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How to Abandon Hegel Sebastian Gardner, one of the UK’s most interesting German Idealist-phenomenological-psychoanalytic philosophers (as well as my old PhD supervisor), once suggested to me that Hegel’s most radical insights had already been more effectively achieved by Schelling. This type of de-radicalising of Hegel - a dismissal of his fundamental relevance - is a recurring theme in strictly Schellingian circles. The best of Hegel, it seems, is in fact not truly Hegelian: whereas Hegel’s Vernunft (Reason) collapses under the supposedly teleological loop of a self-positing totality, Schelling remained faithful to the intraverisble openness and disjunction - the non-totalisable moment of any totality - inherent to the Naturphilosophie. Whether or not this is a justified dismissal of Hegel’s importance, the more perplexing fact is that the other way of rejecting Hegel ironically uses the complete opposite reasoning. This rationale is most effectively concentrated in Deleuze’s famous statement: to philosophise means pretending that Hegel had never existed. Unlike the academic Schellingian dismissal, which diminishes Hegel’s basic contribution, the Deleuzean insistence is that Hegel did too much. Hegel is the behemoth of philosophical discourse - not just as the overpowered mythical creature from the Book of Job, but also in the strictly Neumannesque sense of behemoth: an erratically deployed and often self-contradictory system of power. Philosophy should, in this sense, be post-Hegelian and thereby abandon the opportunistic categories of negation, dialectic or even the ontological identification of logically incompatible terms (such as being and nothing, or even nothing and itself). A popular reaction to either of these position, however, is that there cannot be any post-Hegelianism. Instead, the only option is to re-read and repeat him. Only in such a repetition of Hegel - by dialectically Hegelianising the ghost of Hegel’s own system - that we can possibly do philosophy. Any outright dismissal of Hegel would too easily be integrated into the naive iterations of classical Hegelianism (“to negate is to affirm”) much like the early sceptics of psychoanalysis were themselves absurdly psychoanalytically de-fanged (“they only deny psychoanalysis because of their own Oedipal neuroses…”). The task therefore became re-working the basic coordinates of Hegelian thought, including whether he was a teleological philosopher, whether dialectical contradiction is ever reconciled, and how to negotiate the tension between absolute knowledge and the end of history. For the Ljubljana Lacanian-Hegelians, the task was (to paraphrase Mladen Dolar in an interview for Everyday Analysis) finding not only a new Hegel, but a new version of Lacan’s Hegel: Hegel was already crucial to Lacan, but this was unfortunately based on Kojève’s misreading of Hegel). We see the same Hegelianised repetition compulsion in Fredric Jameson’s The Hegel Variations. The period of French structuralism and post-structuralism (ultimately the same thing, given that even structuralism fixated on the exception to the structure, the irreducible element which frames the structure as such) and its obsession with language could not avoid a Hegelian overtone. As Jameson argues, language was already the driving framework for much of Hegel’s Phenomenology. The progressive reversal of Spirit’s alienation from the world into the religious-artistic separation of Spirit from itself is carried by the linguistic relations by which Spirit philosophically mediates itself in its own external manifestations. In other words, without language philosophy is not possible, and it is philosophy which necessarily mediates the rational structure of apparently irrational religious or artistic movements. It is with this linguistic framing of Spirit that we can understand the deadlock of poetics that Hegel identifies at the end of his Aesthetics. Where Spirit initially recognises itself in the physical, non-linguistic arts of sculpture or painting - and can therefore “complete” the work of art by its philosophical interpretation - poetry forcefully separates language from its philosophical intention. It aestheticises the very language which philosophy deploys to understand aesthetics and in this way seems to render philosophical reflection ineffective. For this reason, poetry ‘corrupts’ (in a proto-Platonic way) even those formations which exist outside of poetry or art, including the idea of nature. The poetic representation of nature, Hegel argues, is inherently contradictory and impossible, since it is always-already Spirit’s depiction of its own outside, an intimate depiction by poetic language of what poetic language is divorced from. This inability to neutrally speak of nature renders nature itself a type of disturbing ideological formation. A fundamental Hegelian claim regarding our current ecological disaster is that the ‘nature’ that apparently threatens our civilisational systems is always a misrecognised, culturally-mediated avatar of nature. The first step towards a serious ecological strategy would be to recognise that we cannot consistently negotiate the opposition between culture and nature - and more radically to furnish (as Timothy Morton put it) an ‘ecology without nature’. It seems, then, that our confusion about the relevance of Hegel also reflects the multiple conceptual positions occupied by Hegel today: philosophy must in one and the same movement diminish the relevance of Hegel, act as if he had never existed, and repeat Hegel to see the Hegelian colour even of everyday existence. This is ultimately a hopeless exercise, leaving Hegel in an impossible hermeneutic position where it seems that nothing can be authentically done with him. Instead, a crucial point to remember is the immanence of everyday reality to Hegel’s project: the ontological is not separate from material-political relations, but immanent to them. Knowing whether we still need Hegel therefore implies not that we negotiate the multiple possibilities of his ontology, but look at his relevance to politics as it exists today. Post-Hegelian Politics: the Paris Riots For the task of politicising Hegel - or rather to discern whether there is still a political relevance to Hegel - what better example is there than the most recent one: the violent outbreak of popular unrest and riots in France? At the very beginning of these riots, the cliché liberal-reactionary condemnation of popular violence was repeated: political commentators understand that people are unhappy with their living conditions, but must they really destroy public property and burn down non-political establishments? The focal point of this condemnation - not of violence, but of an excessive violence (is there really anything we can honestly call modest or appropriate violence?) - was the burning of Limoges city hall. A historic administrative building to which we attach various cultural and architectural sentimentalities apparently had nothing to do with French school conditions or the cost of living crisis. It is these crises which the riots specifically responded to, and the random destruction of non-political spaces would (according to the liberal condemnation) only counteract these goals. And yet it is on this very point that a Hegelian reading is necessary, to show that political violence is always and by necessity excessive. It cannot be separated from a superfluous entropy and indifferent deployment of this very violence. The burning of neutral cultural products is a necessary gesture in critiquing the very notion of ‘neutrality’ in late capitalism. A ghost of volume 3 of Marx’s Capital lingers in this apparent excessiveness to revolutionary violence: capital is itself already excessive, since it is not simply another mode of economic production - it ‘leaks’ into the non-economic sphere, it reorganises the basic coordinates of the social and renders supposedly neutral spaces upholders of the capitalist mode of reproduction. The excesses of political violence are, in other words, an inevitable re-framing of the impossibility of non-hegemonic culture in our current political economy. The Paris riots can therefore be read as the latest iteration of a crucial Hegelian enigma: the most direct violence is always in excess of its own declarative intentions. We cannot just react to the cause of our troubles if this very cause (capitalist globalisation) is disseminated into the fabric of social reality. Any violent reaction will appear to operate beyond the confines of its own intention: the micro-problem is indeed schooling, and yet this is simply a moment in the macro-problem of the political power of privatised industry and the diminishing of public rights. In a more general Hegelian logic, the political constitution of our State requires a supplementary moment of self-redoubling, of appearing as more than it is. Not only does the contradictory structure of the legislative body (where the law can be opposed to itself) require a judicial suspension of this law (a judge is required to overrule the short-circuits in legislative debates), but the very constitution of the State will require a gestural doubling of this same State. More simply, the State exists, but is not constituted, until it appears as a subjective embodiment of itself in the figure of the monarch. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic presents this excess-violence constitutive of any violence in clearer terms. In the slave’s alienated confrontation with the master’s alterity, no possible resolution can be reached by some easily negotiated agreement, by a pleasant discussion between master and slave. In order for the slave to recognise himself by the mediated cruelty of the master, life itself must be put on the line. It is only at the extreme end of death that that the slave’s superiority is asserted, that his violent confrontation with the master becomes possible. If the terms of the dialectic were not the absolute catastrophe of death itself (if more “modest” terms were settled for), the slave would never recognise itself in the exteriority of its products. In other words, it is through the extreme of death that life and right (Recht) become possible. The ‘proper’ violence of the slave is always a totalising hyperviolence, a political act beyond the confines of its own intentions. The liberal naïveté (political opposition without the additionally indeterminate violence) is therefore impossible in a Hegelian perspective: violence and excess-violence are identical. In the case of riots, there is a structural necessity to this apparently contradictory excess of targeting ‘non-political’ objects, since the very hegemony of elite ideology being confronted does not permit non-political positions. But can we really end on this Hegelianised image of modern political opposition? It seems that for every Hegelian rendition of politics, a certain post-Hegelian dimension to modernity emerges. Something about the global system of authoritarian techno-capitalism, it can always be argued, remains perpetually irreducible to the repetitive terms of Hegelian discourse. In our post-Hegelian politics, violence no longer has a real constitutive function, but rather occurs in a type of virtual, de-signified space, permitted and almost encouraged by the dominant system as a pseudo-opposition. More concretely, we are caught between two incompatible moments of violence. On the one hand, there are the familiar iterations of almost entirely ineffective popular uprisings - protests and riots that are instantly rectified by temporary State affordances (such as keeping the retirement age down for a few more years) or by an affirmation of capitalism’s flexible adaptation to its own opposition (such as the Occupy movement or BLM) where anti-capitalist intensities either become moments within capitalism or are abstracted from any real consequence or goal. On the other hand, we have the senseless and incalculable neo-imperialist violence such as that of Trump, which I’ve written about before for ZMagazine and expanded on here. Unlike the violence that ‘moves the wheels of history’, this variation continues whatever opposition we might have to it, it continues without any geopolitical strategy and inevitably implements a new ethics of foreign policy which cannot be retroactively reduced to the necessary logics of State violence. In neither of these (post-)postmodern forms of de-signified, performative violence can we conveniently recognise a Hegelian movement. Hegel no longer automatically accounts for world history or the political ontology of particular events like he once did in the era of 19th century nation politics. So do we still need Hegel? No, we do not. Nothing about the apocalyptic, self-destructive enthusiasm of our current political impasse calls for a Hegelian interpretation. The task of any Hegelian philosopher is not, therefore, to bring Hegel to light in the current age, but the more difficult task of explaining why we need Hegel in a non-Hegelian time. A brief comparison to Catherine Keller’s Political Theology of the Earth is worthwhile here. The question of whether we still need Hegel can be transposed onto the question of whether we still need God. Do we still need an impersonal, divine explanatory agency that accounts for everything? As she insists, God has not only failed us, but we have failed God - not only by becoming secular, but rather in our imperfect fidelity to God. We have failed God theologically by assuming that he can perfectly account for the world. Keller insists on the metaphysical position of God not as the universal, but as the exception, as that which is never identical to His own creation. To defend God is therefore to defend his absence, to return to the negative theology that refuses to make descriptive statements about God, or to see God immediately reflected in reality. God’s existence can ultimately only be affirmed because of his irreducibility to what exists. The Hegelian philosopher’s task is similarly difficult: to realise that Hegel’s thought is not immediately reflected in modernity, but rather that Hegel’s relevance might be found in what he cannot account for. As Quentin Meillassoux once put it, the greatness of the Hegelian Begriff (concept) is that it is active even in its own alterity. Hegel is one of the few philosophers whose potency emerges only when his thought appears utterly irrelevant. We do not need Hegel anymore, and this is perhaps why we should not be done talking about Hegel. Originally published on Rafael Holmberg's substack Author Rafael Holmberg Political writer & philosopher. German-French philosophy, political theory, psychoanalysis, culture, literature, neuroscience, and anything related. Author of After the End: Fragments of the Apocalypse Industry. PhD in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis.
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