The Experience of Nanjie Village and the Possibilities of Socialist Development in Contemporary China: Successes of the Collective Economy under Reform and Opening-Up By: Gabriel Gonçalves Martinez

With the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy, the People’s Republic of China entered a new historical period in its development. Starting in 1978, the country began to prioritize a development model with characteristics quite distinct from those prevailing during the previous period (1949–78). From then on, China began to emphasize the growth of the private economy and gradually dismantled the system of people’s communes, which had been established during the first thirty years of socialist construction (1949–76).

A new economic structure soon took shape, in which the state and public sector progressively lost their dominant position, especially in quantitative terms, while “multiple forms of ownership” were promoted and encouraged. This new political orientation led to the emergence of private capitalist property and the formation of a market economy under the control of the Communist Party of China (CPC), a situation that contributed to intensifying class contradictions, the loss of social status for workers, and a range of problems characteristic of capitalist societies. The Chinese then began to theorize about “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Even in this context, some local experiences of development and strengthening of public and collective economy survived—and many even prospered to the point of becoming genuine models that significantly influence the national debate on building new socialist rural areas. In an era where much is said about achieving “common prosperity,” it is of utmost importance to pay attention to these experiences. Among the collective villages still existing in China, the most emblematic and relevant example is that of Nanjie.

The Historical Context of the Economic Construction of Nanjie Village

Launched in 1978, the reform and opening-up policy had its initial landmark in rural areas. Officially, the CPC considers that these rural reforms began in Xiaogang village, located in Anhui province. At the time, a group of eighteen peasants signed a “secret agreement” in which they agreed to violate the existing laws, clandestinely implementing a model of production and distribution based on the division of land into family plots, which could be cultivated individually by peasant households. This model was later implemented elsewhere, becoming the basic model for rural reforms in the early phase of the new policy. This episode illustrates the difficulties and challenges in establishing socialist relations of production in the face of the spontaneous petty-bourgeois tendencies of peasants in a large rural country like China.

Nanjie is a village located in Luohe City, Henan Province. It houses about 3,000 permanent residents, with a total population of around 13,000 (including migrant workers and employees of local enterprises). It is one of the rare cases of rural development that followed a path diametrically opposed to Xiaogang. Nanjie’s experience is often portrayed by the bourgeois press as the “last Maoist village in China.” This is due to the fact that Nanjie preserved and promoted rural collective ownership and centered its development on the defense and advancement of public ownership.

It is a fact that in present-day China, as the private economy gains ever more strength and influence, examples like Nanjie represent exceptions to the rule, although it is not the only village that still adopts a model based on collective economy.

At the beginning of the reform period, Nanjie also sought to adopt the household responsibility system, following the example then being implemented throughout China. Especially after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Nanjie also began to encourage the growth of individual and private property.[1] However, such incentives and measures soon showed concerning results: a drop in production indices, deterioration of living conditions, and the emergence of social polarization.

Living in a village located near the city, Nanjie’s peasants had historically developed a certain commercial tradition. With the dismantling of the old collective system of people’s communes, the peasants quickly abandoned their rural activities to engage in various commercial activities. At that time, after these changes began, street vendors, food and cigarette merchants, migrant workers, and individuals eager to open private factories reemerged. Many peasants also began leasing land to relatives and friends; in some cases, they even completely abandoned their land. According to data provided by the Party committee in Nanjie, in 1985, annual grain production dropped to just over 3.75 tons per hectare, with agriculture “entering a general decline.”[2]

In response to these problems, the village and the people of Nanjie reacted quite differently from what common sense might suggest. Rather than deepening reforms in favor of private property, the local Party committee chose to resume collectivization. In 1986, the Communist Party committee in Nanjie published a document addressed to the population that expressed the following:

1. Those capable of farming their land must, above all, take good care of their fields. Only then may they engage in trade or outside work. Otherwise, the village would have the right to intervene. It was forbidden to lease contracted land to outsiders or abandon it.

2. Those who, for special reasons, could no longer take care of their land could submit a formal request to the village committee. Upon evaluation and approval, their land would be returned to the collective, and the village mill would ensure the supply of flour for these families.[3]

After publishing the notice, three hundred residents requested the return of their land, which once again came under the collective administration of Nanjie village.

During the brief period when Nanjie experimented with the “Xiaogang path,” in addition to decollectivization, the village also handed over its two small factories (brick and flour) to private management, which resulted in intensified class contradictions and the deterioration of the Party’s leadership position. As revealed in the book The Light of the Ideal, prepared under the supervision of the CPC committee in Nanjie:

The result of the experience was the opposite of what residents had expected: instead of benefits, what came was a hard lesson. Workers were deceived. Besides not receiving regular wages, many went the entire year without any payment, working in vain. Meanwhile, individual contractors visibly enriched themselves, with food, clothing, housing, and possessions far superior to those of ordinary residents. The Party’s authority in the village plummeted; complaints spread. Letters of denunciation reached the Provincial Party Committee and the municipal government, protest posters were placed from the county office to the door of Secretary Wang Hongbin. Leaders at all levels also expressed dissatisfaction with the village’s cadres.[4]

The eventual positive results that reforms brought to Xiaogang and other rural areas did not occur in Nanjie. This shows in practice that, for a reform to succeed, it must consider not only top-down orders or successful experiences from other places, but above all the concrete conditions of each region.

Collectivization as a Prerequisite for the Development of the Productive Forces

The peasants of Nanjie felt firsthand the negative effects of returning to individual production. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, they gradually found a new path to development. Wang Hongbin, secretary of the Communist Party in Nanjie, played a central role in this new endeavor in the small village in Henan. Elected secretary of the Communist Party committee in 1977, Wang Hongbin began to stand out in village politics during the final years of the Mao Zedong era. At the time, he received honorary titles such as “promoter of the limitation of bourgeois right” and “promoter of the reduction of the three great inequalities.”[5] According to his own reflections, the main reason for the political and economic deterioration in Nanjie was that the Party, instead of properly using its leading role to mobilize the masses in their struggle to overcome poverty, had adopted the path of private individual economy, which ended up “hurting the residents’ feelings and tarnishing the reputation of Party organizations.”[6]

With Wang Hongbin at the helm, the Communist Party committee in Nanjie mobilized to find an answer to the village’s new problems. By holding mass meetings with the residents of Nanjie, the decision was made to resume the collective economy, undertaking economic and ideological construction simultaneously, putting “politics in command.” Successfully carrying out both economic and ideological work was what the Communist Party of China historically called “acting with both hands and with equal strength.”[7]

After resuming the path of collectivization, Nanjie once again recorded high levels of economic growth. From 1984,the year it returned to the collective economy—until 1998, the village’s collective enterprises grew from two to twenty-six, including four joint ventures. Fixed assets increased from just over 500,000 yuan to 460 million yuan. The total output value of the village’s collective enterprises jumped from 700,000 to 802 million yuan, and taxes paid gradually rose to over 17 million yuan.[8] These are figures that completely refute the entrenched view that equates collective economy with backwardness and stagnation.

The Communist Party established a method of ideological education based on “red culture” and Mao Zedong Thought. Contrary to what happened in the rest of China after the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy—where Mao Zedong Thought was often declared “outdated”—in Nanjie, the Communist Party committee placed the ideological formation of Party cadres and members, as well as villagers, at the center of its agenda, based on the principles of communist ideology. The classical works of Marxism-Leninism and the writings of Mao Zedong were widely printed and made available to villagers. In terms of Party propaganda, references to China’s revolutionary history, Marxism-Leninism, political speeches, orientations, and revolutionary songs became part of daily life in Nanjie.

Higher Forms of Cadre-Mass Relations: The ‘Spirit of 250’

Once the collectivization of the village’s basic means of production was consolidated, the Communist Party in Nanjie began developing new forms of relations between cadres and the masses. One of the major problems and challenges brought about by the reform and opening-up policy was the loss of prestige of Party organizations. With the reintroduction of the market economy at the national level, the idea that the Communist Party could serve as a springboard for social ascent became widespread. As a result, bureaucratism across China became an extremely serious issue, contributing to the growing public discontent that would culminate in the protests of the 1980s. This had negative consequences for the cause of socialism and communism in China. Nanjie was not immune to this phenomenon.

In the early period of the reforms, when Nanjie also decided to follow the “Xiaogang path,” relations between cadres and the masses quickly deteriorated. According to Marxism-Leninism, cadres play a decisive role in the construction of socialism. The way they perform their duties and relate to the people is a factor that can determine the success or failure of a given endeavor. If cadres engage in economic activities for personal profit and gain, the masses will inevitably begin to view the Party and its representatives with distrust. If such behavior is allowed to flourish, the character of the Party is diluted, and it runs the risk of degenerating into something hostile to the people. Considering these issues, Wang Hongbin correctly observed that the policy initiated by the CPC Central Committee—encouraging people to become rich (remember the slogan “to get rich is glorious”)—should not mean that “Party members should be the first to get rich.” The Party in Nanjie gradually established a cadre management system that took the principle of “serving the people” seriously, implementing the mass line in practice and promoting the so-called “250 spirit” (èr bǎi wǔ, 二百五).

Wang Hongbin, secretary of the Communist Party committee in Nanjie, was the main advocate of adopting the so-called “250 spirit.” In Chinese, the term “250” carries a derogatory connotation, often used to describe someone as a “fool,” “idiot,” or “naive.” However, in Nanjie, this expression took on a completely different meaning, representing “courage,” “boldness,” and a spirit of dedication to the collective. The initiative to use the term “250” as a political and ideological slogan came from Wang Hongbin himself, based on his personal experiences. In the late 1970s, before being elected Party secretary in Nanjie, Wang was offered a transfer to work in a city factory, where he would serve in the warehouse department. Given China’s conditions at the time, working in the city was seen as a real opportunity for social advancement for a peasant. However, Wang Hongbin did not adapt to the new position, feeling that the work he was doing lacked meaning. For him, life alongside his comrades in the countryside was far more valuable—that was where he wanted to be, contributing to the collective construction of socialism.

Upon returning to Nanjie, he was criticized by relatives and ridiculed by friends. Many called him a “250,” that is, a fool. But to Wang, it was precisely this kind of spirit that communists should cultivate and promote. After all, in class societies—and under socialism there are still classes and class struggle—aren’t those who devote themselves to a common cause often labeled as “naïve”? By giving new meaning to the term “250,” the Party began promoting the “250 spirit,” encouraging and fostering the spirit of sacrifice and dedication to the collective cause. Doing “foolish” things became a requirement and a model for Party members.[9]

Among the “foolish” things done by the Party leadership in Nanjie was the establishment of a salary regime for local Party officials that did not exceed 250 yuan per month—a rule that also applied to Wang Hongbin. The justification for such a measure lies not only in the Party’s own experience in Nanjie but also in the historical experience of the workers’ movement and socialist construction on an international scale. Some Chinese commentators and scholars even compare this measure with the example of the Paris Commune. As we know, during the short-lived Paris Commune in 1871, one of the adopted measures was to equalize the salaries of Commune officials with those of workers. As Marx pointed out: “First, it [the Commune] filled all positions—administrative, judicial, and educational—by election, with the right of recall at any time by the voters. Second, it paid all functionaries, high or low, only the wages of other workers. The highest salary was 6,000 francs.”[10]

The comparison between this measure applied in Nanjiecun and the example of the Paris Commune is quite valid—with the difference that in Nanjiecun’s case, the Communist Party leadership receives not the same salary as workers, but a lower one.[11] Evidently, this measure is frequently ridiculed and discredited by many analysts, both inside and outside China, but it helps explain, to some extent, the high degree of influence, prestige, and trust the Party leadership enjoys among Nanjiecun residents. It is one of the ways the Communist Party found to keep its top cadres “grounded” and strengthen their integration with the masses.

Strengthening the Collective Economy and the Socialist Distribution Model at the Village Level

In 1986, Nanjie established a new type of distribution system based on the collective provision of basic benefits to the population. Even with a weak economic base at the time, the village began to guarantee a wide range of social services to its residents: “From 1986 to 1994, the welfare items expanded from the free provision of water and electricity to 14 items, including gas, cooking oil, flour, special holiday foods, free education through university, collectively funded cultural activities, personal insurance, vaccinations, medical expenses, family planning, agricultural taxes, etc.”[12]

These measures were also very important in consolidating the prestige of the Party leadership in Nanjie among the local population. They represented enormous progress compared to what was happening in other regions of China, where the implementation of reforms was often accompanied by cuts or reductions in benefits previously provided by the State and work units. The Party leadership in Nanjie viewed the distribution system based on collective provision as an effective measure to combat inequality and poverty, as well as a means of alleviating social tensions and conflicts. As the village developed its productive forces, the Party sought to strengthen the supply-based distribution mechanism, expanding its scope of action. From 1993 onward, Nanjie began to build modern residential buildings, with apartments and houses of up to 92 square meters, fully furnished (sofa, bed, wardrobe, air conditioner, television, etc.), distributed free of charge to the local population. In the area of food, the village also began to provide it for free through its collective restaurants, where village residents can take their daily meals, although use of these facilities is not mandatory.[13]

This distribution model applied in Nanjie has only grown stronger over the years. Today, in addition to all the benefits listed above, the village also provides free healthcare and education. The hospital and local health clinics provide basic health services to the population; when specialized treatment is required in more advanced facilities—regardless of which city in China—the expenses are fully covered by Nanjiecun, even for surgeries or expensive procedures. In education, residents who are accepted into Chinese universities can study with all expenses paid by the village, along with a monthly subsidy. The same applies if they need to study abroad.

It is important to note that the current distribution system in the village does not reject the wage system. The Party leadership in Nanjie understands that, because the village’s productive forces are not yet highly developed, it is still necessary to maintain wages, applying the distribution method based on the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.” In this regard, the village established a system that combines wage payments with the collective provision of services and social benefits by the State, placing greater emphasis on the latter, in a 30 percent to 70 percent ratio.[14]

According to Secretary Wang Hongbin, the adoption of the “wage + collective provision” system stems from two main factors:

1. Because China is in the socialist stage, residents’ ideological awareness still has many limitations. Therefore, it is important to establish a social environment that rewards those who contribute more to the collective through the principle of “those who work more, earn more,” while also exerting pressure on ideologically backward elements;

2. Through collective provision, people have the opportunity to experience concretely what the communist mode of distribution would look like (even if only in embryonic form), which has an important ideological impact and encourages workers to dedicate themselves more actively to the collective cause, reducing the influence of selfish ideas. This greatly aids the work of building the “socialist spiritual civilization.”

In this sense, the existence of wages corresponds to the fact that Chinese society—including Nanjiecun itself—is still in the primary stage of socialism; the collective provision system, then, aligns with the communist character of society, pointing to the direction in which economic and social development should move. The success of the distribution model based on “wage + collective provision” is one of the distinctive features of Nanjiecun. Its success, even in a small village, demonstrates to all of China the feasibility and superiority of a distribution model based on public ownership of the means of production, as well as presenting a creative way of applying the principle of “limiting bourgeois right” in the new era. It can serve as an important reference for achieving common prosperity.

Nanjie and the Reform and Opening-Up Policy: Building a ‘Communist Community’ in the New Era

It is quite evident that the path taken by Nanjie in its economic development process has characteristics that are very distinct from those applied in the rest of China since 1978. While in other areas the trend of decollectivization prevailed, Nanjie opted to promote its development through the strengthening of the collective economy and, consequently, the public sector. The Party committee in Nanjie set out on a mission to build what they call a “communist community”: a small rural community that lays the foundations of socialism and communism at the local level.

In the early 1990s, China’s political and economic debate was in full swing. The international context was marked by the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries; in China, following the protests of the late 1980s, the debate over which path the reforms should take deepened, while neoliberal ideology gained increasing influence within society. In 1992, with Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, the political conditions were created for a new wave of reforms, which led to the interruption of the debate about the “nature of the reforms”—whether they were capitalist or socialist—a debate that had been largely promoted by what many considered the “left” within the Communist Party of China at the time.[15] Nationally, the Communist Party of China set as its main goal the creation of a “socialist market economy” and allowed the private sector to expand more rapidly.

In the opposite direction, the Communist Party committee in Nanjie—without denying the reality of the market economy—openly defends the need to build a village with an economic base rooted in public ownership of the means of production.

As Wang Hongbin stated:

Especially today, upholding and defending the line of public ownership has become a central point and focus of attention for all of society. Public ownership is the core of socialism, the direction and lifeline of socialist society’s development. It expresses the essence of the socialist system and is the principal economic form in the victorious march of socialist society. If we do not understand the superiority of public ownership, if we do not understand its origin and development, nor its distinction from private ownership, we will not be able to recognize the correctness and value of the path followed by Nanjie.[16]

In September 1997, the Communist Party in Nanjie launched the “great debate on public ownership,” a major political mobilization process that involved not only Party cadres but also workers and village residents. In August of that same year, during a leadership meeting in Nanjie, Wang Hongbin read a letter written by a young researcher from Beijing who had visited the village to conduct fieldwork. In the letter, the young researcher stated that the principal contradiction in Nanjie was the struggle between capitalism and socialism; between collectivist and selfish worldviews; between the idea of serving the people and the pursuit of wealth, pleasure, and fame. The letter also pointed out some political and social problems emerging in the village as it overcame its condition of poverty.

​Among them: bureaucratism; resistance among youth to revolutionary ideological education; criticisms of the existing distribution system in the village; individualism, etc. All these manifestations demanded that the village better systematize a correct ideological line, which would help solidify among Party cadres a clear understanding of the superiority of public ownership. It also concretely showed that building a “communist village” must not rely solely on economic development.

The defense of public ownership of the means of production is considered a basic premise for the ideological construction of Nanjie. The Communist Party committee in Nanjie actively promotes the study of the works of Mao Zedong, texts by Deng Xiaoping, and Party documents in which the defense of public ownership is explicitly mentioned. Deng Xiaoping, on several occasions, also pointed out that the socialist system is based on public ownership of the means of production, meaning that Nanjie never needed to “deviate” from the Party’s official line to defend its project of building a “communist village.” Even so, the Communist Party in Nanjie openly criticizes the pro-privatization tendencies seen in other regions, as well as the cadres and intellectuals who promote the demonization of public ownership.

According to Wang Hongbin:

Currently, there are people in our village who still have a vague understanding of public ownership, showing mistaken attitudes. They do not perceive its superiority nor understand the dangers of private property. We said years ago that ‘privatization’ is the source of all evils. When selfish desires grow and individualism acts, phenomena such as ‘eating, drinking, prostitution, gambling, smoking, extortion, deceit, kidnapping, fraud, and theft’ emerge—and such situations in society are alarming. Those who do not understand the superiority of public ownership end up losing faith in it.[17]

Nanjie began promoting ideological campaigns aimed at clarifying the superiority of the public and collective economy, exposing the evils produced by private ownership. In the context of the “great debate” taking place in the village, Professor Xing Guosen, a veteran cadre and member of the Party committee in the village, gave a public lecture in which he explained to residents the essence of private property:

In all societies based on exploitation—whether in slavery, feudalism, or capitalism—the majority of wealth belongs to individuals who hold economic power. In slave society, even the life and death of slaves were completely controlled by the masters. During feudalism, the State itself was considered the property of a dynasty, concentrating power and resources in the hands of a hereditary aristocracy. In capitalism, the political system is manipulated by the bourgeoisie, which defends private ownership, while most social wealth remains concentrated in the hands of capitalists. Workers’ wages barely guarantee the minimum for survival—and sometimes not even that. The relationship between capitalists and workers remains one of exploitation. To transform this reality and achieve the true liberation of the working masses, private property must be eliminated.[18]

In terms of property relations, with the re-collectivization and the development of local enterprises controlled by the Party committee, the individual economy gradually lost its economic influence, so that the ownership of the means of production and commerce quickly returned to State control. The issue of eliminating private property was placed by the village committee as a present task, not something for a distant, unreachable future. In this way, socialist relations of production were preserved and consolidated, which brought enormous benefits to the village.

Nanjie’s leaders are aware that they cannot deny the reality that today the village is a “small island” of public economy surrounded by a vast sea of market economy. Therefore, Nanjie was forced to develop a commercial and entrepreneurial vision as a means of advancing its local enterprises, adopting a policy known as “externally flexible, internally strict.” This policy aligns with the measures of reform and opening-up, but introduces them in a highly original way.

On the “external” level, Nanjie’s economy needs to operate in accordance with the practice of the “socialist market economy,” following market competition laws and the national and international standards established therein. For instance, regarding foreign investment and partnerships with foreign enterprises, Nanjie established a few companies with foreign capital participation, which helped modernize local production.[19]

On the “internal” level, however, Nanjie’s policies must align with the socialist and communist character of the village, ensuring that business management obeys socialist principles and remains under the firm control of the Party committee. Even in joint ventures, this guarantees that the negative aspects of dealing with capitalist firms and actors do not contaminate or negatively influence the village’s internal development. Nanjie is not immune to the “entry of mosquitoes”—hence the Party committee’s constant emphasis on “placing politics in command” and persisting in the construction of “socialist spiritual civilization.” All profits generated by the village’s enterprises are funneled into a collective social fund, which is later reinvested in infrastructure projects and expansion of social benefits. The path taken by Nanjie allowed the village, already in the 1990s, to become a “billionaire village.” According to available data, between 1984 and 1997, the village’s economy grew more than 2,200 times, with output value rising from 700,000 to 1.6 billion yuan.[20]

Conclusion

The existence of Nanjie is not without controversy. In China, openly right-wing intellectuals view the village’s successful experience with suspicion and proclaim that sooner or later the path it has chosen will fail. Among the Chinese left, opinions are also divided. Some enthusiastically support the village’s experience, arguing that it can serve as a viable model for rural revitalization and the resumption of socialist construction in the country. There are also those who argue that what exists in Nanjie is a kind of “collective capitalism,” making comparisons with the socialist period of Mao Zedong’s era impossible. The fact that the village still accepts foreign capital participation for financing, and that it employs peasant labor from other regions (in which case the workers do not enjoy all the benefits granted to original villagers—although it must be acknowledged that even in these cases, working and living conditions are generally much better than those of most Chinese peasants and migrant workers), seems to support this argument.

However, while it is correct to take into account all the concrete limitations imposed on Nanjie’s development and its project of building a “communist village,” it is equally mistaken to underestimate its existence or to fail to recognize the highly positive value this experience holds in demonstrating the feasibility and superiority of development centered on public ownership of the means of production—even while acknowledging the inherent contradictions of having to adapt and integrate into the broader context of the market economy. The existence of a village with Nanjie’s characteristics demonstrates in practice that the collective economy can play a positive role in China’s overall economic development, and that its strengthening is a necessary condition for achieving “common prosperity” and expanding socialist relations of production on a national level.

From the perspective of Party “governance” within the village, the “Nanjie model” can also serve as a reference for more concretely visualizing the Communist Party of China’s role as an active force in socialist construction at its best. In Nanjie, the Party’s role as educator and organizer of the masses is evident—but it is more than that. The Party acts in a manner consistent with its proletarian character, placing Marxism-Leninism at the forefront and seeking to educate and mobilize the masses in the spirit of that ideology.

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Originally published on MROnline.

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Author

Gabriel Gonçalves Martinez holds a master’s degree in Marxist Philosophy from Beijing Normal University.

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Notes

[1] The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held from December 18 to 22, 1978. It was at this session that the CPC officially announced the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy, focusing on the promotion of “socialist modernization.”
[2] Nanjiecun Bianxiezu 南街村编写组, 理想之光 (The Light of the Ideal), vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 1998), 3.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., 4.
[5] In Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx presented the idea that in the lower phase of communism (socialism), the principle of distribution based on the amount of labor contributed prevails. However, Marx noted that this labor-based distribution was still a form of “bourgeois right,” as it presupposes real differences between individuals. In China, Mao Zedong warned that under socialism, bourgeois right still exists and is a major source of revisionism and capitalist restoration. Therefore, its influence must be restricted by proletarian power, through mass mobilization and popular political measures. See Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme. The information that Wang Hongbin was named a model promoter of “limiting bourgeois right” can be found in: 王宏斌. 南街村党委书记王宏斌汇报材料 (Report by the Secretary of the Communist Party of China in Nanjiecun), 2004. Video available at: https://www.szhgh.com/Article/red-china/redman/513.html
[6] Nanjiecun, 理想之光 (The Light of the Ideal), vol. 1, p. 4.
[7] The term “act with both hands and with equal strength” (两手抓，两手都要硬) was coined by 邓小平 (Deng Xiaoping) and refers to the idea that in order to successfully modernize socialism, it is necessary to simultaneously promote the development of material civilization (productive forces) and spiritual civilization.
[8] Nanjiecun, 理想之光 (The Light of the Ideal), vol. 1, 2.
[9] 陈先义 (Chen Xianyi), “南街村的党员干部为什么都甘愿做“二百五”？” [“Why Are All the Party Cadres in Nanjiecun Willing to Be ‘250’?”], 红色文化网 (Red Culture Net), June 11, 2024. https://www.hswh.org.cn/wzzx/sdjl/nm/2024-06-11/88465.html
[10] Karl Marx, The Civil War in France.
[11] In Nanjiecun, the salaries of Party cadres and leaders do not exceed 250 yuan—a symbolic reference to the “250 spirit” (二百五精神). Nanjiecun, 理想之光 (The Light of the Ideal), vol. 1, p. 35.
[12] Ibid., 12.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “南街村体质” [The Nanjiecun System], 南街村村委办公室 (Nanjiecun Village Committee Office). Accessed at: http://www.nanjiecun.cn/about.asp?id=5
[15] In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a significant faction within the Communist Party of China promoted a discussion about the nature of the reforms. Without denying the need for changes to the economic system, the debate aimed to systematize the problems arising in the early phase of reform, emphasizing that reform and opening-up should be understood as a way to “self-perfect” socialism’s political and economic system. During his “Southern Tour” (南巡讲话), 邓小平 (Deng Xiaoping) criticized the debate on the nature of reforms, saying it was useless to discuss whether something was “socialist” or “capitalist.” He also stated that the CPC should primarily guard against “leftist deviations,” which he considered more dangerous than rightist ones. See Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpts From Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994), 37–387.
[16] Nanjiecun Bianxiezu (南街村编写组), 理想之光 (The Light of the Ideal), vol. 3 (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 1998), 1.
[17] Ibid., 3.
[18] Ibid., 26–27.
[19] With the development and modernization of the village, Nanjie established a corporate group named “河南南街村集团有限公司” (Henan Nanjiecun Group Co., LTD). This is a large collective conglomerate that currently includes twenty-eight subsidiary companies. Of these, eight are joint ventures—five with foreign capital and three through domestic cooperation. All companies are managed by the Party committee, and all profits go into the village’s collective social fund, which finances the continuous development and expanded reproduction of the collective economy.
[20] Ibid., summarized.