes, ‘Heaven produces the teeming multitude. As there are things there are their specific principles. When the people keep their normal nature they will love excellent virtue.’ He also quotes Confucius to the same effect.’ Now before you say anything Karl, I want to also read you what Chan says about this passage. 'Mencius is the most important philosopher on the question of human nature, for he is the father of the theory of the original goodness of human nature. In spite of variations and modifications, this has remained the firm belief of the Chinese.’ And he adds that ‘evil or failure is not original but due to the underdevelopment of one's original endowment. Later Confucianists, especially Neo-Confucianists, devoted much of their deliberations to these subjects, but they have never deviated from the general direction laid down by Mencius.’”
 
“I’m still unimpressed Karl. Mencius is not arguing for his position he is simply declaiming his position. Look here for a moment.” Karl got up and pulled down a volume from his bookcase. “This is a classic study of Chinese thought by Herrlee G. Creel, Chinese Thought From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung. I want to read a couple of passages on what you might call Mencius’ ‘technique’ if you don’t mind.”
 
“Sure Karl, go ahead all of this is interesting to me.”
 
“Here are a couple of quotes from pages 75 and 74: ‘The discussions of Confucius with his disciples were conducted in a relatively calm atmosphere and were devoted, at least in considerable part, to an attempt to arrive at and to examine the truth. [That is the Prime Directive again Fred!] The discussions of Mencius, on the other hand, are largely taken up with the enterprise of defending and propagating the true doctrine, which is of course another thing entirely.’ He also notes that ‘Mencius was usually more interested in winning the argument than in trying to find the truth. Not that he cared nothing for the truth but that he was convinced that he had it already, and needed only to persuade his opponent of that fact.’”
 
“But you say he isn’t doing anything but disclaiming not giving arguments.”
 
“True, but some arguments are coming up I’m sure. He just hasn’t made any yet. I think Creel’s observations will be borne out the farther we progress into the text.”
 
“The following may be more like an argument Karl. 6A:7--’Although there may be a difference between the different stalks of wheat, it is due to differences in the soil, as rich or poor, to the unequal nourishment obtained from the rain and the dew, and to differences in human effort. Therefore all things of the same kind are similar to one another. Why should there be any doubt about men? The sage and I are the same in kind. Therefore Longzi [an ancient worthy] said, “If a man makes shoes without knowing the size of people’s feet, I know that he will at least not make them to be like baskets.” Mencius then says that the whole world [all men] agree with Yi Ya [ancient chef] with regard to flavor, Kuang [ancient musician] with regard to music and that Zidu [ancient handsome man] was handsome. He concludes, 'Therefore I say there is a common taste for flavor in our mouths, a common sense for sound in our ears, and a common sense for beauty in our eyes. Can it be that it is in our minds alone we are not alike? What is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the sense of principles and righteousness (i-li, moral principles). The sage is the first to possess what is common in our minds. Therefore moral principles please our minds as beef and mutton and pork please our mouths.’”
 
“Well I can tell you right off that these are very bad examples for modern people to mull over. Nothing is more relative than taste in food, music and concepts of beauty. Mencius is just taking Chinese standards as universal. This may perhaps be forgiven for someone living well over two thousand years ago except that there were people in his age, as we shall see, who were very much more advanced in their thinking. His analogy of the stalks is a bit better but only goes to show that humans may have a common nature before environmental factors come into play. It does not give any evidence that that common nature is ‘originally good.’"
 
“I agree with you completely Karl, but now I’ll read you Chan’s comment on that very same passage. ‘In saying that one is of the same kind as the sage, Mencius was pronouncing two principles of utmost significance. One is that every person can be perfect, and the other is that all people are basically equal. Also, in pointing to the moral principle which is common in our minds, he is pointing to what amounts to the Natural Law. Belief in the Natural Law has been persistent in Chinese history. It is called Principle of Nature (T’ien-li) by Neo-Confucianists. It is essentially the same as Mencius’ i-li.’”
 
“But Mencius has not established that there is any common moral principle in our minds. He has only made a lot of assertions of his opinions but these opinions have not been grounded in anything like a philosophical demonstration. One may speak of T’ien-li as the Law of Nature with regard to the physical universe that we are a part of, and of the human mental and cognitive apparatus as a part of it as well, but this should not be confused with i-li, that is to say, with principle and righteousness. I think we will have to wait until we come to the Neo-Confucianists to see if they really do, as Chan asserts, confuse moral principles with physical principles. It may be that some do and some don’t.”
 
“Here is 6A:8, ‘Mencius said, “The trees of the Ox Mountain were once beautiful.... When people see that it is so bald, they think there was never any timber on the mountain. Is this the true nature of the mountain?.... People see that [a certain man] acts like an animal, and think that he never had the original endowment (for goodness). But is that his true character? Therefore with proper nourishment and care, everything grows, whereas without proper nourishment and care, everything decays.”’
 
“This is fine Fred. He is simply saying environmental conditions are responsible for how things appear. That an original X can end up not-X due to the environment. But it proves nothing with respect to his main thesis about humanity.”
 
“Well what about this in 6A:10, ‘I like life and I also like righteousness. If I cannot have both of them, I shall give up life and choose righteousness. I love life, but there is something I love more than life, and therefore I will not do anything improper to have it. I also hate death, but there is something I hate more than death, and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger.... There are cases when a man does not take the course even if by taking it he can preserve his life, and he does not do anything even if by doing it he can avoid danger. Therefore there is something men love more than life and there is something men hate more than death. It is not only the worthies alone who have this moral sense. All men have it, but only the worthies have been able to preserve it.’”
 
“He has only established that the worthies have it. They may have gotten it by the study of philosophy. He has given no evidence that all men have it and just lost it. So far Creel is right. Mencius is just trying to convince us without any real evidence and discussion. It's as Creel said, he is convinced of his brand of truth and just keeps repeating it over and over. He is a far cry from the methods of Confucius!”
 
“6A:15, ‘The function of the mind is to think. If we think, we will get them (the principles of things). If we do not think, we will not get them. This is what Heaven has given to us. If we first build up the nobler part of our nature, then the inferior part cannot overcome it. It is simply this that makes a man great'.”
 
“Most interesting. Now he says we have 'superior' and 'inferior' parts to our nature. This is somewhat different from saying our (original) nature is 'good.' Now it appears as mixed and it is up to us to develop the right part. This is, of course, dependent on our environmental circumstances-- for which a Confucian government is responsible. This appears to me to be more realistic that the notion that our original nature is good--for which Mencius has so far provided no evidence. Indeed this passage seems to contradict it!”
 
“That is because he is so unsystematic Karl. Chen says this passage has a great influence on later Neo-Confucianists. He says, ‘that the idea of building up the nobler part of our nature became an important tenet in the moral philosophy of Lu Jiuyuan 1139-1193), leader of the idealistic school of Neo-Confucianism.’”
 
“Next!”
 
“6A:16, ‘The ancient people cultivated the nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man naturally came to them. People today cultivate the nobility of Heaven in order to seek for the nobility of man, and once they have obtained the nobility of man, they forsake the nobility of Heaven. Therefore their delusion is extreme. At the end they will surely lose (the nobility of man) also.’”
 
“Does he say what this ‘nobility’ of Heaven is?”
 
“Yes, he says it consists of, ‘Humanity, righteousness, loyalty, faithfulness, and the love of the good without getting tired of it....’”
 
“And of man?”
 
“He says it's ‘to be a grand official, a great official, and a high official....’”
 
“Ok, I’ve found Fung’s comment on this on page 77 of his book [A Short History of Chinese Philosophy]. Shall I read it to you?”
 
“Go ahead.”
 
“’According to Mencius and his school of Confucianism, the universe is essentially a moral universe. The moral principles of man are also metaphysical principles of the universe, and the nature of man is an exemplification of these principles. It is this moral universe that Mencius and his school mean when they speak of Heaven, and an understanding of this moral universe is what Mencius calls “knowing heaven.”’ And then Fung explains the meaning of that quote which you just gave Fred. He says it means that, ‘heavenly honors [the nobility of Heaven] are those to which a man can attain in the world of values, while human honors [the nobility of man] are purely material concepts in the human world. The citizen of Heaven...cares only for the honors of Heaven, but not those of man.’” Does that remind you of anything?”
 
“Plato?”
 
"Yes indeed.” Karl pulled down a copy of The Republic. “This is a quote from the end of Republic IX in Reeve’s revision of Grube published by Hackett. Plato has just finished describing the best possible state based on justice and the Good but grants that it is too ideal, perhaps, to ever be seen on earth, yet he has Socrates say there might be ‘a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the practical affairs of that city and no other.’ This is also similar to Augustine’s City of God. You know, the city of man, Rome, and then Heaven to which our real loyalties must ultimately be given. In so far as Mencius’ ‘sage’ or philosopher identifies with heaven rather than with man he and Plato are in agreement.”
 
“But how would that work Karl? How could we live in the 21st Century US of A and live by these Confucian or Platonic principles?”
 
“It would work like this Fred. I’ll use Plato as an example. Suppose you accepted Socrates’ argument for equality of the sexes. Now, if you live in a country which has sexual discrimination you will support measures for equality and your reason will be--in Plato’s republic equality is advocated and since I’m going to support his philosophy I’ll make my political, social, cultural decisions down here on earth according to the laws of the ideal republic. I may never get all the laws and customs of my country to be similar to that republic but the more they become that way the more like the republic will my actual country become.”
 
“So we have a Confucian model like a Platonic one if we are Confucians and we live according to the model, as best we can, and only really support the actual customs and conditions of our society in so far as they conform to our model.”
 
“That’s right Fred. The real crux is your qualifier ‘as best we can.’ How much will we compromise to safeguard our own personal interests, how committed are we to our beliefs, how much risk will we take in coming into conflict with the status quo? The answers to these questions define the hypocrite and the sage.”
 
“In 6A:17 Mencius says, ‘...all men have within themselves what is really honorable. Only they do not think of it. The honor conferred by men is not true honor. Whoever is made honorable by Zhao Meng [high official in Chin] can be made humble by him again. The Book of Odes says, “I am drunk with wine, and I am satiated with virtue.” It means that a man is satiated with humanity and righteousness, and therefore he does not wish for the flavor of fat meat and fine millet of men. “
 
“In his own way, I think Mencius is saying something like the quote from the Republic I gave. I think his words are just another way of saying what I just said before.”
 
“Here is 6A:19--’Mencius said, “The five kinds of grain are considered good plants, but if they are not ripe, they are worse than poor grains. So the value of humanity depends on its being brought to maturity.”’
 
“This little saying is, of course, dependent on his still unproved assumption that the original nature of human beings is ‘good’ so it only has to be properly ‘matured.’ His position is if you take a seed and put it in bad soil you get a bad plant but if you put it in good soil you get a good plant. In one sense the soil determines the type of plant. But the good soil only allows the original potency or nature within the seed to come forth to be a good plant i.e., just the type of plant it was meant to be by its internal nature. The bad plant has had its original nature destroyed or corrupted by the bad soil it was put in. The human beings’ internal nature and potency is the same. The right environment just brings out the true inner nature of the human. But this has to be better argued. Suppose the nature is really evil and sinful, as Christians maintain, what then? Or maybe the human being’s nature is a ‘blank slate’ so it is neither good nor bad. Mencius hasn’t adequately addressed these issues.”

​“We have come to the end of the main section in Chan’s anthology. Now I am going to turn to the ‘Additional Selections’ he has chosen. Hopefully he will address the problems you have raised with respect to his position on human nature.”
 
“This (1B:7) is the advice Mencius gave to King Xuan. He told him that with respect to all of his ministers and great officers telling him that such a person was worthy or unworthy or that such and such a person should be executed, that this consensus of big shots was not enough for the King to make the right decision. The King has to ask the people what they think and only if the people agree with the advice of the big shots should the King then look into the recommendations and if he follows them it can be said that the people actually are responsible for them. ‘Only in this way can a ruler become parent of the people.’ And Chan remarks, apropos, of this passage: ‘No one in the history of Chinese thought has stressed more vigorously the primary importance of the people for the state.’” Marxism would agree.
 
“And Mencius will provide other examples, Fred, of this proto democratic spirit. I think this is a good example of the positive influence some Confucians had in Chinese history. It also explains why he never got a real job at any of the Chinese courts!”
 
“Then what about this--1B:8. ‘King Xuan of Ch’i asked....”Is it all right for a minister to murder his king?” Mencius said, “He who injures humanity is a bandit. He who injures righteousness is a destructive person. Such a person is a mere fellow. I have heard of killing a mere fellow Chou [murdered an evil king], but I have not heard of murdering [him as] the ruler.”’ And Chan adds, ‘The doctrine of revolution is here boldly advanced and simply stated. A wicked king has lost the Mandate of Heaven and it should go to someone else.’” Actually this more of a revolt than a revolution.
 
“The Chinese Marxists should support Mencius on this one. It shows that the king is king only so long as he rules in the interest of the people. Since most of the people were peasants in China it appears that Mencius is in some sense a representative of peasant interests. Confucians in general favored benevolent rulers, and although the peasants were often ruthlessly exploited this was not in the spirit of Confucianism anymore than the Vietnam War, say, was waged in the spirit of Christianity whatever so called Christian leaders from Billy Graham to Cardinal Spellman may have said. This is something the Chinese party should take to heart in case the economic reforms being pushed end up only benefiting a narrow portion of Chinese society. This does not, however, seem to be the case.”
 
“Now we are coming to what looks like some ideas concerning man’s internal constitution. Mencius says (2A:2) ‘The will is the leader of the vital force, and the vital force pervades and animates the body. Therefore I say, “Hold the will firm and never do violence to the vital force.”’ Later he says, ‘I am skillful in nourishing my strong, moving power’ but he has difficulty saying just what this power is although he says, ’It is produced by the accumulation of righteous deeds but is not obtained by incidental acts of righteousness. When one’s conduct is not satisfactory to his own mind, then one will be devoid of nourishment. I therefore said that Gaozi [putting him down again!] never understood righteousness because he made it something external.’ Chan says the concept he translated as ‘strong moving power’ is hao-jan chih ch’i in Chinese.”
 
“I remember that term from Fung. He translated it as ‘Great Morale.’”
 
“That seems to be really a different concept from Chan. Read out what Fung says Karl.”
 
“You mean about why he calls it the ‘Great Morale.’ He says this is a special term for Mencius. Fung says the ‘Great Morale is a matter concerning man and the universe, and therefore is a super-moral value. It is the morale of the man who identifies himself with the universe, so that Mencius says of it that “it pervades all between Heaven and Earth.”' In order to develop this Great Morale, Fung says two things are needed: ‘One may be called the “understanding of Dao;” that is, of the way or principle that leads to the elevation of the mind.’ The other is what Mencius mentioned in the quote you read from Chan concerning the accumulation of ‘righteousness.’ The Dao and the righteousness together will produce the Great Morale, or as Chan calls it, ‘the strong moving power’ i.e., our moral identification with ‘Heaven’--but this cannot be forced.”
 
“That’s right Karl. Mencius says ‘let there be no artificial effort to help it grow.’ To underscore this he tell us not to act like the man from Sung....”
 
“Let me read the story. Its right here on page 79 of Fung. Mencius is speaking: ‘There was a man of Sung who was grieved that his grain did not grow fast enough. So he pulled it up. Then he returned to his home with great innocence, and said to his people: “I am tired to-day, for I have been helping the grain to grow.” His son ran out to look at it, and found all the grain withered.’ You can’t ‘help’ the Great Morale to grow by taking shortcuts. As Fung says, ‘If one constantly practices righteousness, the Great Morale will naturally emerge from the very center of one’s being.’ The point of all this is that Mencius still has superstitious notions about the nature of ‘Heaven.’ That it is in favor of certain moral rules and regulations and we should follow ‘Heaven’ by carrying them out. According to Fung ‘righteousness’ is similar to the Kantian concept of ‘duty.’ “
 
“Very good, Karl. Chan says more or less the same thing. Mencius is against artificial efforts. Mencius says, ‘Always be doing something [in accordance with righteousness] without expectation.’ The Great Morale will follow of its own accord. The Buddhists have similar views but they are more concerned with our mental states rather than our actions. Chan says, ‘The difference between the Buddhists and the Confucianists is that the former emphasize the state of mind while the latter emphasize activity.’”
 
“I think we have said enough about this Fred.”
 
“OK, here is some political philosophy, from 2A:3: ‘Mencius said, “A ruler who uses force to make a pretense at humanity is a despot.... When force is used to overcome people, they do not submit willingly but only because they have not sufficient strength to resist. But when virtue is used to overcome people, they are pleased in their hearts and sincerely submit, as the seventy disciples submitted to Confucius.” And he gives us a comment which encapsulates Confucian political philosophy: ‘The foundation of Confucian political philosophy is “humane government,” government of the true king, who rules through moral example. His guiding principle is righteousness, whereas that of the despot is profit. This contrast between kingliness and despotism has always remained sharp in the minds of Confucian political thinkers.’”
 
"That is a good summary, Fred. I think if we looked at the policies of our own government and many others which are based on the control of the world’s oil resources and hegemony over financial and other markets backed up with the use of military might we would find this contradicts Confucianism completely.”
 
“This next quote isn’t very philosophical but it affords us a glimpse of economic life in ancient China. We can see what type of rules and regulations were considered good and bad by what Mencius approves of. There are FIVE THINGS which the ruler must do in order to have his neighbors ‘look up to him as parent.’ So here is Mencius version of NAFTA: 1.) honor the worthy and employ the competent; 2.) in cities if he charges rent but does tax goods OR enforces the regulations but does not charge rent; 3.) at his borders--inspections but no tax; 4.) the farmers should mutually cultivate the public field and pay no taxes: 5.) no fines for idlers or families who fail to meet the cloth quota. Mencius adds, this is all in 2A:5, ‘Ever since there has been mankind, none has succeeded in leading children to attack their parents. Thus such a ruler will have no enemy anywhere in the world, and having no enemy in the world, he will be an official appointed by Heaven.’”
 
“A little optimistic, I think. Such a ruler would presumably have a prosperous kingdom so Mencius should not discount the desire of greedy rival kingdoms or barbarian nations to take over his country. Having a good constitution is no guarantee that you ‘will have no enemy anywhere in the world.’”
 
"Now we have a VIP [Very Important Passage]! This quote (2A:6) is a major statement of Mencius’ doctrine about the ‘innate goodness’ of humankind. Mencius details what he means by THE FOUR BEGINNINGS and Chan says, ‘Practically all later Confucianists have accepted the Four Beginnings as the innate moral qualities.’”
 
“So let’s hear the quote Fred!”
 
“’Mencius said, “All men have the mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others. The ancient kings had this in mind and therefore they had a government that could not bear to see the suffering of the people....When I say that all men have the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: Now, when men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the child’s parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity if they did not rescue the child]. From such a case, we see that a man without the feeling of commiseration is not a man; a man without the feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; a man without the feeling of deference and compliance is not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Men have these Four Beginnings just have they have their four limbs.”’”
 
“He thinks his example proves all this! Actually he has only shown that some people experience a feeling of alarm when they see a child about to fall into a well. This might be the beginning of a feeling of humanity. I think this is the only immediate feeling. The others come about as a result of reflection. Mencius’ views are of course a result of his having lived in ancient China. I doubt that today we would consider these attitudes ‘innate’, that is, genetically constituted. We will see a better account of all this if we discuss Xunzi down the line. In the meantime I can only say that Mencius’ views have deleteriously affected all subsequent Chinese thought by having pushed Xunzi s theories [man’s original nature is evil] into the background.
 
“More political philosophy in 3A:3. ‘Duke Wen of Teng asked about the proper way of government. Mencius said, “The business of the people should not be delayed.”’ He means that the government should be making sure that the people have secure living arrangements, education, etc. He has in mind a government, within the feudal context, that is ‘for the people’. The welfare state or a socialist approach as in Cuba would be a contemporary example of his basic attitude. If the government fails to provide for the people--say there is a lot of homelessness, drug addition, unemployment [to use modern examples]-- the people will not be secure in their minds. ‘And,’ Mencius goes on, ‘if they have no secure mind, there is nothing they will not do in the way of self-abandonment, moral defection, depravity, and wild license. When they fall into crime, to pursue and punish them is to entrap them. How can such a thing as entrapping the people be allowed under the rule of a man of humanity? Therefore a worthy ruler will be gravely complaisant and thrifty, showing a respectful politeness to his subordinates, and taking from the people according to regulations.’ The ruler must also: ‘Establish seminaries, academies, schools, and institutes to teach the people.’ It is the responsibility of the ruler to set a good moral example and to instruct the people. ‘If human relations are made clear and prominent above, then the common people below will have affection to one another. When a true king arises, he will surely come to take you [Duke Wen] as an example, and thus you will be the teacher of kingly rulers.' Duke Wen was impressed by all this and sent Bi Chan to consult with Mencius about the ‘well-field’ land system.’ What is that Karl?”
 
“It is the system of land tenure recommended by Mencius. He claims it was the system of olden times but many scholars doubt that it ever existed. The land was to be divided into nine equal sections. Eight families would cultivate their own plots and the left over plot would belong to the state and all eight families would take turns cultivating it. Since the state would own zillions of these plots it would have much wealth of produce, etc., to do all the state business and every family would enough for its needs as well. A perfect mixture of state and individual ownership [with respect to the technical developments of the time]. What a fortunate country China would have been had Mencius’ theory been put into practice!”
 
“Anyway, this is what Bi Chan was told by Mencius: ‘Now that your ruler is about to put in practice humane government and has chosen you for this service, you must do your best. Humane government must begin by defining the boundaries of land. If the boundaries are not defined correctly, the division of the land into squares will not be equal, and the produce available for official salaries will not be fairly distributed. Therefore oppressive rulers and corrupt officials are sure to neglect the defining of the boundaries.’”
 
“To better understand the wisdom of Mencius as a practical reformer, Fred, I just want to mention that most of the suffering and killing and tyrannical government behaviors of the last century, and so far in this one too, has been the result of a failure to have fair land distribution and neglect in the ‘defining of the boundaries’. This is what is behind all the massacres and killing of people from the Palestinians, to the Mayan Indians in Guatemala, also the Indians in Mexico and throughout Brazil and the rest of South America. the Bantu and others in South Africa, the people in Zimbabwe, in India, it was behind the Russian [and French] revolutions, the Communist victories in China, Cuba, and Vietnam, it's one of the reasons behind the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan, it's the reason Turkey and Iraq kill Kurds and American Indians are confined to reservations. Everywhere you look the big, powerful governments of today spend trillions of dollars just to repress and kill the poor all over the world so that they won’t have to be fair about sharing the land. Humane government is very rare indeed.”
 
“I agree with that Karl, and you haven’t begun to list all the examples!”
 
“Enough of my going on about this. What is next Mencius?”
 
“Next is 3A:4 which has been criticized for being undemocratic. It also discusses what are called the ‘Five Relations.’ Here is what Mencius said: ‘If one must make the things himself before he uses them, this would make the whole empire run about on the road. Therefore it is said, “Some labor with their minds and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others.” Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern them are supported by them. This is the universal principle....’ It’s a little like Plato’s Republic. Chan has the following comment ‘Mencius, generally considered the most democratic of Chinese philosophers, has been severely criticized for this undemocratic class distinction. It does not seem to be in harmony with his idea of the basic equality of the people [Chan then gives a reference,7A:4, that has nothing to do with anything]. We should not overlook, however, that the distinction is essentially one of function, not of status, as in Plato, for no one is confined to one class by birth.’ “
 
“I don’t think we should be calling Mencius ‘democratic.’ The concept of democracy was not in use in China at this period. It developed in Greece around this time, or a little before, with its system of city states, but China was not organized into city states and did not have democratic ideals at this time. Mencius’ philosophy grew up in a system of feuding feudal territories based on a hereditary nobility. His thrust is to try to humanize this system and minimize the suffering and degradation within it. He should not be faulted for having ‘feudal’ notions--that is, the notions more or less of his historical time. He is simply describing the actual social reality around him. It is also ingenuous for Chan to say that people are not confined to one class by birth. In reality 99.9% are.
 
“I think you are correct Karl. Mencius goes on to say that the people will be like animals if they are only fed and looked after by the lords. Education is needed. He said, ‘The Sage (emperor Shun) worried about it and he appointed Xie to be minister of education and teach people human relations, that between father and son, there should be affection; between ruler and minister, there should be righteousness; between husband and wife, there should be attention to their separate functions; between old and young, there should be a proper order; and between friends, there should be faithfulness.’ Chan then makes the following comment about the FIVE RELATIONS. ‘It is often said that these do include the stranger and the enemy. But to Confucianists, no one is unrelated, and a stranger is therefore inconceivable. He is at least related as older and younger. As to the enemy, there should never be such a person, for all people should be friends.’ Finally a bon mot as it were from Mencius: ‘It is the nature of things to be unequal.’”
 
“Just a minute Fred. I remember that bon mot. It has to do with his attack on equality of prices, the economic theory of some other scholar of the day.”
 
“Yes, Xu Xing. Most of what Mencius said before in this chapter was in response to Xu and so was the bon mot.” 
 
“Well, I think you should go ahead and contextualize the whole thing.”
 
“Xu Xing had put forth the theory of economic equality. ‘Linen and silk of the same length should be sold at the same price. Bundles of hemp and silk of the same weight should be sold at the same price. Grains of the same quantity should be sold at the same price. And shoes of the same size would be sold at the same price.’ You can see that he knows nothing about the cost of production of different things!”
 
“What else does he say?”
 
“After he says things are unequal he says ‘If you equalize them all, you will throw the world into confusion. If large shoes and small shoes were of the same price, who would make them? If the doctrines of Xuzi were followed, people would lead one another to practice deceit. How can these doctrines be employed to govern a state?’”
 
“Here again, Fred, is an example of the lack of logical training, or if not that, of not paying attention to an opponent’s argument.”
 
“What do you mean?”
 
“Xu said ‘shoes of the same size would be sold at the same price’ and we get a criticism from Mencius referring to large shoes and small shoes for the same price. This is not really attacking Xu on what he actually said. Mencius should have criticized his views on hemp and silk of the same weight being sold for the same price where he could have made a point, if he really understood economics, that silk costs more to produce than hemp on an equal weight basis. I mean, Mencius had a valid point to make but he used sloppy logic.”
 
“Regardless, Chan thinks the bon mot that came out of all this is important because it was later used by the Neo-Confucianists to argue against a metaphysical point, namely ‘that reality is not an undifferentiated continuum’.”
 
“That is even better. A casual comment regarding an economic theory in the context of a political discussion is used by his successors to bolster a metaphysical position! We may eventually get to the Neo-Confucianists but I hope they have better arguments for their positions that you just indicated a la Chan.”
 
“We will find out. Now I have a great comment of Mencius that shows his attitude towards women. An attitude I fear that was pervasive in Chinese society and is even today a big problem in China. Remember the FIVE RELATIONS? Well, here is an elaboration of that between men and women. Mencius is speaking in 3B:2, ‘At the marriage of a young woman, her mother instructs her. She accompanies the daughter to the door on her leaving and admonishes her, saying, “Go to your home. Always be respectful and careful. Never disobey your husband.” Thus, to regard obedience as the correct course of conduct is the way for women.’”
 
“This will have to go, of course, if Confucianism is to be updated for our new century. The idea that women are somehow inferior to men is just rampant, not only in China, but in India, in Islamic lands (the Koran even says men are ‘superior’) in the plethora of Christian sects (with maybe a few exceptions) and in most third world countries (always excepting Cuba where a real struggle is being waged by the government for sexual equality.) It is a shame that neither Confucius nor Mencius recognized the potential of women, especially since such philosophers as Pythagorus, Plato, and Epicurus did so and encouraged women to study philosophy. Hypatia was in fact a famous woman philosopher (brutally murdered by Christians) in the ancient world. I can’t think of an equivalent in ancient China.”

​“In 3B:9 Mencius proclaims his purpose in being a philosopher, his ‘Manifesto’ as it were.”
 
“Let’s hear it!”
 
“’Do I like to argue? I cannot help it.... Sage emperors have ceased to appear. Feudal lords have become reckless and idle scholars have indulged in unreasonable opinions. The words of Yang Zhu and Mo Di [Mozi] fill the world. Yang advocated egoism, which means a denial of the special relationship with the ruler. Mo advocated universal love, which means a denial of the special relationship with the father. To deny the special relationship with the father and the ruler is to become an animal.... If the principles of Yang and Mo are not stopped, and if the principles of Confucius are not brought to light, perverse doctrines will delude the people and obstruct the path of humanity and righteousness.... I am alarmed by these things, and defend the doctrines of the ancient kings and oppose Yang and Mo.’’
 
“Of course we must remember that ‘the doctrines of the ancient kings’ is just code for ‘the principles of Confucius.’
 
It seems to be de rigor for a Chinese philosopher to make appeals to mythological past policies of ancient kings.”
 
“And Chan makes the following comment on this passage: ‘The dispute between Mencius and the Moists involves a fundamental issue of ethics, namely, whether there should be distinction in love....Applied to ethics, this means that while love is universal, its applications to the various [human] relations are different.”
 
“I know that Fred. Mencius thinks we must love our own parents, kin and countrymen more than other people’s in the sense that we owe our first responsibilities to them and then we should love the parents, kin and countrymen of others, while Mo says we should make no distinctions in love.” 
 
“Karl, here is an interesting observation in 4A:12. ‘If one does not understand what is good, he will not be sincere with himself. Therefore sincerity is the way of Heaven, and to think how to be sincere is the way of man.’”
 
“Actually the way of the philosopher or sage. People ignorant of the ethical requirements of jen [ren] or humanity really don’t know the ‘good’ they will not be sincere because knowing and doing the good are not priorities for them. To be ‘sincere’ of course means to be trying to implement the Confucian ideals of humanity. Otherwise people just try to do what is good for themselves without much thought of the consequences for others or at least not for others outside their own immediate circle and sometimes not even then. Examples are everywhere. Every time a business person or corporate executive makes a decision to cut costs in order to increase profits--as in moving a factory to a cheaper labor zone, skimping on safety checks (almost the rule in business) it is obvious these people, and they dominate the world system we live under, are enemies of the Confucian ideal of the good and of humanity.”
 
“You are a little too radical Karl, but Mencius might just be radical too. Here is what he thinks about war for territory. I can’t help but think of the constant fighting in the West Bank and Gaza that is going on. 
 
This is 4A:14--’Mencius said, ”When a ruler failed to practice humane government. all those ministers who enriched him were rejected by Confucius. How much more would he have rejected those who are vehement to fight for their rulers? When they fight for territory, they slaughter so many people that the field is full of them. When they fight for a city, they slaughter so many people that the city is full of them. This is what is called leading on the land to devour human flesh. Death is not enough for such a crime. Therefore those who are skillful in fighting should suffer the heaviest punishment.”’”
 
“It is fairly obvious that Mencius and Mozi at least agree that only a defensive war not one to take some other people’s land is acceptable. In today’s world the equivalent to land taking is resource taking. Wars to get control of other peoples resources is equally a great crime. There are very few governments of today, at least in the so-called capitalist world, that a Confucian sage could work for. In fact the so called ‘free enterprise’ system itself, since it puts profits before humanity, might be totally inconsistent with a modern day Confucianism.”
 
“Or maybe, like feudalism Karl, the Confucian should work in the system to try and mitigate its worst features.”
 
“Maybe.”
 
“At any rate this is 4B:11: ‘Mencius said, “The great man does not insist that his words be necessarily truthful [at all times and under (all) circumstances] or his actions be necessarily resolute. He acts only according to righteousness.”’”
 
“This is really interesting for it shows that Mencius was a precursor of situation ethics.”
 
“What is that?”
 
“Look Fred, take Kant for instance. He would say you should never lie or steal in general you can never break any ethical commandments--no exceptions. But Mencius has just said you don’t have to always be truthful--it depends on righteousness. This can only mean that you can sometimes lie, etc., if righteousness is promoted. Suppose you had to lie in order to save the child from falling into the well? There are situations in which righteousness outweighs our common notions of truth telling, etc. As for ‘situation ethics,’ let me read to you from Reese’s dictionary (1980: p. 531), ‘The position of Joseph Fletcher (Situation Ethics, 1966) that any action may be good or bad depending on the situation. What is wrong in most situations may sometimes be right if the end it serves is sufficiently good.’ There is more about how this works in Christianity (it's based on agape) but it applies to Confucian ends as well i.e., jen or ren.”
 
“Sounds like ‘the end justifies the means’ to me and that can lead to all kinds of problems. What Hitler considers ‘sufficiently good’ may not be either agape or ren.”
 
“I understand the complications Fred. I just wanted to point out that Mencius is not an ‘absolutist’ except on the ren question which is, after all, the basis of Confucianism. It's their prime directive and for us, we can make it the second directive after our own prime directive we set up in the discussion we had on Confucius.”
 
“First the truth of reason then the good of humanity. It doesn’t sound right. Shouldn’t it be reversed or the two rules given equal status?”
 
“This can take all day. Since I think that we can’t begin to know what constitutes ren without recourse to the Prime Directive given before, that is why I put them in that order. But they are inextricably bonded.”
 
“Here is 4B26: ‘Mencius said, “All who talk about the nature of things need only [reason from] facts [and principles will be clear]. The fundamental principle [of reasoning] from facts is to follow [their natural tendencies].”’”
 
“This is practically our own Prime Directive!”
 
“This next quote (4B:30) is just to remind us of the special role of ‘family values’ in Ancient China. ‘Mencius said, “There are five things which in common practice are considered unfilial. The first is laziness in the use of one’s body without attending to the support and care of one’s parents. The second is chess-playing and fondness for wine, without attending to the support and care of one’s parents. The third is love of things and money and being exclusively attached to one’s wife and children, without attending to the support and care of one’s parents. The fourth is following the desires of one’s ears and eyes, thus bringing his parents to disgrace. And the fifth is being fond of bravery, fighting and quarreling, thus endangering one’s parents.”’”
 
“Well, I think these five rules could be boiled down to ‘attend to the support and care of one’s parents’--i.e., ‘Honor thy father and thy mother.’”
 
“Sounds familiar.”
 
“What’s next?”
 
“In 5A:5 there is a discussion of just how we should understand the term ‘the will of heaven’ when we are using it politically. It is a rather long passage but the gist of it goes like this. In ancient times the good emperor Yao gave the empire not to his own son but to Shun. One of Mencius’ students, Wan Chang, asks him about this. Mencius replies that only Heaven can give the empire to someone. So how does Heaven show it’s ‘will’ so to speak. Well, Yao presented Shun to the people and, Mencius says, ‘the people accepted him. I therefore say that Heaven did nor speak, but that it simply indicated its will by his character and his conduct of affairs.’ The people were aware of the type of person Shun was and it ‘was Heaven that gave the empire to him. It was the people that gave the empire to him. Therefore I said, “The emperor cannot give the empire to another person.”’ Now after the death of Yao, Shun withdrew from Yao’s son but the people went to him anyway. ‘The feudal lords of the empire, however, going to court, went not to the son of Yao but to Shun, litigants went not to the son of Yao but to Shun, and singers sang not to the son of Yao but to Shun. Therefore I said, “Heaven [gave the empire to him].”’”
 
“This is vox populi, vox dei. Mencius is saying that the will of Heaven is made known through the consciousness of the people, intimations of democracy, and that the person the people think most likely to champion their interests, peace, fair taxation, eliminating poverty, feeding the poor, preventing famines, etc., is the person they would support. This is a good Confucian notion--the ruler is last, the people first and the will of Heaven is just a symbolic way of saying the Dao of Government is the Dao of the interests of the masses of people."
 
“So you think, Karl, that ‘Heaven’ is just a metaphor for conditions and events that can be given more properly a naturalistic or ‘scientific’ explanation. Do you think that was all ‘Heaven’ meant to Mencius?”
 
“I think that was the track that he was on. The fully developed logical conclusion of his ideas would end up with what you just said. I’m not sure Mencius was fully conscious of this conclusion which first becomes explicit in the thought of Xunzi which we are yet to discuss.”
 
“Well, Chan gives a comment on all this as a part of 7A:1 when he discusses the different notions the Chinese had of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ or ming = ‘fate’. Here is what Chan says: ‘In ancient China there were five theories about destiny or the Mandate of Heaven. The first was fatalism: the Mandate was fixed and unchangeable. The second was moral determinism: Heaven always encourages virtue and punishes evil; therefore man can determine his reward and punishment through moral deeds. The third was anti-fatalism, advocated by the Moist school. The fourth was naturalistic fatalism which means that destiny is not controlled by Heaven in the sense of an anthropomorphic God but by Nature and works automatically. Lastly, there was the Confucian theory of “waiting for destiny.” According to this doctrine, man should exert his utmost in moral endeavor and leave whatever is beyond our control to fate. It frankly admits that there are things beyond our control but that is no reason why one should relax in his moral endeavor. The tendency was definitely one of moralism and humanism. The Confucian theory represents the conviction of enlightened Chinese in general.’”
 
“I would say about these, Fred, that the first theory is just classical determinism--no event could have happened otherwise. The second theory is like karma but is confusing because people argue about what ‘moral deeds’ are. It also opens up the option of an anthropomorphic God. The third one of Chan, Mo’s view, I hope we can discuss later if have a talk on his philosophy. I don’t get the fourth one--it just seems to be a rehash of the first in other words. This fifth one, the Confucian, does not seem very clear. What does it mean to leave what is beyond our control to ‘fate’. It can only mean that we live in a non-deterministic universe but one which has deterministic sequences in it. We should do our best to live according to morality but when we bump into one of the deterministic sequences we just go with the flow. That doesn’t sound right at all. And what does it mean to say ‘we leave whatever is beyond our control to fate.’ What is beyond our control is going to happen whether we ‘leave it’ or not. I don’t think Chan really clears up the notion of ‘fate’ very well.
 
“This next quote from Mencius (7A:2) is even more confusing. ‘Everything is destiny (ming). A man should accept obediently what is correct [in one’s destiny]. Therefore, he who knows destiny does not stand beneath a precipitous wall. Death sustained in the course of carrying out the Way to the limit is correct destiny. But death under handcuffs and fetters is not due to correct destiny.’”
 
“So ming isn’t really ‘fate’. There seems to be a configuration of factors making up the world at any given time and one of those factors is the individual and his or her mental make up and ability to make choices based on the educational level of the person, position in society, etc. Its like Sartre’s being thrown into the world then you have to make choices. You make the best choices you can given your circumstances but since you don’t have control over all the factors you can’t really control ming. Even looked at this way Mencius’ statement still has some problems. Suppose, in correctly following the Way, you end up in fetters? E.g., suppose you oppose some unjust action of the government. Was it not ‘correct destiny’ for Martin Luther King, Jr. to end up in the Birmingham jail?"
 
“Like most philosophers, from the Ancient Greeks to modern times, Mencius doesn’t think much of hoi polloi! Here is what he says in 7A:5-- ‘To act without understanding and to do so habitually without examination, following certain courses all their lives without knowing the principles behind them--this is the way of the multitude.’”
 
“Yes, Fred, this is the traditional view but it does not mean that the multitude should be abused or exploited by the rulers who must be guided by the Confucian principles of ren. And please note, that in the historical circumstances of the past this attitude is justified. Only now have we the ability to see to it that all humans can have the educational opportunities such that the ‘multitude’ will be able to approach the wisdom of the Sage. Remember 6A:7? In theory Mencius held that every person could be a sage [he may not have included women, so I am updating him] it was the material conditions of his time that held people back. In our time it is possible to achieve this goal or at least lay the foundations for it but for us it is the property relations not the material conditions [i.e, scarcity as a brute rather than social fact] that are holding us back. The institution of socialism would lead to the educational advance of the multitude and without a ruling class there would be no motivation to impart a false consciousness to the people.”
 
“Here is a good passage that really spells out Mencius’ view of ‘love’. Mencius says, in 7A:45, ‘In regard to [inferior] creatures, the superior man loves them but is not humane to them (that is, showing them the feelings due human beings). In regard to people generally, he is humane to them but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his parents and humane to all people. He is humane to all people and feels love for all creatures.’”
 
“Nicely put. If humanity could just get to this level, as opposed to the almost impossible level of ‘love’ that Mozi aspires to (equal love) it would be a great advance. This position is possible, I think, with proper education and the restructuring of society to human needs rather than the accumulation of money and wealth and profit. One thing should be noted. When Mencius says ‘love for all creatures’, I think that commits him to vegetarianism and an anti-hunting ethic, neither of which, as far as I know, the historical Mencius committed himself to.”
 
“OK, Karl, here is the last passage from Mencius. This is 7B:14, ‘Mencius said, “[In a state] the people are the most important; the spirits of the land and grain (guardians of territory) are the next; the ruler is of slight importance” Oops, and one more [7B:33] to just sum up--’The superior man practices principle (Natural Law) and waits for destiny (ming, Mandate of Heaven) to take its own course.’”
 
“So, Fred, this has been a long discussion, but I think we have a pretty good idea of Mencius’ philosophy and its relation to Confucius and how Marxists could deal with it in a positive way.”